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ABSTRACT 
 This dissertation examines the relationship between diagnostic communication 
practices and deliberative rhetoric through the lens of Actor-Network theory and feminist 
theory. Specifically, I argue that Bruno Latour’s Actor-Network Theory (ANT) provides a 
generative framework for tracing diagnostic networks as it accounts for uncertainty, dispersed 
agency, community stakeholders, and nonhumans. The chapters explore how a networked 
approach to diagnosis opens up opportunities to reform doctor-patient relationships, 
expands our conceptions of diagnostic actants, suggests ways to respond to patients living at 
risk for disease, and broadens our understanding of ethos in healthcare contexts. 
Furthermore, I also consider how a networked framework can help us comprehend how 
public misdiagnoses happen so we can prevent them in the future. I conclude by advocating 
for healthcare providers to reform diagnostic communication practices to account for the 
agency and expertise of non-specialist stakeholders, particularly patients. I also explore 
methods for intervening within global health networks and addressing the intersectional 
problems they collaboratively solve.  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CHAPTER 1: 
DIAGNOSING DIAGNOSIS: A RHETORICAL APPROACH TO NETWORKED 
PRACTICE 
This clash of contexts pits the doctor's impulse to reduce against the patient's impulse to multiply. 
Medicine's reductionism narrows its gaze, eliminating that which proliferates around the 
biological phenomena of sickness in a patient's always generative and teeming life. – Rita Charon  
 Popular representations of diagnosis, in television shows such as House, commonly 
depict the diagnostic process as a doctor (usually male) and his trainees looking down at test 
results or a lab report that reveals the problem. Cancer. Kidney failure. Multiple Sclerosis. The 
doctor usually experiences relief and sometimes pride because he or she has cracked the case. 
In real life, though, diagnosis is much messier. A patient waits for over an hour with 
trembling, sweaty palms in a stark, white office that smells like Latex gloves and hand 
sanitizer, and she listens anxiously to her doctor’s greeting for hints as to what will come next. 
When she hears the news, she will either breathe a heaving sigh of relief because she is safe—
but only for now—or she will face a new reality, one to be haunted by incomprehensible 
medical terminology, pokes and prods by needles, stethoscopes and laser rays, and potentially 
most troubling, her own mortality.   
 In response to the divide between the two presentations just described, one of cool 
rationality in the face of illness, and one of the confusion, pain, and chaos that illness can 
engender, scholars within the medical and health humanities have posed a series of 
challenging questions in recent years: how can doctors most ethically respond to patient’s 
needs for emotional as well as physical support? (see Nancy Mairs and Ann Jurecic); who 
should get to tell narratives of illness? (see Arthur Frank and Rita Charon); and what do 
patients deserve in communication about their health, and where do doctors fall short in 
delivering on these rights? (see Lisa Sanders and Kathryn Montgomery Hunter).  
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 This dissertation adds to such questions by considering how acknowledging the 
rhetorical and intersectional dimensions of diagnoses might enable doctors to more ethically 
account for (1) the complex factors that constitute illness and (2) the narrative agency of 
patients. More importantly, I will examine how this shift in framework might enable patients 
to find a sense of meaningfulness within an illness experience that can significantly alter one’s 
sense of self. Contemporary rhetorical accounts of diagnosis tend to cast the encounter as a 
static process wherein the doctor is granted ultimate narrative authority. In “Diagnosis: A 
Biocultural Critique of Certainty,” Lennard Davis highlights the roots of the term diagnosis 
itself: “Dia means both ‘through’ and ‘thorough [knowing]” and “Gnosis, as knowledge, 
implies the certainty of religious knowledge” (85; emphasis original). He argues that 
diagnosis serves two key rhetorical functions: it grants doctors the status previously held by 
priests, who could make determinations about a person’s spiritual health, and it also renders 
diagnoses ostensibly a-rhetorical, or incontestable. Similarly, in Every Patient Tells a Story, Lisa 
Sanders argues that in diagnostic encounters, the doctor plays the role of detective and the 
patient plays the role of the “passive bystander to the ongoing crime” (6). Within this 
detective work, according to Rita Charon, the patient loses even her ability to control the 
form that her narrative of illness will take: “Instead of listening silently while a patient makes 
the countless narrative decisions that must be made in conveying anything, the doctor spoils 
the patient’s narrating by forcing it into medicine’s preferred outline and sequence” (99). 
Such a move on the part of the physician to control both the form and content of the 
patient’s narrative means that “information of the most valuable sort” is lost (99).  
 Significantly, these views of diagnosis limit the patient’s agency (narrative and 
otherwise), ignore sociocultural factors that cause and contribute to illness, and fail to 
account for the complex network of actants involved in any illness or diagnosis. Perhaps Judy 
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Segal, in Health and the Rhetoric of Medicine, most clearly establishes this static view of 
diagnosis when she takes an Aristotelian approach to medical rhetorics by defining rhetoric as 
persuasion (1-2). While of course many medical encounters involve persuasion, such a 
definition fails to account for the dynamism of diagnosis, the uncertainty it engenders, and 
the multiplicity of actants involved in molding illness narratives and their meaning.  
 My thesis is that shifting from an Aristotelian view of diagnosis to a Latourian 
(networked, rhetorical) framework will promote a more relational practice that accounts for 
various actants, narratives, social and structural factors, and objects that shape diagnosis, 
specifically, and illness, in general. I’m interested in an Actor-Network Theory (ANT) 
approach to diagnosis because networks enable us to trace complex situations and follow the 
movements of every actant so that we might intervene and respond to what we find. As 
opposed to the static model of diagnosis, which solely considers the doctor and patient (who 
remains powerless), ANT suggests that diagnostic networks are vibrant, ever evolving, and 
constitutive of our worlds, but most importantly, they can always be reassembled if actants 
redistribute into other, better chains of associations. Thus, such a method serves well as a 
framework for medical rhetorics because it reflects the dynamism of medicine, the relational 
qualities that are inherently apart of caring for patients, and the reassemblage of practices and 
theories that no longer serve patients’ needs. Such a framework might empower patients to 
navigate the various narratives that haunt their illness experience rather than simply 
accepting a diagnosis that reduces their complex identity into a singular narrative of patient 
hood. I also hope that such an approach will counter the stigmatization and blame that often 
accompany contemporary diagnoses by contextualizing illness within a Western framework 
of racism, sexism, homophobia, poverty, and ableism. For example, such a rhetorical 
framework might take into account the extent to which poor minority women living near 
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waste sites are more likely to develop breast cancer, and this analysis might shape the 
diagnosis so as to assign blame to the social factors that influence disease. It is not enough for 
medicine to define or even treat illnesses; it must respond to the structural sources that 
disproportionately cause them. To the extent that diagnoses serve to categorize the healthy 
and the sick, the normal and the abnormal, the self-governing and the dependent, ignoring 
such rhetorical dimensions that inform diagnosis is irresponsible and deeply unethical. 
 Beyond speaking to more healthy power dynamics between doctors and patients, 
such a rhetorical rethinking of the practices and assumptions particular to diagnosis 
represents a vital way for medicine to reclaim its significance in a time when Google, Web 
MD, and other medical websites sometimes offer cheaper, faster, and more empathic 
interactions than doctors do (Topol 26). If doctors fail to acknowledge the rhetorical and 
networked elements of medicine and diagnosis, then they will further undermine their own 
relevance by limiting their role to the interpretation of test results. Ann Jurecic reminds us 
that doctors offices and hospitals have replaced churches as the foremost place wherein 
people face questions of life, death, pain, and suffering, and since this is the case, healthcare 
providers must account for this growing need that people have to make meaning in medical 
spaces (10). Medical rhetorics is a field that must engage with the most painful type of 
uncertainty, mortality, and this means that medicine as a rhetorical enterprise must recognize 
patients as agentive participants in the diagnosis and treatment of illness. Charon claims that, 
“Nothing will ease patients’ uncertainty in the face of illness, but perhaps their doctors can 
help them to articulate the uncertainty and thereby live less painfully with it” (30). And 
perhaps the field of medical rhetorics remains uniquely poised to support such efforts by 
advocating for patients, opening up forums for listening to their narratives, and considering 
the intersectional and networked actants that cause and inform illness.  
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Actor-Network Theory 
 Before I shift to a more specific analysis of the diagnostic problems to which Actor-
Network Theory might respond, I want to first discuss what Actor-Network theory does, and 
then provide an example of what such a framework might look like in practice. In 
Reassembling the Social, Bruno Latour introduces his method(ology) of Actor-Network 
Theory, which he uses to trace connections between actants (he prefers this term to the more 
humanist “actor”) under the umbrella of a particular social institution, sociology in his case. 
ANT’s key slogan is to “follow the actors themselves,” or “to try to catch up with their often 
wild innovations in order to learn from them what the collective existence has become in 
their hands, which methods they have elaborated to make it fit together, which accounts 
could best define the new associations that they have been forced to establish” (12). To put it 
most simply, networks are action, and the researcher who adopts an ANT framework must 
follow this action to see the linkages and assemblages they (re)form. Latour notes that while 
definitions for ANT have proliferated, there are three “tests” that may be applied to see if a 
given study can accurately be dubbed ANT. First, an ANT method will grant to nonhumans 
the role of “actors and not simply the hapless bearers of symbolic projection” (10). ANT 
dramatically reconceives of the agency of non-human actants, which are now seen as not only 
agentive but “vibrant,” in the words of Jane Bennett. Furthermore, another test is to check 
whether the assemblage being considered (such as science, diagnosis, or sociology) is treated 
as static and stable. “If the social remains stable and is used to explain a state of affairs,” says 
Latour, “It’s not ANT” (10). Or, to translate Latour, ANT remains highly suspicious of 
efforts to present any assemblage as inevitable or explain away an assemblage by pointing to a 
“hidden social force” responsible for a particular event (11). Finally, the most difficult test is 
to “check whether a study aims at reassembling the social or still insists on dispersion and 
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deconstruction” (11). Latour’s ANT aims to eschew the iconoclasm or critique in favor of a 
method that builds something new and reassembles actants into a more healthy chain of 
associations. Rather than critique, Latour introduces the word “gather” to serve as the project 
for the 21st century ANT practitioner, who must undertake “a multifarious inquiry launched 
with the tools of anthropology, philosophy, metaphysics, history, sociology to detect how 
many participants are gathered in a thing to make it exist and to maintain its 
existence” (“Why Has Critique Run Out of Steam?” 246). Thus, Latour’s version of ANT 
demands a commitment to active tracing of associations, attempts to reassemble unhealthy or 
malfunctioning networks, and recognition of all actants as engaged and agentive. 
 Within Rhetoric and Composition, Latour’s ANT has been embraced as revival of 
rhetoric, a way to not only open up rhetorical inquiry to nonhumans but to recognize that 
deliberation occurs in response to complex negotiations amongst human and nonhuman 
actants. In their “Introduction” to Thinking with Bruno Latour in Rhetoric and Composition, 
Paul Lynch and Nathaniel Rivers put it simply: “Rhetoric’s new thing is, in fact, things” (40). 
Despite the misleading “new” moniker, however, ANT stresses the limitations that have 
always haunted human deliberators:  “Latour dramatically increases the number and kinds of 
deliberators. The truth is made but not solely by humans. In Latour’s agora, everything is 
nervously loquacious. There is not a ‘society’ but rather a ‘collective’” (4). The serious 
question that Latour puts to rhetoric—how can a discipline that has “historically defined 
itself in terms of human language and expression adequately account for the persuasive 
contributions of nonhuman agents?”—has serious implications for agency, ethics, and policy 
formation, to name just a few key areas of rhetorical study (Scot Barnett 81). Not only do we 
co-create truth and knowledge with nonhuman actants, but we rely on them even to create 
occasions for speaking.  
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 For example, in her dissertation, Relational Agency, Networked Technology, and the 
Social Media Aftermath of the Boston Marathon Bombing, Megan McIntyre argues that agency 
can no longer be considered a possession of a single actor but rather something co-created 
through a relationship among actants, a shared power to act. She explains, “agency is not the 
property of any single actant but the product of the relationship between actants. Or, 
perhaps, more importantly, agency becomes a product of the work of what Latour calls 
mediation and translation undertaken by actants to improve the strength of their networks, 
which is, at its core [...] a rhetorical endeavor” (73). For McIntyre, we have no choice but to 
embrace such a conception of agency and to negotiate with nonhumans as we come to 
decisions together. She also acknowledges that the stakes are quite high: “By layering 
dependent and networked visions of agency, we might come to a more complex vision of 
agency, one that privileges the relational over the autonomous and the dependent over the 
independent” (73). Such a conception of agency, as ushered into rhetoric by ANT, better 
responds to the problems facing many disciplines—from rhetoric to science studies—as it 
promotes relational and collaborative decision-making.  
  Of course, medicine is also one such discipline that stands to benefit from ANT’s 
method of tracing assemblages and relational agency. ANT has recently been adopted as a 
method for studying medical environments, interactions, and even illnesses themselves. In 
The Body Multiple, for example, Annmarie Mol, an ANT practitioner, argues that disease can 
never be isolated as a single object—it is instead a dynamic series of “practices” involving “the 
body, the patient, the disease, the doctor, the technician, the technology” (4-5). She explains, 
“The ‘disease’ that ethnographers talk about is never alone. It does not stand by itself. It 
depends on everything and everyone that is active while it is being practiced. The disease is 
being done” (31-2). Whereas rhetorical ANT practitioners emphasize agency’s dispersal, Mol 
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emphasizes that illness itself is dispersed, relational, and uniquely uncertain. Others have 
emphasized that ANT serves as a productive method for deliberating within medical contexts 
of uncertainty. In Illness as Narrative, Jurecic wonders how stakeholders might best respond 
to illness narratives if we exchange the critical project, which haunts the study of illness 
narratives, for Latour’s concept of gathering. She asks, “Does prioritizing concerns about risk, 
pain, human vulnerability, and the uncertainty of the future alter the critical project? What 
might the study of narratives about illness look like if the critic’s task were to create 
intellectual arenas for the gathering of ideas, and to address matters of concern with care and 
compassion?” (17). Jurecic wonders if accounts of medical events can unhinge the critical 
project of debunking fact and fiction by creating a different task for the stakeholder within 
an illness event: a commitment to care. In fact, Latour himself speaks to the need to 
reconceive of illness, among other complex figures including God and art, apart from 
critique when he writes: “I know, for instance, that the God to whom I pray, the works of art 
I cherish, the colon cancer I have been fighting, the piece of law I am studying, the desire I 
feel, indeed, the very book I am writing could in no way be accounted for by fetish or fact, 
nor by any combination of those two absurd positions” (“Why Has Critique Run Out of 
Steam?” 243). ANT’s value within medicine, at least in part, is its ability to open up 
alternative ways for responding to illness that are actively constructive and responsive to 
other actants.  
 While further sections of this introduction, and later chapters, will perform ANT 
and more fully articulate its value to medical rhetorics, generally, and this dissertation, 
specifically, I want to shift to an example of what Latour’s theory might look like when used 
as a method for tracing an illness experience. In Exile and Pride: Disability, Queerness, and 
Liberation, Eli Clare approaches the issues of environmentalism and disability in conjunction 
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with his emotional and mental problems: “body-deep terror, grief, and confusion” (36). 
Rather than treating these issues from a purely psychological standpoint, he generates an 
intersectional approach to identity-generation through what he calls “multi-issue politics,” or 
an attempt to invite political and personal unity regarding issues that affect us all (xi). 
Primarily, Clare organizes this approach by focusing on the loss of home—the body as home 
and his backwoods logging community in Oregon as home. As he reflects, he is “exiled” from 
both due to his borderlands identities. He writes as a queer “supercrip” from a “redneck,” 
working class family (36-8). He writes of his homesickness for a place that he cannot return 
to because of the physical danger associated with being queer in the backwoods of Oregon 
(35-6). As he explains, “If I moved back to Port Orford, the daily realities of isolation would 
compete with my concerns for safety” (35). Thus, the loss of home involves a physical 
separation from his working-class, rural roots, which remain at odds with his sexual and 
political identities. 
 Clare also writes of being exiled from his body, which has been repeatedly abused, 
tortured, and raped by his father and other men in his community throughout his 
childhood. “Being a queer is one piece of this loss, this exile,” he writes, “Abuse is 
another” (36). Beyond the extreme trauma Clare experiences based on past violations of his 
body, Clare lives in the world as a queer person who must navigate societal demands that he 
identify as a male or female. He writes of a desire to maintain his “long history as a girl” in 
conjunction with his current state of living “as a man, even while my internal sense of gender 
is as genderqueer, neither man nor woman” (xiii). Significantly, Clare’s complex identities 
lead him to think of issues within mainstream feminist and queer studies and 
environmentalism from an intersectional perspective. For example, he chastises queer 
theorists for maintaining classist stereotypes about working-class “rednecks,” and treating 
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them as if they are not intelligent enough to engage in conversations about homophobia, 
racism, sexism, and other forms of structural and interpersonal violence (37). He also argues 
that environmentalists need to think carefully about the lives of those who might be affected 
if logging towns are shut down—as he emphasizes, caring for the environment might mean 
putting entire towns of people out of work (67).  
 Most importantly, perhaps, Clare highlights the extent to which his personal traumas 
associated with being exiled from home require structural and multi-faceted changes. He 
explains, “My displacement, my exile, is twined with problems highlighted in the 
intersection of queer identity, working-class and poor identity, and rural identity, problems 
that demand not a personal retreat, but long-lasting, systemic changes...I want each of us to 
be able to bring our queerness home” (48). As I consider my project of adopting an ANT 
approach to diagnosis, I am reminded of Clare’s story and his intersectional approach to the 
personal and political problems that haunt him. In Latourian terms, Clare’s narrative is a 
tracing of an assemblage, a lively (re)construction of a series of identities, and an exploration 
of the varying factors that have shaped them. Whereas the terror, grief, and confusion could 
have been diagnosed as a particular illness that shaped his story, Clare takes another approach
—one that reiterates the many narrative threads that inform him and rejects the idea that one 
simple explanation can suffice. In what follows, I will explicate what I mean by this method 
of narrative (re)assemblage, and I will explain why I find it so meaningful in the contexts of 
healthcare and diagnosis.  
 As Clare probes the intersectional nature of his life problems, he discovers that none 
of his problems can be neatly allocated to medicine—they are rather hybridized results of 
trauma, location, class, politics, and many other factors. As this example illustrates, medical 
rhetorics needs a hybridized approach to diagnosis to account for all of the factors that 
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intersect to cause illness and shape a person’s response to it. While some have considered the 
intersections of medicine and rhetoric in relation to intake forms (see Allan Peterkin’s “Adult 
Intake Form,”), public conversations about abortion (see Bernice L. Hausman’s “Public 
Fetuses”), and death and dying (see Felicia Cohn “When the Doctor is Not God”), among 
many other issues, few have questioned the overlapping purviews of rhetoric and medicine in 
relation to diagnosis. In response to the need for a theory that can adequately account for 
complex experiences of illness, this dissertation interrogates the intersections of rhetorics of 
diagnosis, theories of narrativity, selfhood, and meaningfulness, and networked theories of 
human and nonhuman attachments. 
 In what follows, I will more fully articulate these three key areas of inquiry and their 
intersections. Following a Latourian method of tracing assemblages, I will begin by 
discussing a few problems within the rhetorics of diagnosis, and I will then consider how 
ANT responds to such problems and opens up possible solutions. While later chapters will 
explore these issues in greater depth, my aim here is to highlight what is at stake in a 
rhetorical, networked view of diagnosis, and to establish the connection I see between ANT 
assemblages and diagnostic encounters.   
Problems with Contemporary Diagnosis 
 I am most concerned with the extent to which diagnoses have come to dominate 
conversations surrounding illness today. For example, many argue that “reckless and 
misleading drug company marketing” leads to the over-diagnosis of particular illnesses 
(notably childhood Bipolar Disorders) (Frances 5), and about ten new disorders are added to 
the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) annually (Davis 85). I 
acknowledge, of course, that diagnoses are oftentimes necessary for patients to seek treatment 
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and insurance coverage; most patients, after all, see a doctor because they want to know what 
is wrong or affirm the belief that they are healthy. The problem lies, then, not primarily in 
diagnosis itself, but in a tendency to overly emphasize its importance in relation to the 
assemblage of stories that comprise a person’s identity, her illness, her culture, her triggers, 
and many other factors that cannot be captured in a DSM number. In “Diagnosis: A 
Biocultural Critique of Certainty,” Davis defines diagnosis as “a complex process in which a 
person’s behaviors and thoughts, capable of being seen in many registers, are transmuted into 
the register of symptoms” (84). As Davis highlights, diagnosis involves reducing a set of 
complex, oftentimes confusing experiences with illness to a set of symptoms that must be 
objectively determined and matched to a diagnostic label. As I will suggest in what follows, 
this overemphasis of diagnosis can limit the significance of the narratives generated by 
patients, diagnosticians, and other stakeholders. While diagnoses can provide explanations 
for what is causing a person’s illness, they can be less helpful when patients seek to answer 
questions regarding why they are sick and how they might cope.  
 Furthermore, the tremendous inflation of certain illnesses in recent years suggests a 
sort of faddish approach to diagnosis, in which common illnesses are overly diagnosed 
because they are conveniently memorable or seem to be the illness du jour. More specifically, 
Allen Frances cites research by Ronald C. Kessler et al. that illustrates this inflation: their 
study found that “half of Americans will meet the DSM-IV disorder criteria sometime in 
their life, with first onset usually in childhood or adolescence” (Kessler et al. 593, Frances 5). 
Beyond these problems of presuming that half of the population might be disordered given 
the current criteria, many physicians fail to communicate diagnoses to patients. According to 
Shergill et al., in “Communication of Psychiatric Diagnosis,” in their study of 126 patients, 
only 53 percent were informed of their diagnosis, although most patients revealed that they 
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wanted to know (32). Furthermore, only 75 percent of patients agreed with their diagnosis 
(32). This speaks to the ethical dangers of viewing diagnostic encounters as arhetorical; at 
times, when the diagnosis is seen as indisputable, some physicians may feel that it doesn’t 
warrant a conversation with the patient. Worse than a limited view of a diagnostic encounter 
as only being rhetorical to the extent that its persuasive is the view that the diagnostic 
encounter does not require any dialogue at all.  
 In other cases, particularly within medicine, diagnoses may be ineffectively 
communicated to patients in ways that increase their suffering or confusion. In Nancy Mairs’ 
Waist High in the World, she recounts her experience of visiting a student health center with 
complaints of a limp and weakness on her left side. After she waited for a few days while her 
doctor made phone calls to neurologists, she was finally told that “I had to worry about a 
brain tumor. [...] The weakness on my left side, coupled with a history of headaches, pointed 
to a tumor, which a battery of tests could confirm” (25). In response to this diagnosis, 
“electrodes were pasted to my scalp, my spine and groin were punctured, dyes were injected 
and X rays taken, and in the event there simply was no brain tumor” (26). The doctors 
effectively shrugged their shoulders over this failed diagnosis, and Mairs remembers that it 
was only when she recognized her symptoms in a Parade magazine article months later that 
she asked her doctor if she had Multiple Sclerosis. “Probably,” he told her, “But only time 
[will] tell” (27). This lack of clear communication about diagnosis, while partially 
understandable given the lack of tests available for MS at the time, still contributed to added 
stress and grief on the part of Mairs, who had to wait eighteen more months before her 
diagnosis would finally be confirmed by the onset of more symptoms. 
 Beyond these problems associated with diagnosis, there remains the problem of how 
patients can account for their suffering post-diagnosis. According to Arthur Frank, “Whether 
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ill people want to tell stories or not, illness calls for stories” because they must explain their 
experiences to various audiences including “medical workers, health bureaucrats, employers 
and work associates, family and friends” (53-4). The demands placed on patients by the need 
for insurance coverage, Social Security benefits, employer understanding, and even the 
concern of friends and family places the patient in the position where she must be able to 
name and speak about her illness. She must be a responsible rhetor post-diagnosis, so why is 
she not considered a key informant and participant in the diagnostic process itself? After all, 
it is she who must give an account for her illness—and in many cases, such as for insurance 
coverage, defend the legitimacy of her condition and the extent to which she is impaired by it 
(if she wants to “claim” disability). 
 In all of the above examples, a few major stalemates within the field of medical 
rhetorics are invoked that I wish to more fully explore in the following sections. In particular, 
I want to shift away from a static view of the actants involved in diagnosis, the construction 
of illness, and the post-diagnosis account of illness and towards a Latourian framework that 
imagines all actants—from the patient herself to her X-Ray images—as active and engaged in 
the process of diagnosis and its attendant meaning. In what follows, I will consider three 
major stalemates within medical rhetorics surrounding diagnosis—shifting from the patient 
vs. doctor to the assemblage, from critique to reassemblage, and from listening to tracing—
and the ways in which ANT opens up new possibilities for responding to them.  
Diagnosis and Actor-Network Theory  
From Patient vs. Doctor to the Agentive Assemblage 
 The tendency to view a diagnostic encounter as solely involving two rhetors, the 
doctor and patient, remains a key issue within medical rhetorics because of the way in which 
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it denies patients agency. Trish Roberts-Miller, whose research focuses particularly on 
political deliberation, defines rhetoric as the “art of communities coming to decisions 
together in a context of diversity and uncertainty” (“Research”). This definition, and its 
emphasis on communal decision making, informs this research because of its emphasis on 
navigating diverse and uncertain contexts, which applies perfectly to the complex and 
multifaceted diagnostic experiences my project will cover. This definition also remains 
significant because a major tension within medical rhetorics is the question of how best to 
balance power relations between doctors and patients in a technologically-savvy time when, 
according to Eric Topol, many would rather visit Google than their local doctor’s office when 
they fall ill (26). As Roberts-Miller’s definition suggests, taking a rhetorical approach to 
diagnosis will involve moving past the model that pits doctors against patients to invoke a 
community of actors who decide together. This question of how best to balance the authority 
of patients, doctors, technologies, and other stakeholders such as family members, nurses, 
and hospital administrators remains crucial to conversations surrounding ethical decision-
making in healthcare settings.  
 In response to this tension, some have suggested that doctors must find better 
strategies to convince their malleable patients to work with and trust them. For example, 
Sanders is critical of attempts to rely on medical expertise to diagnose illness while ignoring 
the patient’s agency and testimony. However, she insinuates that paying attention to the 
patient’s agency is most useful for persuading her to trust the doctor and even obey him or 
her. She writes: 
Studies have repeatedly shown that the greater the patient’s understanding of 
his illness and treatment, the more likely it is that he will be able to carry out 
his part in the treatment [...] Patients who understand their illness are far 
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more likely to follow a doctor’s advice about how to change their diet and 
how to take their medications than those who do not. It’s understandable. 
Taking medications on a regular basis isn’t easy. It requires dedication on the 
part of the patient. Motivation. A desire to incorporate this inconvenient 
addition into a life that is already complicated. Greater understanding by the 
patient has been shown to dramatically improve adherence. This is where 
getting a good history—one that provides you with some insight into the 
patient and his feelings about the illness, his life, his treatment—can really 
pay off. (14-15) 
While Sanders encourages doctors to help their patients “understand” their diagnosis and 
invite them to participate in conversations about their treatment, her emphasis remains on 
the doctor’s orders that must be followed. The process of letting patients speak about their 
feelings abruptly becomes “getting a good history,” and Sanders notes that it can “pay off”—
but for whom?  
 Similarly, Segal also defines rhetoric as persuasion in Health and the Rhetoric of 
Medicine, which implies that the doctor and patient have very different functions in the 
diagnostic encounter. More specifically, she argues that doctors must not merely rest on their 
ethos but must effectively persuade patients to comply with their advice and/or demands 
within kairotic moments of illness. Patients, she argues, are “an audience, addressed but also 
interpellated and constituted by the physician” because “each time [they] are addressed, 
[they] are invited, sometimes irresistibly, to take the shape of a particular audience” (39). Not 
only are patients generally limited to the rhetorical role of being convinced by their doctors 
and dutifully following their advice, they are called into (rhetorical) existence by their 
physicians. In being addressed by a physician, patients are asked to be a particular type of 
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patient, a particular type of audience. Physicians, too, are bound to the work of 
interpretation rather than rhetorical invention, within Segal’s framework. “The text to be 
read,” she writes, “is not the person but the disease” (27). For Segal, doctors are limited to 
the role of interpreting the disease (commonly through tests and technologies that speak for 
the person) and to convince patients that the diagnosis is correct and that they should 
therefore pursue the recommended treatment options. While such a belief suggests that the 
patient and doctor are active participants in the diagnostic encounter, it problematically 
assumes that patients are called into rhetorical existence only as an audience to the doctor’s 
persuasive tactics and that doctors are rhetors who may not create meaning but only interpret 
facts. 
 Segal’s view of medical rhetorics is echoed in Kathryn Montgomery Hunter’s Doctor’s 
Stories. As the title suggests, Hunter also privileges the doctor’s function within the rhetorical 
exchange of medicine. She adds that “It is interpretive work that the physician is doing, not 
original composition, nor even (except in rare cases) co-composition. Physicians who attend 
the funeral of one of their patients have this brought home to them in a striking manner. The 
discovery that neither the physician nor the disease has been the strongest force in a patient’s 
life comes as a surprise and relief ” (12). I would suggest that what surprises and relieves 
physicians, in this case, is the undeniable sense that their patient was a person, a rhetorical 
being that existed and acted apart from their control as the authoritative rhetor. Hunter goes 
further with this idea by labeling the doctor as a detective and the patient as the bystander to 
the illness crime, suggesting that diagnosis is not rhetorical (in the sense of coming to a 
collaborative decision in an uncertain context, a la Roberts-Miller) as much as a challenging 
but surmountable interpretive act (Hunter 11, Sanders 6). Within Roberts-Miller’s 
conception, the rhetorical encounter might fail. For Hunter, there is no room for error: the 
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doctor’s role is reading the patient’s body and solving the case by locating the culprit behind 
the problem.  The patient’s job is to open herself up to interpretation by a doctor and her 1
instruments while accepting that she will, within such a framework, inevitably be both the 
victim and perpetrator of the crime.  
  On the other hand, feminist physicians and therapists reframe the diagnostic 
encounter as more egalitarian, and they argue that patients should reclaim authority over 
their bodies and illnesses. In particular, Laura S. Brown, who self-identifies as a feminist 
therapist, argues that in an egalitarian model of diagnosis, “therapists are charged with the 
responsibility of acting in such a manner as to earn clients’ trust, thus offering to clients the 
power to decide as to the therapist’s trustworthiness rather than having the therapist declared 
trustworthy simply by virtue of occupying that role in the exchange” (50). Physicians must 
earn a client’s trust, then, not simply to reify their authority, but to encourage patients to 
engage in the rhetorical exchange with them. Brown notes that feminists tend to “avoid 
[diagnosis] when possible” because it commonly “reifi[es] an objectification of the client and 
pathologizes her or his pretherapy strategies for increasing personal power by whatever means 
available” (51). When diagnosis is necessary, however, for medical or financial reasons, Brown 
advocates for an alternative model of diagnosis wherein the patient actively contributes to the 
diagnosis, and wherein the constructed qualities of the diagnosis are discussed. “Thus,” 
Brown explains, “in the worst case scenario where a diagnosis is written down, it is not given 
by the therapist but arrived at collaboratively and known to the client because she or he has 
taken part in deciding which [diagnosis] is a best fit” (51). Whereas Sanders wants to engage 
 Such a metaphor raises obvious ethical questions when we consider the rhetoric of war that 1
circulates within conversations about illness, which Audre Lorde spoke out against in her 
Cancer Journals. As Lorde highlighted, such a metaphor causes patients to look at their own 
bodies as an alien enemy, rather than directing their warlike aggression and concomitant 
anger towards the environmental, social, and political factors that contribute to their disease.
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patients in the rhetorical diagnostic exchange solely to persuade them to listen to the doctor, 
Brown offers a refreshing alternative that might assert the patient’s right to name and own 
her illness. 
   Such a debate about whether the doctor’s authority or the patient’s agency should be 
emphasized is troubling for two major reasons. First, the stakes are quite high when patients 
are left to be read and “solved” by their detective doctor. Sanders notes that much 
information about illness will be overlooked, possibly leading to an incorrect diagnosis and 
medical error, when physicians fail to engage patients as co-creators of knowledge within the 
medical encounter. She notes, for instance, that doctors need to listen to the patients rather 
than asking the questions that are solely important to them; the patient’s own testimony 
about her illness will reveal the correct diagnosis up to 70 percent of the time (57). Such an 
approach might also save patients the time and money that extensive testing requires and the 
distress of being viewed by their doctor as an object. Furthermore, this stalemate also casts 
the doctor as either an absolute authority figure who objectively diagnoses illness or a 
detective who must distrust her patient as an unreliable witness and the perpetrator of a 
crime that she must solve. Perhaps such options for a doctor’s relationship to her patients and 
to illness can account, in part, for the disproportionately high rates of depression and suicide 
amongst physicians in training. According to Louise B. Andrew, a survey of physicians found 
that “1 in 16 had experienced suicidal ideation in the past 12 months, [and] only 26% had 
sought psychiatric or psychologic help” (n.p.). For medical trainees, the rates were even 
higher, even accounting for less ability or willingness to share given the extremely 
competitive nature of residency programs. For trainees, one study revealed, “9.4% of fourth-
year medical students and interns reported having suicidal thoughts in the previous two 
weeks” (Goebert et al 238, Andrew n.p.). While many factors undoubtedly contribute to 
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physician and trainee depression and suicide, a better model for understanding diagnosis, 
and the doctor-patient relationship, might open up alternative ways for doctors and patients 
to work together rather than at cross-purposes as they confront illness. Improving doctor-
patient relations might reduce stress and isolation for both parties. 
 A networked framework for diagnosis shifts the conversation previously explicated 
away from an emphasis on the adversarial relationship between doctors and patients and 
towards an assemblage model. Rather than fighting for authority and privilege within the 
diagnostic process, patients and doctors might recognize their mutual expertise that they 
bring to bear: for patients, their embodied experience of illness and their personal history 
with it, and for doctors, their generalized knowledge of the illness and its complications. As 
co-creators of knowledge about illness and its attendant meanings, doctors and patients 
might come into a more healthy relationship as nodes on a diagnostic network rather than 
rhetorical adversaries. For example, Rita Charon implores doctors to better attune themselves 
to the health care divide that exists between themselves and patients. She, too, describes the 
fraught power struggle inherent within diagnosis, albeit in different terms: 
Despite the complexity and consequences of the events that unfold in the 
doctor’s office, the participants are often ill prepared for that meeting. They 
speak different languages, hold different beliefs about the material world, 
operate according to different unspoken codes of conduct, and are ready to 
blame one another should things go badly. Many patients feel abandoned by 
their doctors, dismissed in their suffering, disbelieved when they describe 
their symptoms, or objectified by impersonal care [...] Sadly, patients have 
come to reconcile themselves to a forced choice between attentiveness and 
competence, between sympathy and science. At the same time, many doctors 
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feel aggrieved by the extravagant hopes patients have come to hold for the 
powers of medicine. They feel unable to measure up to the patient’s inflated 
expectations and demands that medical treatment will reverse the results of 
unhealthy behaviors, poor health choices, or random and unfair bad luck. 
Realizing how ‘slow’ are their true fixes, doctors prepare to disappoint 
patients or to be sued for not being as effective as everyone seems to think 
they are. (21)  
In this passage, Charon captures the frustration of patients, who feel they must either trust a 
cold, distant, but effective doctor or a sympathetic, patient, incompetent one, and the 
feelings of inadequacy that doctors experience when they are seen as ultimate authorities, 
invincible healers. The framework that presents doctors and patients as rhetorical adversaries 
ultimately fails both doctors and patients, since it leaves them both feeling (often secretly) 
vulnerable and helpless.  
 Another key value of the networked method is that it moves us past a focus on these 
two actants alone and brings in other areas of expertise—that of the tests that generate 
knowledge about illness rather than just interpret facts for doctors, that of the nurses who 
spend intimate moments caring for the patient and therefore have their own insights, that of 
the objects in the patient’s room that shape her relationship to her illness, that of the family 
members who will advocate for the patient based on their emotional connections, and that of 
the larger community which shapes conversations about illness, treatment, and what it means 
to be a patient. Within a networked framework, no single actant is privileged more than any 
other, so the narratives of the patient and the doctor, the technology and the location, the 
nurses and the family members, and the social circumstances and the history of the patient, 
would all be accounted for within the rhetorical encounter of diagnosis and coming to 
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decisions about treatment options. Graham Harman sums up this position nicely in “The 
Road to Objects,” where he writes:  
There can be no better example of a perfectly flat ontology than the early 
philosophy of Bruno Latour. At that point in Latour’s career, all human and 
inhuman things, all chunks of physical matter and people and cartoon 
characters, are equally actors. What makes all things actors, despite the vast 
differences between them, is that they have an effect on other things. As 
Latour puts it as recently as 1999 in Pandora’s Hope, to be real means “to 
modify, transform, perturb, or create” something else. Reality is defined not 
by what it is, but by what it does. Not everything is equally strong, since the 
Chinese government affects more things than does a stick figure drawn in the 
notebook of a Chinese schoolboy, but everything is equally real, since even 
that stick figure has some faint emotional resonance in the boy’s mind and is 
therefore not just an empty hole of non-being, while the mighty effect of the 
Chinese government on its citizens is different only in degree from the stick 
figure, even if that degree of difference is huge. Reality for the early Latour 
means having an effect on other things. And just as for Aristotle all humans 
are equally humans and all trees equally trees, for the early Latour all actors 
are equally actors. (177-8) 
Within healthcare contexts, interestingly, objects and nonhumans—such as tests and scans—
have come to be more credible actants than humans themselves. Some doctors find that 
relying on tests is more comfortable and accurate than listening to the stories of patients, 
their bodies, and the other actants within the diagnostic assemblage. However, networked 
diagnosis would bring the expertise of all such actants to bear on difficult cases and would 
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draw on their collective authority in responding to the most challenging and painful of all 
uncertainties: how to regain health or face death. 
From Critique to Reassemblage  
 Another stalemated debate within medical rhetorics to which a networked framework 
might respond is the problem of critique. Previously, I mentioned that some scholars within 
medical rhetorics have tried to locate alternative ways of responding to illness experiences and 
narratives that evade the distrust and iconoclasm of critique. Such techniques are 
undoubtedly inappropriate for experiences of illness that can devastate a person’s identity and 
life. But feminist writers and disability activists have also been particularly, and rightly, vocal 
in speaking out against disparities within healthcare settings and encounters, such as 
disproportionate access to compassionate care, abusive practices that harm rather than help 
patients, and neglect of the elderly, in particular, in long-term care facilities. While I align 
myself with such critiques, as will likely become apparent in the analysis that follows, I also 
recognize the importance of moving beyond critique and towards an active reassemblage of 
the very medical networks of which we’re apart. As Latour claims in “Why Has Critique Run 
Out of Steam?” critique on its own can result in compassion fatigue, frustrated abandonment 
of difficult conversations, and stakeholders pointing fingers at each other from opposite sides 
of the room (I might add, hospital). Perhaps the most common example of such an 
overemphasis on critique can be seen in discussions surrounding mental healthcare, where 
some attempt to shore up their field’s ostensible objectivity by citing the authority of such 
tools as the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, while others rally against these 
disempowering justifications for labeling (primarily) minorities as “ill.” In what follows, then, 
I will focus on mental healthcare rhetorics as I consider ways in which a networked approach 
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would more fruitfully address the need to hold those in power accountable while it opens up 
ways to reconstitute traditional methods for diagnosing people with mental illnesses. 
 Perhaps the most commonly critiqued practice within mental healthcare rhetorics is 
the use of the DSM to diagnose mental illness. In 2013, in fact, the National Institute of 
Mental Health revoked support for the DSM-V, the most recent version of what some 
affectionately call the “Bible” of mental disorders, noting that they would no longer support 
research projects that relied on or studied DSM criteria. Christopher Lane, in “The NIMH 
Withdraws Support for DSM-5,” calls the decision a “humiliating blow” to the American 
Psychiatric Association, particularly since the NIMH explained that “The weakness of the 
manual is its lack of validity” (n.p.). This significant move comes in the wake of much dissent 
about the manual’s validity, usefulness, and misuse. For example, in Making Us Crazy, Herb 
Kutchins and Stuart Kirk argue that the groups most likely to be designated as mentally ill 
are already vulnerable populations, such as women, minorities, and LBGTQ+ individuals. 
For example, the “illness” of homosexuality remained a mainstay in the DSM until the 
1970s, and several “illnesses” have surfaced within the DSM’s history that attempt to 
pathologize women’s interest in sex. Furthermore, Frances notes that many physicians fail to 
even double-check DSM criteria when making a diagnosis, and that when he quizzed them 
on the basic guidelines for diagnosing common disorders, most of the physicians were 
stumped. He argues that a tool is only as useful as its implementation, and that the DSM’s is 
most useful at instigating overdiagnosis of illnesses like depression or anxiety because of their 
popularity or because new drugs are being pushed by pharmaceutical companies. Relatedly, 
others have criticized the small group of (mostly) white, male physicians who have 
traditionally served as the DSM editors for allowing drug companies to influence their 
categorization of illnesses. For example, the diagnosis of depression exploded in popularity 
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following the invention of Prozac, which drug companies marketed directly to doctors and 
consumers. As this all-too-brief analysis illustrates, critiques of the DSM from many 
stakeholders—including psychiatrists and NIMH leaders—proliferate.  
 Other prominent criticisms of diagnosis within mental healthcare circles come from 
feminists who challenge the authority of psychologists to label some “ill” and others “well” 
based on a reductive criteria. For example, Joan Jacobs Brumberg challenges diagnoses with 
eating disorders by demonstrating that, since the Victorian period, women’s appetites have 
represented sexual appetite, drudgery (such as housework and extensive meal preparation), 
and aggressiveness. She cites historical stigmatizations of female desires and appetites as the 
underlying cause of eating disorders rather than a pathological state on the part of the 
woman who suffers. She writes, “even when an illness is organic, being sick is a social act” 
that responds to contemporary circumstances (8). “Among affluent young Victorians,” she 
adds, “food and eating were at the center of a web of associations that had a great deal to do 
with gender and class identity. The same is true today, but broad social and cultural forces, 
particularly the intensification of messages about the female body, have promoted the 
urgency of appetite control and generated a new experience of the disease” (8). For 
Brumberg, DSM criteria describe symptoms of a larger cultural disease that affects particular 
vulnerable populations more accurately than they describe the disease itself. Susan Bordo 
echoes Brumberg’s analysis and extends it to argue that anorexia nervosa, as a common 
example of a disease that cannot be reduced to a DSM diagnosis, represents not a rejection of 
the “ideal” female body but a hyperbolic enactment of it. The disproportionately high 
incidence of eating disorders in women during periods of gender change leads her to suggest 
that these disorders tell us what is wrong with Western culture rather than what is wrong 
with self-starving women. The contemporary anorectic, for Bordo, “experiences her life as 
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well as her hungers as out of control,” and due to cultural messages that tell her that this is 
wrong, she becomes “hooked on the intoxicating feeling of accomplishment and control” 
that eating disorders can supply (149). This feminist approach levies blame at representations 
of female bodies in advertising, cultural ideas that women should be thin and without 
appetite, and expectations for women to focus on controlling their appearance rather than 
becoming politically engaged. While I am quite sympathetic with such critiques of the DSM, 
in particular, and constructions of mental illnesses that affect vulnerable populations, more 
specifically, I want to suggest that they might be more powerful when enacted with an eye to 
reassemblage of these troubling paradigms. 
 A networked framework for shifting from critique to reassemblage would involve 
generating alternative narratives about mental illnesses and other methods for responding to 
them in addition to critiquing structural inequities and abuses within medicine. For Latour, 
reassemblage is additive in the sense that, “The social that makes up society is only one part 
of the associations that makes up the collective. If we want to reassemble the social, it’s 
necessary, aside from the circulation and formatting of traditionally conceived social ties, to 
detect other circulating entities” (Reassembling the Social 233). What other actants are 
circulating that might be added to this assemblage to strengthen it? Digital support groups 
offer excellent examples of patients and concerned stakeholders coming together to support 
each other, rally for their rights to insurance coverage and to define their illnesses on their 
own terms, provide advice to those who have recently fallen ill, and respond to injustices 
within healthcare settings (see Kristen Gay, “Unbearable Weight, Unbearable Witness”). 
These groups oftentimes critique problems that they’ve witnessed, but they also construct an 
alternative space wherein patients might tell their stories and reclaim their subjectivity from 
stigmatizing mental health diagnoses. Such an active reassertion of what is missing in medical 
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discourse for many—the unique identities of individuals that cannot be encapsulated by a 
diagnosis—speaks to the empowerment that a network reassemblage might foster. 
Furthermore, for researchers who want to engage in networked critique, they might follow 
the lead of Becky W. Thompson in A Hunger So Wide and So Deep, who interviewed many 
Black, working-class, and lesbian women with eating disorders and found that nearly all 
named experiences with sexual abuse as the cause. While she firmly levies a critique against 
assumptions that eating disorders are a superficial “white girl” illness, for example, she goes a 
step further by suggesting a new way to label eating disorders without stigmatizing those who 
suffer: eating problems. Problems, she suggests, indicate the complex narratives that 
interweave to create a troubled relationship between a woman and her body in contrast to 
disorder, which implies that the woman is somehow responding inappropriately to a 
traumatic experience. Beyond adding this new word to the network, she also adds new 
voices; she writes that, “scholarship on eating problems is not particularly behind in its lack 
of attention to race, sexuality, and class. Unfortunately, it mirrors health scholarship in 
general” (6). Rather than simply critiquing such an omission, which has led to misdiagnosis 
and lack of treatment for women of color, she fills this gap, in part, with the voices of the 
women she interviews, who reassemble what it means to be a woman with an eating problem 
(12).  While there is still room for critique within and against diagnosis, Thompson’s method 
for also assembling something new might empower patients, enliven conversations 
surrounding a particular illness, and lead to more structural changes by inviting conversation 
with multiple stakeholders.  
 As I hope my extended example of critique and reassemblage in the literature 
surrounding eating disorders has illustrated, ANT’s commitment to adding new voices and 
listening to those who have been excluded offers a compelling alternative to the critical 
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project. The trick, for Latour, is not to reassemble our networks to account for all of the 
isolated voices that must be heard but to be able to negotiate with them in concert—after all, 
when we trace a chain of associations, the actants to who we are responsible only grows. In 
“Where are the Missing Masses?” he writes, “Students of technology are never faced with 
people on the one hand and things on the other, they are faced with programs of action, 
sections of which are endowed to parts of humans, while other sections are entrusted to parts 
of nonhumans. In practice they are faced with [...] the only thing they can observe: how a 
negotiation to associate dissident elements requires more and more elements to be tied 
together and more and more shifts to other matters” (174). The work of reassembling 
networks is never done because the network is never stable or complete but ever evolving, 
like a swarm of ants attacking a piece of food, carrying pieces away, eating the food, and 
making new shapes as they go. Furthermore, what can initially look like a small chain of 
associations will eventually reveal, in the tracing of them, a complex system of humans and 
nonhumans that have never stopped moving. For diagnosis, critique falls flat because it 
ultimately reinscribes the very hopelessness and frustration that simplistic diagnoses 
engender. On the other hand, a reassemblage project that adds new actants to the diagnosis 
being considered (and actants here might be anything from the poverty affecting a young 
woman with an eating disorder to the diet pills she abuses), opens up new ways to conceive 
of the problem, new sources of the problem to consider, and new ways to intervene in the 
assemblage.  
From Listening to Tracing  
 As previously discussed, when doctors consider their role to be that of persuading 
patients to listen to them or interpreting their bodies and symptoms, all members of the 
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diagnostic network suffer and diminish their agentive capacities. Furthermore, when 
researchers and theorists respond by critiquing such practices without creating alternatives, 
they fail to open up conversations about revising them. A final debate wherein a networked 
framework for diagnosis might be preferable to the current, static framework is within the 
characterizations of diagnostic encounters as hinging on silencing vs. listening. Countless 
debates within medical rhetoric stem from a concern about whether patients are being 
silenced or listened to, and in fact, such concerns often inform alternative practices like 
narrative medicine. I want to consider what a shift to tracing, in addition to listening, might 
do to move this conversation into a third space of active reconstruction of networks. In this 
section, I will discuss several prominent voices within this debate before I explicate why 
tracing might be a helpful complement to listening practices. 
 In Thomas Couser’s Recovering Bodies, he argues that the professionalization 
techniques that doctors have adopted function more to shore up their own authority than to 
serve patients and their needs (20-1). For example, he highlights problems surrounding the 
diagnostic interview, and mentions that doctors are highly likely to interrupt patients, 
especially Black female patients, during this process (20). As patients tell the story of their 
illness, doctors might tell them to stick to the facts or only answer their questions, or they 
might abruptly cut patients off and ask a particular question that they deem important. 
Couser also mentions that fears surrounding identification with a patient who might be ill or 
dying leads to a depersonalization of medical care, while concerns that their authority might 
be undermined can lead doctors to withhold information or even a diagnosis from patients. 
Beyond not listening to patients, the fear doctors experience of identifying with patients and 
their unsettling mortality has led some to adopt a language that downplays their personhood 
altogether. Thus, Couser writes, a man with liver failure might be referred to as “the liver in 
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201” (26). Similarly, Couser refers to Perri Klass, who highlights the language used when a 
patient’s treatment isn’t going well: “You never say that a patient’s blood pressure fell or that 
his cardiac enzymes rose. Instead, the patient is always the subject of the verb: ‘He dropped 
his pressure.’ ‘He bumped his enzymes.’ [...] When chemotherapy fails to cure Mrs. Bacon’s 
cancer, what we say is, ‘Mrs. Bacon failed her chemotherapy’” (A Not Entirely Benign 
Procedure 73-4). Such issues within the diagnostic process, far from simply reiterating 
doctors’ insecurity about their authority to speak for illness, also highlight the routine 
silencing of patients as they try to speak about what pains them, what they fear, and what 
might be wrong. Patients aren’t merely silenced; they are even grammatically blamed for their 
illness, since the disease has happened in their body, and they must thus be a co-conspirator 
with it. Couser sums up these problems by noting, “Thus discourse between patient and 
doctor occurs in a way that may be at odds with the root meaning of communication, the 
making common of information” (20-1).  
 As if to highlight the silencing of patients on the part of doctors—and to reinstill the 
sense that it’s somehow the patient’s fault if the doctor ignores them—Barbara M. Korsch 
and Caroline Harding authored the Intelligent Patient’s Guide to the Doctor-Patient 
Relationship to ostensibly teach patients to “lear[n] how to talk so your doctor will listen,” as 
the subtitle promises. While Korsch and Harding attempt to put patients in doctors’ shoes to 
help them better appreciate the struggles and demands they face, the text comes off as 
defensive. For example, they write that “Ideally, we all would like our physicians to be 
completely dedicated. In the best of all worlds, our doctors would cater to all our needs and 
we would no longer have any complaints. Although that sort of an arrangement does sound 
alluring, it doesn’t work. When physicians consistently go beyond what should realistically be 
expected of them, they become less responsive to their patients” (128). What cannot be 
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realistically expected of physicians—what chafes too much against time restrictions and 
compassion fatigue—is apparently the commitment to listening to patients, hearing what 
concerns them, and reassuring them that they will do something about it together. 
 In response to such methods for interrogating, rather than engaging, patients during 
the diagnostic encounter, Charon and others have created an alternative narrative medicine 
practice that shifts from silencing patients to listening to them. Charon advocates for 
enabling patients to not only tell their stories but to do so on their own terms; in her 
experience, the ability to control the way the story is told is as important to patients as the 
ability to speak. Her process involves listening carefully to patients, asking open-ended 
questions that allow them to elaborate as they wish, and letting them open up about 
uncomfortable topics such as their fears of death, what it might mean to be terminally ill, or 
how their bodies might change through treatment. She explains that her process “begins 
simply with the invitation to ‘tell me what you think I should know about your situation,’ 
and is followed by a commitment to listen and not—at least at the start—to write or even to 
speak. When I first started doing this, I had to literally sit on my hands to prevent myself 
from writing in the chart or calling up the patient’s computerized medical records” (187). As 
the patient recounts her story, Charon listens intently, avoids interrupting unless its 
absolutely necessary, and pays attention “as I sit there at the edge of my seat, absorbing what 
is being given—to metaphors, idioms, accompanying gestures, as well as plot and characters 
represented for me” (188). Once the patient has told her story, a process that tends to take 
twenty or thirty minutes, she then begins the physical examination, keeping in mind the 
patient’s experience of her illness, the language and idioms she used to describe it, and her 
fears and concerns. She refutes the idea that such a process is too time-consuming to be 
useful as she notes that the time she spends listening to her patients early on usually saves her 
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time later as she more quickly comes to a diagnosis and can more easily generate treatment 
plans with patients once she has earned their trust. She elaborates, “Unfortunately, sickness 
does not travel in straight lines, and we who care for sick people have to be equipped for 
circuitous journeys if we want to be of help. Although many health care professionals worry 
that they do not have the time to listen for stories, many of us who have incorporated 
listening into practice find that time invested early is recouped quickly” (67). While Charon’s 
process is both more ethical and compassionate than the type of “care” previously described 
by Couser, Korsch, and Harding, I want to suggest that it could be taken a step further by 
incorporating a Latourian concept of tracing a network. Rather, the kind of work within 
which Charon engages, while it can aptly be called listening, also serves an important 
function of inviting the patient to trace her illness experience in collaboration with the 
doctor.  
 As Charon acknowledges in her practice, for Latour, tracing is a necessarily slow 
process, one that requires care and precision. He writes that when tracing one must “Instead 
of cutting the Gordian knot [...] struggl[e] to follow the gestures of those who tie it together” 
(Pandora’s Hope 87). Rather than trying to separate interwoven problems, then, one who 
traces must look at where the problems intersect and follow the actants as they navigate their 
networks. As McIntyre puts it, “Tracing is a painstaking process that requires adherents to 
follow nonhuman and human participants from network to network and trial to trial” (21). 
Just as Charon experiences when she listens to her patients trace their experiences with 
intersecting problems, the time invested in listening often yields more fruitful ways to 
approach treatment and healing since tracing emphasizes intersectionality.  
 For example, Charon recounts the experience of working with Mr. Ortiz, a patient 
who described not only his symptoms but “the recent shift from construction work to part-
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time clerking in a clothing store because of physical inability to do strenuous work, and his 
current shame at being unable to support his family without accepting welfare” (185). In 
treating Mr. Ortiz, she treated the physical symptoms of his coronary artery disease, but she 
also discovered that “his sadness and shame have by no means gone away. He continues to 
have joint pain, fatigue, trouble with his son, bursts of intolerable but uncontrollable 
anger” (185). Charon notes that she listens “as an internist—deciding to get knee films, for 
example, and to start anti-inflammatory medicine for his joint pain” but also “for his story of 
himself ” (185). She concludes by writing, “He finds comfort and strength in the telling and 
finds himself remembering things from childhood and making connections among his 
emotions, his past, and his physical symptoms” (185). Ultimately, such disclosure enables 
Mr. Ortiz to seek talking therapy with Charon, who asks a colleague in medical social work 
to be her mentor as she develops her skills in this area. “It feels right,” she says, “for me to 
commit this work myself instead of referring Mr. Ortiz to a separate psychotherapist because 
his emotional pain is intimately tied to his physical situation. It would feel disruptive of his 
integrity as a self-with-a-body to pull apart those two aspects of his suffering, apportioning 
the discouragement and depression to the social worker and keeping the chest pain and 
shortness of breath for myself ” (186). While Charon does not assume full responsibility for 
the care of Mr. Ortiz—and she reiterates later that “bearing witness requires community”—
she does refuse to disentangle the Gordian knot of the patient’s sources of pain to preserve his 
integrity as a complex but whole person (197). For Latour, similarly, “ANT claims that it is 
possible to trace more sturdy relations and discover more revealing patterns by finding a way 
to register the links between unstable and shifting frames of references rather than by trying 
to keep one frame stable” (Reassembling the Social 24). Thus, Charon’s listening can be seen as 
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a kind of Latourian tracing, a practice for medicine that is preferable to a dynamic of 
listening to or silencing patients. 
 Furthermore, tracing is also invaluable for medical rhetorics because, although 
Sanders allows that while in simple cases doctors can easily tell “whodunit” due to advances 
in medical technology, difficult cases offer a chance to revert to diagnosis as an art, since they 
suspend the doctor’s automatically assumed authority to speak for disease. As the medical 
advisor to the popular television show House, she estimates that up to 15 percent of patients 
are given the wrong diagnosis, and that incorrect diagnoses cause many of the adverse effects 
associated with illness (xxii). Far from blaming the patient for failure to be “read” properly or 
to comply with the doctor’s instructions, Sanders blames the diagnostic interaction, as 
recommended by Segal, that values technology over touch, testing over discussing, speaking 
over listening. In “Overconfidence as a Cause of Diagnostic Error in Medicine,” Eta S. 
Berner and Mark L. Graber corroborate Sanders’ assertion while they argue that doctors’ 
pride itself is commonly to blame for inaccuracies. They assert that physicians tend to 
generate an automatic hypothesis when examining patients, and once they have (often 
prematurely) made this educated guess, they automatically limit the range of available causes 
of illness. This creates a “general tendency on the part of physicians to disregard, or fail to 
use, decision-support resources” because “physicians do not think they need diagnostic 
assistance” (57). Berner and Graber attribute this tendency to overconfidence, at least in part, 
to the demands placed on physicians to be absolute authorities, to eschew uncertainty, and to 
present themselves as competent professionals—even in the face of fatal or complex illnesses 
(Timmermans and Mauck 18, Katz 35). Lest I sound too critical of physicians, it’s important 
to note that this process generally works—more often than not, such a process is adopted 
because of its general efficacy in limiting an enormous range of illnesses to a few likely 
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“culprits.” However, the relatively high rates of inaccurate diagnosis for common illnesses 
such as Bipolar Disorder (wrong diagnosis in 69 percent of patients), breast cancer (missed in 
21 percent of patients), endometriosis (missed in 18 percent of cases), and pulmonary 
embolism (diagnosis was incorrect in 55 percent of fatal cases) suggests that perhaps this 
model doesn’t work well for all illnesses, or in all situations (Perlis, Beam et al, Buchweitz et 
al, Pineda et al). Perhaps doctors and patients need other ways to trace problems particular to 
pain and illness that move beyond the antagonistic or paternalistic models so common in the 
medical literature. Perhaps, more to the point, they need each other. 
From Certainty to Meaningfulness 
 The suggestions here of the implications of networked diagnosis are by no means 
comprehensive, as there are both other fruitful benefits of adopting such a framework and 
potential consequences to consider, such as the allotment of resources and medicine’s values 
of efficiency and timeliness. If I at times come across as particularly critical of doctors, I want 
to acknowledge too that they face very real constraints when diagnosing patients. For medical 
doctors, a patient’s risk of death or other health complications (like a stroke) might urge 
them to quickly and perhaps brashly move forward in pursuit of an answer rather than 
considering their patient’s need to tell their story. For mental health practitioners, fears that 
their patients might take their own lives or endanger others if they don’t adopt a paternalistic 
role within the diagnostic encounter can foster detrimental but nonetheless understandable 
psychologist-patient dynamics. I also acknowledge that my project challenges a key value 
within medical or psychological diagnosis: the ability to be certain. As previously mentioned, 
Davis argues in that the very roots of the term diagnosis speak to the intricate relationship 
between certainty and medicine. However, as I hope this analysis highlights, coming to a 
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certain knowing of a patient’s illness may not only be impossible in some cases, it may not be 
enough to satisfy their need to make meaning out of a death-inflected or life-altering 
diagnostic experience. Thus, I want to conclude by suggesting that a networked approach to 
diagnosis might finally move us past the rigid pursuit of certainty and towards a striving for 
meaningfulness. 
 Ann Jurecic, in Illness as Narrative, says that if folk explanations for illness and 
religious justifications for suffering no longer hold sway in our contemporary moment, then 
doctor’s offices become the new space wherein people ask these questions “human fragility 
and significance” (10). The failure of doctor’s offices, both in general medicine and 
psychology, to answer these questions or to even entertain them has been well-documented, 
as the recent increase in autobiographical accounts of illness in digital and print spaces 
suggest. But as long as patients will be diagnosed with terminal illnesses, as long as everyday 
persons will suddenly have to open themselves up to medical authority because of a dot on 
an X-ray, and as long as doctors will serve as patients’ guides in their journey towards better 
mental health, it will not be enough to definitively tie down a diagnosis for a given person. 
People want to be cured, but they also want to be healed. And a networked approach to 
medicine, as it opens up alternatives to the diagnostic process that decenter medical 
authority, enable revisionary practices, and instigate tracings of complex illness experiences, 
might more effectively heal people by inviting them to make meaning within their networks.  
Chapter Overview  
The chapters that follow develop and qualify my claim that diagnostic practices are 
out of sync with the narratives diagnoses foster. As I will argue, ANT provides a generative 
framework for diagnostic deliberation as it more fully accounts for uncertainty, dispersed 
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agency, community stakeholders, and even nonhumans. In what follows, I will further tease 
out an alternative approach that better reflects diagnostic narratives authored by doctors, 
patients, and community stakeholders.  
 In Chapter 2, I conduct qualitative research on Dr. Lisa Sanders’ interactive New York 
Times “Diagnosis” column and explore an alternative definition for medical rhetorics. 
Whereas medical rhetorics has traditionally been defined as persuasion, interpretation, or 
identification, I argue instead that Sanders’ diagnostic narratives point to a more complex 
work for rhetoric: assembling actants together to solve a problem, enlisting new actants, and 
maintaining connections. I pay particular attention to the actants responsible for solving the 
diagnostic “cases”: the doctor and/or other healthcare providers, the patient and other actants 
(including family and community members), and chance. As these narratives reiterate, 
diagnosis is much messier than many doctors and patients would like to recognize; in fact, 
many of the cases are solved through random happenings, such as doctors agreeing to work 
late or a doctor deciding to run a challenging case past a greenhouse employee. This chapter 
highlights the need for a rhetorical approach to medical assemblage that might better enable 
us to account for and respond productively to uncertainty rather than being paralyzed by it.  
 Chapter 3 tells a more cautionary tale of what can happen when a network 
misdiagnoses patients, which occurred in 2015 for asymptomatic Ebola nurses who were 
forced into involuntary quarantine. The chapter focuses on methods for intervening in 
networks when they fail and holding all actants accountable. I focus particularly on Kaci 
Hickox, or the so-called “Ebola Nurse,” who was involuntarily quarantined by Chris 
Christie. I offer a rereading of the Hickox network through the lens of ANT, arguing that 
Christie and Maine governor Paul LePage attempted to exclude Hickox from the public 
health network and reinforce a myth that U.S. healthcare networks are safe from outside 
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influence. I also serve as a moralist in Latour’s sense by arguing that we must reincorporate 
several actants back into the collective if we are to confront future Ebola outbreaks more 
effectively. In particular, I reincorporate nonhumans (such as destroyed habitats and bat 
populations in Africa), perspectives of African aid workers, and conservative politics as they 
contributed to Hickox’s quarantine and the breakdown of the Ebola network. 
 In Chapter 4, I return to Chapter 2’s emphasis on uncertainty to argue that non-
Western theories of deliberation might better equip patients and doctors to navigate 
uncertain diagnostic contexts. In particular, I will consider the activities of two enigmatic 
communities. First, I will analyze the phenomenon of bug-chasers, or a subgroup of gay men 
who intentionally try to contract HIV because — among other reasons — they’d rather 
know they have it than live in constant fear. Then, I will highlight the experiences of people 
at risk for genetic diseases who choose not to take predictive tests, primarily because they 
would rather live with uncertainty than know for certain whether they will develop a 
particular disease. Such cases point to a dangerous fixation on certainty within Western 
medicine, which values outcome generation and knowledge of one’s health status even when 
such efforts may not help — and may actually harm — patients. I draw on Arabella Lyon’s 
research in Deliberative Acts: Democracy, Rhetoric, and Rights and explore how a shift towards 
Chinese deliberation practices (which closely resemble ANT practice) might better enable 
patients to dwell with uncertainty. Such research might also contribute to Western rhetorics 
an appreciation for alternatives to outcome-driven and hierarchical deliberation.  
 Finally, in Chapter 5, I argue that medical assemblages can contribute to rhetorical 
scholarship a more complex understanding of ethos. Drawing on both examples of networked 
ethoi in diagnostic practice and theories of networked ethoi from feminist ecological 
rhetoricians, I will consider how such a framework might enable rhetoricians to ethically 
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respond to the needs of multiple stakeholders. The view of medicine—and rhetoric—as an 
assemblage means grappling with pressing questions regarding which stakeholders should be 
prioritized and why. Diagnostic networks perform a kind of “calibrated” ethoi, to borrow a 
term from Annmarie Mol, wherein the expertise of doctors, patients, healthcare providers 
community members, insurance companies, family members and friends, and nonhumans 
must be shared. I will conclude by exploring the implications of such a model of ethoi for 
rhetoric and composition.  
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CHAPTER 2:  
DIAGNOSING MEDICAL RHETORICS 
Socrates wants to replace pistis with a didacticism that is fit for professors asking students to take 
exams on things known in advance and rehearsed by training and rote exercises, but that is not fit 
for the trembling souls who have to decide what is right and wrong on the spot. - Bruno Latour 
  
 In April 2016, a CFP began circulating for an edited collection entitled The Rhetoric 
of Health and Medicine as/is: Theories and Concepts for an Emerging Field. Editors, including 
Lisa Meloncon, Scott Graham, Jenell Johnson, John Lynch, and Cynthia Ryan, called on 
readers to propose chapters that “[would] explore how scholars in the rhetoric of health and 
medicine use rhetoric in theoretical and practical ways to examine the discourses of health 
and medicine and how those discourses create meaning within a wide variety of scientific, 
technical, practical, and political sites” (Ryan “Re: CFP”). They charged those submitting 
proposals with the hefty task of defining what it means to take a rhetorical approach to 
studying medicine and healthcare. More specifically, they asked for submissions to address 
what rhetoric as/is medicine means: 
Let’s take the concept that is part of the field’s name, “rhetoric.” For many 
years, scholars in rhetorical studies and rhetoric and composition have argued 
that rhetoric is a way of analyzing existing discourse as well as providing a 
framework for creating it. As provides us an entryway into thinking about 
different concepts as theoretical underpinnings. Is provides us an entryway 
into thinking about how theories can potentially be applied in practice. We 
definitely want to nudge and even push scholars in the rhetoric of health and 
medicine to appraise what it is that we do and examine what sets us apart 
from other related fields. This endeavor means taking a critical stance to 
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determine what is at stake when we say that we are rhetoricians of health and 
medicine. (Ryan “Re: CFP”) 
Aside from delineating theoretical foundations for the field of healthcare rhetorics, the CFP 
raised a deceptively simple question: what is medical rhetorics? Perhaps it should be no 
surprise that such a question be posed by those attempting to further establish a growing 
field, since it directly echoes another question that scholars since Plato have attempted to 
answer: what is rhetoric?  
 The CFP is merely the most recent example of an attempt to explore the intersections 
of rhetoric and medicine and locate what makes studying them in concert so compelling. 
According to Stephen Pender in “Between Medicine and Rhetoric,” medicine and rhetoric 
have been linked since at least the fourteenth century since “both rhetoric and medicine are 
pragmatic and interventionist: one devoted to the body, the other to the body politic” (40). 
The study of medicine’s rhetorical dimensions initially served the needs of physicians who 
needed to categorize complex medical and bodily phenomena. Pender argues that rhetorical 
inquiry has also informed the ways in which physicians are able to generalize medical 
findings based on particular cases and data; rhetorical theories of probability and best 
practices have shaped medical inquiry. “For physicians struggling with the variable, 
conflicting medical theories and a frangible, uncertain practice,” he writes, “rhetoric offers 
methods for reducing phenomena to their common forms, for placing these forms within 
emergent systems, and for practical intervention devoted to agitation, comfort, or cure” (41). 
Because rhetoric has so heavily influenced the way medicine is conceived and practiced, 
Pender concludes: “[M]edicine cannot be immured from the pressures and pulsions of 
rhetorical inquiry” (64). Since rhetoric provides us with tools for analyzing situations, 
categorizing types of situations, and acting in a decisive and informed manner, Pender 
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suggests, it is indispensible to the art of medicine. Indeed, each of the famed ancient 
rhetoricians and philosophers—from Plato’s Socrates, to Aristotle, to Quintillian, to Cicero
—spoke to the relationship between the two. 
 Reinvigorating rhetoric’s and medicine’s ancient affinities, the area of study labeled 
“Rhetoric of Health and Medicine” or the “Health Humanities” more recently developed as a 
subgenre of the “Rhetoric of Science” and Science and Technology Studies (Segal 12-14). 
Barbara Heifferon and Stuart J. Brown note that the emergence of Writing Across the 
Curriculum (WAC) programs in the 1970s influenced a renewed interest in medicine on the 
part of rhetoric and composition scholars, since the WAC movement “turned attention to 
textual production in other disciplines” (3). Although Kenneth Burke had long before 
“opened up rhetoric to science” just as Thomas Kuhn “opened up science to rhetoric,” it 
wasn’t until the 1980s that the field of rhetoric and composition began to rhetorically study 
scientific processes and texts (Segal 10). In part, the downplaying of “humanistic origins and 
impulses” in Western biomedicine contributed to the resurgence of studies that linked 
rhetorical theory and science studies / medicine (Heifferon and Brown 3). In response, the 
1990s “saw a return to humanities training and an understanding of the role of language in 
both medical school curricula and health practices” (3). In the 1990s, the narrative therapy 
movement (see Michael White and David Epston’s Maps of Narrative Practice) began to 
thrive, and in 2000, Rita Charon founded Columbia’s Program in Narrative Medicine, later 
theorizing her alternative philosophy and method in Narrative Medicine: Honoring the Stories 
of Illness. The 1990s also saw the relative proliferation of scholarly texts dealing with 
rhetorical approaches to medicine, including Celeste Condit’s Decoding Abortion Rhetoric, 
Kathryn Montgomery Hunter’s Doctor’s Stories: The Narrative Structure of Medical Knowledge, 
Lennard J. Davis’ Enforcing Normalcy: Disability, Deafness, and the Body, Arthur W. Frank’s 
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The Wounded Storyteller, and Marc Berg’s and Annemarie Mol’s Differences in Medicine: 
Unraveling Practices, Techniques, and Bodies, among others. As these titles suggest, topics 
ranging from medical practices, scholarship and writing to the constructions of bodies / 
ability were explored through the lenses of rhetorical theory, literature, philosophy, 
communication studies, and sociology.    
 In 2000, Technical Communication Quarterly’s special issue on medical rhetoric 
seemingly sealed medicine’s place within rhetoric and composition scholarship. In their 
“Guest Editor’s Column,” co-editors Heifferon and Brown mention that the special issue is 
the first to invite submissions pertaining to “medical rhetoric,” but they also note the historic 
roots of their project: their goal for the collection is to reverse Plato’s splitting of rhetoric and 
medicine by reuniting them and designating their union as an area of study (247). Heifferon 
and Brown define medical rhetoric loosely as “how we communicate healthcare concerns,” 
and highlight its evolution from the first time an ancient cave person “turned to the person 
next to him/her and tried to describe a pain” to contemporary healthcare policies and 
attempts to theorize the body (247).  
  Jessica Masri Eberhard’s “An Annotated Bibliography of Literature on the Rhetoric 
of Health and Medicine” provides an especially detailed review of key texts within this area of 
study from 1973 (Foucault’s Birth of the Clinic) to 2011 (Joan Leach’s and Deborah Dysart-
Gale’s Rhetorical Questions of Health and Medicine). By the time of Eberhard’s writing in 
2012, the compilation of sources for an annotated bibliography on medical rhetorics 
scholarship proved a “daunting task” given “The various methodologies, objects of interest, 
critical lenses, disciplinary affiliations, and overarching conversations [that] have spread and 
now overlap to a large extent” (n.p.). Since 2012, the study of medical rhetorics has 
continued to flourish in terms of technical communication, narrative theory, healthcare 
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education, and public health discourse, among others (see, for example, Therese Jones’, 
Delese Wear’s, and Lester D. Friedman’s Health Humanities Reader for a vibrant display of 
such scholarship).  
 This tracing of the recent history of rhetorics of healthcare and medicine brings us 
back to the CFP for scholarship that defines the boundaries and foundations of the field of 
medical rhetorics. How might we define medical rhetorics now—8 years after Heifferon and 
Brown—and what might we change about their early definition to better reflect 
contemporary circumstances? In “Recognizing Differences and Commonalities: The Rhetoric 
of Health and Medicine and Critical-Interpretive Health Communication,” John A. Lynch 
and Heather Zoller revert to an even older definition in response to my question: 
Like rhetorical studies generally, rhetoric of science, technology, health, and 
medicine identify Aristotle’s Rhetoric as its foundational text. Rhetorical 
studies of health and medicine, like the rhetoric of science and technology, 
usually emphasize the situatedness of discourse, consider stylistic components 
(i.e., metaphor, trope) as key to persuasion, and culminate with a judgment 
about the rhetorical practice(s) being considered (Condit et al., 2012, Depew 
& Lyne, 2013, Prelli, 2013; Segal, 2009). (500) 
This approach to defining medical rhetorics in Aristotelian terms presumes that medical 
rhetoric means studying the available means of persuasion in healthcare contexts. While 
Lynch and Zoller are not alone in this presumption (about which more later), I want to 
suggest that continuing to define rhetoric in general, and medical rhetorics in particular, 
based on Aristotle’s limited purview means failing to account for contemporary theories that 
better represent the complexity (rhetorical and otherwise) of medical encounters. Of course, 
some aspects of medicine are inherently persuasive—doctors must persuade their patients to 
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trust them; in some cases, they must persuade patients to take their medicine, and in other 
cases, they attempt to persuade them that a particular course of treatment will best suit their 
needs. However, as I will argue in this chapter, persuasion alone cannot account for all that is 
communicated and all that happens in rhetorical encounters surrounding medicine.  
 The idea that rhetoric in medical contexts always takes the form of persuasion fails to 
reflect the uncertainty of day-to-day medical encounters, in particular. The proliferation of 
narratives written by doctors, surgeons, medical residents, and other healthcare providers has 
revealed the extent to which doctors are often not in a position to persuade patients 
regarding what to do since they are unsure themselves. In Atul Gawande’s Complications: A 
Surgeon’s Notes on an Imperfect Science, he emphasizes that doctors are constantly uncertain as 
they make informed life-and-death decisions, despite years of training, education, and 
specialization. He writes: 
Medicine is, I have found, . . . a disturbing business . . . We drug people, put 
needles and tubes into them, manipulate their chemistry, biology, and 
physics, lay them unconscious and open up their bodies to the world. We do 
so out of an abiding confidence in our know-how as a profession. What you 
find when you get in close, however—close enough to see the furrowed 
brows, the doubts and missteps, the failures as well as the successes—is how 
messy, uncertain, and also surprising medicine turns out to be. (4) 
Gawande’s book makes a compelling case for viewing medicine as a science with limitations 
and doctors as humans with vulnerabilities, despite technological advances and medical 
discoveries that have generated an alternative narrative of medical perfection. For Gawande, 
notwithstanding the “habit, intuition, and sometimes plain old guessing” that medicine 
entails, there is still the need to “act decisively,” to make decisions in the moment with 
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people’s lives on the line (7-8). In contrast to the view that doctors are authorities who must 
persuade patients to accept their diagnoses and comply with a treatment plan, Gawande 
views the doctor-patient relationship as a dynamic and fragile one wherein the doctor must 
act decisively yet with full knowledge of his/her limitations. Gawande’s response to the idea 
that rhetoric within medical contexts is persuasion might echo Jake’s infamous quote in The 
Sun Also Rises: “Isn’t it pretty to think so?” (251).  
 However, Gawande implicitly speaks to the value of studying what rhetoric means 
for/within medicine when he writes, “[W]hat seems most vital and interesting is not how 
much we in medicine know but how much we don’t—and how we might grapple with that 
ignorance more wisely” (8). In this chapter, I will extend Gawande’s question by considering 
how rhetorical theory might help healthcare providers contend with uncertainty and 
ignorance more productively. I’m primarily interested in how medical practitioners might 
grapple with diagnostic uncertainties more effectively because, as Gawande notes, diagnosis 
often looks less like “plug[ging] it all [test results and patient information] into a formula [to] 
calculate the result” and more like “us[ing] . . . clinical judgment [and intuition] . . . to 
decide” (42). Diagnosis, perhaps more than any other rhetorical interaction within medicine, 
is haunted by uncertainty, and the stakes are high since doctors can only effectively treat 
patients once they’ve accurately determined what’s wrong. As Lisa Sanders points out in Every 
Patient Tells a Story, “[A]s treatment becomes more standardized, the most complex and 
important decision making will take place at the level of diagnosis” (xv). In contrast to the 
definitions previously proposed, I define rhetoric as collective decision-making in contexts of 
uncertainty and diversity (as adapted from Trish Roberts-Miller’s definition, see Chapter 1), I 
wonder what such a conception of rhetoric might illuminate within diagnostic encounters. 
My goal is not to offer physicians a new way to conceive of their work but to trace diagnostic 
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processes and their rhetorical events as they unfold within real-life scenarios. Furthermore, I 
do not hope to offer a “once-and-for-all” definition of medical rhetorics but to rather see 
what the lens of this definition can reveal about medical decision making surrounding 
diagnosis.  2
 In what follows, I will first trace tentative definitions for rhetoric within diagnostic 
contexts before I elaborate on my own definition, as informed by Bruno Latour and 
Nathaniel Rivers. I will then perform an analysis of narratives written by Dr. Lisa Sanders for 
the New York Times’ “Diagnosis” column to consider what rhetorical interactions are taking 
place, and what they reveal about the intersections of rhetoric, medicine, and diagnosis. In 
particular, I will pay attention to the actants responsible for solving a diagnostic “case,” such 
as the doctor, another healthcare provider, the patient and other actants (including her family 
members), and chance. 
How is Medicine Rhetorical? 
 As I consider how key figures in medical rhetorics define their area of study, I am 
struck by the resonances of their definitions with classic definitions for rhetoric. Thus, in 
what follows, I will highlight three ancient definitions for rhetoric now adopted by medical 
rhetoricians to describe their practice: medical rhetorics as persuasion, interpretation, and 
identification. While all of these rhetorical interactions occur within medical rhetorics, I find 
it restricting to reduce the complex and multi-faceted interactions between healthcare 
providers and patients to one type of rhetorical event. I will thus adopt what I find to be a 
more encompassing and versatile definition for medical rhetorics via Latour and Rivers. 
 It’s also important to note that the meaning of medical rhetorics will change depending on 2
the type of medicine and type of medical situation being studied. A surgeon will likely 
conceive of rhetoric’s role differently than a pathologist would, for example.
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These scholars bridge two major areas of study: new materialism and rhetorical theory; they 
are thus well-suited to generate a multi-faceted conception of medical rhetorics that resonates 
with the uncertainty of medicine that Gawande highlights.  
 First, as previously discussed, persuasion continues to be perhaps the most popular 
definition for medical rhetorics in contemporary scholarship. Judy Z. Segal’s foundational 
text, Health and the Rhetoric of Medicine, espouses this definition: rhetoric is persuasion, 
especially in medical contexts. As Segal notes in the introduction, “The premise of the book 
is that rhetorical study—essentially, the study of persuasion—is a good means of illuminating 
and recasting problems in health and medicine” (1). By conflating rhetoric and persuasion, 
Segal uncovers a myriad of provocative relationships between health and rhetoric; for 
example, she writes of hypochondriacs that they “have become persuaded in the absence of 
an organic precipitating cause that they are ill” (74). But more pressingly, Segal focuses on 
the extent to which persuasion saturates the doctor-patient relationship. In her 1994 article 
“Patient Compliance, the Rhetoric of Rhetoric, and the Rhetoric of Persuasion,” Segal 
emphasizes the usefulness of persuasion for understanding the problem of patient 
(non)compliance with taking medications as prescribed, which was labeled the most pressing 
problem facing medicine at the time of its publication (90-1). How is it, she wonders, that 
doctors can effectively persuade patients to take their medicine as prescribed? And what goes 
wrong when they fail to convince their patients? However, Segal’s useful insights ultimately 
lead her to go too far in suggesting that rhetorical criticism is solely “the study of persuasive 
elements . . . in a wide range of texts, especially in the realm of social action or public 
discourse” (10). Although she expansively highlights the value of Burkean and Kuhnean 
versions of persuasion within medical situations pertaining to compliance, Segal overstates 
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her case by assuming that all rhetorical interactions within medicine are persuasive—thus 
failing to anticipate other rhetorical relationships.  
 Even Segal’s previous work undermines her book’s argument, as she suggested in an 
earlier essay that imbalanced power dynamics and asymmetrical relationships within 
medicine may prevent doctors from persuading patients. In short, she posits that 
communication breakdowns between doctors and can oftentimes be attributed to a failure to 
find common ground.. She explains:  
Within this rhetorical view, persuasion is predicated on the existence of at 
least a shared language and shared values—both of which are absent to 
varying degrees within biomedicine's physician-patient relationship. In fact, 
with its focus on the discourse community as a context and necessary 
condition for rhetoric, rhetorical theory so clearly predicts the failure of 
physician-patient persuasion within the current medical model that the more 
interesting question (though one I will not attempt to answer) is probably 
not why so many do not comply with medical advice, but why so many do. 
(“Patient Compliance” 97) 
Because in Segal’s view effective persuasion must involve both rhetors speaking the same 
language and caring about the same things, doctors cannot truly persuade patients, or, at 
best, they can do so only in rare circumstances. Segal’s later assertion, in Health and the 
Rhetoric of Medicine, that rhetorical persuasion must involve “a contact of minds,” while 
idyllic, fails to account for her own point regarding the divisions between doctors and 
patients: linguistic barriers, differing expertise, and, perhaps most significantly, varying levels 
of health (17). Thus, the view that medical rhetorics need always hinge on persuasion fails on 
Segal’s own criteria. 
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 Other scholars, most notably Kathryn Montgomery Hunter, define medical rhetorics 
in terms of Renaissance-era hermeneutics, of which Augustine is perhaps the most famous 
practitioner. For Hunter, rhetoric’s function within medicine lies in its interpretive power, 
particularly in regards to diagnosis. She likens diagnosis to a process of active reading wherein 
the patient is a text and the doctor is a critical reader, thus reinforcing stereotypical and 
paternalistic relationships between doctors and patients. She writes:  
[T]he investigative procedures of medicine resemble the act of reading far 
more closely than they do the laboratory process that has customarily been 
regarded as scientific. Diagnosis is interpretive; therapeutics is interpretive; 
and the care of the patient includes the interpretation of what is regarded as 
brute fact: the symptoms, the test results. ‘Your pain is bursitis,’ the doctor 
says; or, ‘The biopsy indicates that that lump is malignant.’ Patients enter the 
doctor’s office sick; they have come for interpretation of their signs and 
symptoms. (9) 
The diagnostic process then, for Hunter, occurs when a patient willingly presents her body as 
a text to be read and interpreted by an expert. Hunter carefully distinguishes the work 
doctors do from invention, since she argues that the view that patients and doctors co-create 
narratives of illness “accords the physician a much too central role in the life drama of the 
person who is ill” (12). She adds, “It is interpretive work that the physician is doing, not 
original composition, nor even (except in rare cases) co-composition” (12). While Hunter 
claims that doctors play an integral role in interpreting patients’ bodies as texts (apparently 
passively inscribed with symbols and codes to be deciphered), she simultaneously denies that 
doctors participate in the creation of such texts. In effect, Hunter denies that diagnosis and 
interpretation are rhetorical events at all in that she sees them as a process of inputting data 
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to gain the correct answer (a view that Gawande explicitly rejects, as previously 
demonstrated).  
 Beyond the issue of physician agency, Hunter’s offers a disempowering theory of 
patient identity in diagnostic contexts. A patient who fails to be read by a doctor, for Hunter, 
hardly exists at all as a rhetorical being. She explains:  
As a medical construct, the patienthood of the sick person requires a 
physician-reader for its existence in a way that illness and suffering do not. 
Indeed, the physician’s reading as it is recorded in the patient’s chart or 
presented at morning report transforms the ill, unknowable person into a 
knowable, narratable, and thus treatable medical entity. Interpretation is in 
itself not a method that leads to good or ill. The medical reading ideally does 
no violence to the person and does not intervene in or alter the illness. (12) 
To reiterate: the patienthood of the sick person requires a physician-reader for its existence. A 
person does not become a patient until a physician reads her—and yet it is not an agentive 
role that the physician holds. Hunter’s conception of diagnosis as a static interpretation of 
illness casts both the physician’s reading and the patient’s body/text as passive, a-rhetorical 
objects. Within Hunter’s framework, all that matters is treatment (wherein patients attempt 
to re-embed a diagnostic interruption into their ongoing life story) and attempts to 
standardize the identification and categorization of each illness, regardless of the individual 
who suffers. She posits that “[M]edicine awaits the day when the anomalous character of 
each malady will disappear, and with it the need for all narration” (105). Or, put another 
way, a perfect medicine would need no rhetoric. 
 In contrast to Hunter’s a-rhetorical approach to medicine, and in response to the 
problems previously described, the narrative medicine movement proposes an alternative 
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definition for medical rhetorics, particularly surrounding diagnosis: identification. In “The 
Reader’s Response and Why It Matters in Biomedical Ethics,” Charles M. Anderson and 
Martha Montello describe identification via Plato’s Gorgias: “Rooted in what rhetorician 
Kenneth Burke describes as the natural inclination of persons to ‘identify’ with others, 
Socrates’ greatest form of friendship seeks ‘consubstantiality,’ which is the recognition that, 
despite significant differences, I am of the same substance as you, we share interests, 
experiences, and we value each other accordingly” (88). Such an approach prefigures any 
ethical rhetorical interaction, for Anderson and Montello, because Socrates’ version of 
consubstantiality enables readers to “imaginatively experience [and inhabit] the narrative 
realities” he proposes and to thereby “return to the present moment to consider in a more 
critical, more analytical way the knowledge gleaned from the experience” (89). The process of 
identification, then, becomes a way of destabilizing the self to enter the “rhetorical power of 
the narrative” and experience “the relational impact of the friendship shared by participants 
in the conversation” (89). Such a method serves bioethical deliberation, too, since Anderson 
and Montello envision patients and doctors engaging in a similar exchange as they experience 
the patient’s story.  
 For example, Anderson and Montello describe a woman named Mrs. Green, who 
meets an “appalled” and “harried” medical student who takes her “case” when she is 
hospitalized for end-stage diabetes (91). The student “accidentally opens a door onto the 
narrative of the patient’s life” by inquiring into her history of growing cotton as a child; the 
patient responds by opening up to the medical student about her life and the challenges she 
has faced (92). This moment of narrative exchange alters the relationship—or rather creates 
one—between Mrs. Green and the medical student, who “finds himself transformed by the 
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narrative consubstantiality they share” and “resists and finally discards the normative medical 
narrative” of her deteriorating health (92). The medical student’s response is powerful:  
As he enters the world her story offers him, he meets her authentic, historic 
self and understands that she and he, as different as they might seem, are 
indeed of the same substance at the deepest levels of human experience and 
value. He is empowered by that knowledge to deliver effective, efficient 
medical care that brings about significant improvement . . . medical care he 
simply could not deliver had he not so fully participated in the narrative 
events in which her story engages him. (92)  
Such an approach enables the patient to receive better treatment and the medical student to 
achieve greater personal satisfaction from his work, as he identifies with the patient’s story 
and sees her as a human being. 
 Identification seems crucial to the process of viewing a patient as a human being with 
individual needs and life stories. However, I worry about the wholesale and uncritical 
adoption of a practice that enables doctors to feel like they can fully understand a patient by 
listening to their stories. While doctors taking the time to listen to patients and hear their 
needs represents progress, the claim that they can fully understand the needs of a patient that 
may—in many cases—lead a less privileged life than they do based on a single narrative is 
naïve. Imbalanced power dynamics cannot simply be erased when a physician empathizes 
with a patient. Furthermore, what happens to patients with whom doctors cannot identify? 
Will they receive less effective care, less empathy, or less attention from their physician? 
While identification may occur in some cases, to the mutual benefit of doctors and patients, 
it cannot be counted on to guide rhetorical relationships in medicine.  
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 All of the above definitions for medical rhetorics fail to fully account for the 
diagnostic process—what is rhetoric’s function in this medical situation? While doctors may 
need to persuade patients to receive a particular treatment, it is uncommon for patients to 
actually reject a diagnosis that can be substantiated with evidence (as most diagnoses are), 
which renders persuasion an improper definition for medical rhetorics in diagnostic cases. 
Doctors must certainly interpret test results, their patient’s story, and their bodies in order to 
diagnose, but does this cover the decisions that doctors must make to determine which tests 
to order, which elements of the patient’s story to focus on, and which bodily symptoms to 
pay attention to? Finally, while identification may enable doctors to provide more empathetic 
care, it can actually prevent diagnoses from occurring when it obscures important 
information—in the cases that follow, despite their ongoing relationships with patients, 
primary care physicians often miss a diagnosis that a new doctor immediately catches. A 
more fitting and encompassing way to conceive of medical rhetorics—particularly in regards 
to diagnosis—can be found in bringing together the work of Latour and Rivers since it 
accounts for deliberating in complex situations that encompass a range of actants. 
  
Toward A New Definition for Medical Rhetorics 
 In contrast to the previous definitions offered for rhetoric (persuasion, interpretation, 
identification), Rivers offers an alternative definition for rhetoric via Latour; rhetoric “is the 
glue or the work of gluing together relationships” and “the art or science of living 
together” (“Introduction” n.p.). Lest anyone imagine that “relationships” or “living together” 
applies only to humans, Rivers speaks to the value of Latour’s work for rhetoric: its assertion 
that we must also “account for the glue between humans and nonhumans and maybe even 
between nonhumans and nonhumans” (n.p.). The shift then is away from a conception of 
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rhetoric as static and occurring between two actors (speaker and audience) and towards a 
dispersed view of rhetoric occurring within a collective of actants, many of them 
nonhumans. “The term ‘collective,’” Latour clarifies, “does not mean ‘one’; rather . . . it 
means ‘all, but not two’” (Politics of Nature 94). Whereas Latour refrains from defining 
rhetoric, as he famously prefers to watch what something does rather than posit what it is, I 
suggest that, based on his framework, rhetoric assembles. For Latour, assembling occurs as 
actants move and shift in and out of networks that together form such concepts as the social, 
reality, rhetoric, and, I might add, medicine. An assemblage within medicine, for example, 
might involve a doctor, patient, nurse, X-Ray, family member, the patient’s prescriptions, her 
body, the conditions in her history or environment that caused her illness, among many 
others. While the only way to trace an actant’s movements is to watch it act, Latour carefully 
reminds readers that no actant ever acts alone. He explains that “Action is not done under the 
full control of consciousness; action should rather be felt as a node, a knot, and a 
conglomerate of many surprising sets of agencies that have to be slowly 
disentangled” (Reassembling the Social 44). While networks will continue to assemble 
regardless of our intervention, Latour does allow that the ANT practitioner should “trace 
social connections using the unexpected trails [traces] left” behind when they shift or mutate 
into new associations (Reassembling the Social 43).  
Thus, rhetoric can be understood as having two key functions within ANT 
assemblages. First, as Rivers points out, rhetoric operates within networks as “the glue” that 
holds actants together. Assembled actants use discourse to enlist actants into the collective, 
negotiate their communal actions, and bind themselves together. The work that networks do 
is rhetorical in that actants (human and non-human) must be persuaded to join forces within 
a network and maintain the assemblage using discourse, though this does not always take the 
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form of written or spoken language. The work of network (re)composition is also rhetorical 
in that ANT practitioners use rhetoric to trace associations, intervene in networks as they 
shift, and determine which actants have been excluded and need to be reconsidered (about 
which more later). At the level of network tracing, ANT practitioners employ rhetoric to 
reshape networks to most effectively meet the problems requiring our collective attention.  
 While Latour does not speak directly about rhetoricians, he addresses a group he calls 
the “moralists” in Politics of Nature as he redefines the roles that scientists, politicians, 
economists, and moralists will share in the new collective. Rather than defining the world in 
terms of nature vs. society (or fact vs. value), Latour proposes a new system wherein experts 
would solve the same problems using their own expertise “Like fairies . . . offer[ing their] 
own particular gifts” (137). While a full analysis of the new collective is beyond the scope of 
this chapter, it’s important to note that Latour explicitly tasks scientists with the 
responsibility to “detect scarcely visible phenomena very early” and, using their specialized 
tools, skills, and ability to see (through their instruments) through multiple points of view, to 
take into account the imperceptible propositions demanding to be heard” (138). Scientists, 
then, are tasked with listening to a range of actants and attuning themselves to their 
demands. On the other hand, Latour tasks moralists (who I read as rhetoricians and/or 
ethicists) to “equip the entities that have been set aside with the right to appeal that they can 
use when, in order to fulfill the requirement of closure, they are driven out of the 
collective” (156). Thus, while scientists must hear the actants that are apart of the 
assemblage, moralists/rhetoricians must constantly ask who has been excluded from it. These 
excluded voices cannot be left out forever but will “have to be reintegrated, at some later 
point” when the network needs them, at which point, “Those who have been excluded from 
the collective are going to come back all the more quickly to knock on the door, to the extent 
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that the moralists will . . . go looking for them outside the collective, in order to faciliate their 
reentry and accelerate their insertion” (157). While moralists and scientists work in concert 
with economists and politicians, I want to emphasize the complementary roles Latour assigns 
to scientists and moralists—the work of listening to the imperceptible, tracing its 
movements, considering the problem from multiple points of view, asking which actants 
have been prematurely excluded, and bringing these actants back into the network when 
necessary. Put another way, Latour sees scientists and rhetoricians as intervening in 
assemblages to observe actants at work and add to the assemblages when actants previously 
considered insignificant stand to reshape the collective in beneficial ways. 
 As the above analysis attempts to make clear, the work of assemblage serves well as a 
definition for what medical rhetorics looks like in diagnostic situations. When a doctor 
diagnoses a patient, she must be able to trace associations amongst actants, listen to the 
actants as they speak—even and especially the scarcely perceptible ones—and she must 
constantly ask herself which actants have been overlooked or excluded as insignificant that 
might illuminate the problem. Only once she has traced all of the actants within the 
assemblage, often in conjunction with a variety of other actants that comprise her own 
professional network, can she intervene in the illness’s network and revise it to remove 
dangerous actants and add healthier links. Networks are never static but ever evolving, which 
results in a vibrant and always uncertain work of following them without being certain where 
one of going; such a point resonates with diagnoses because, for Sanders, “Uncertainty is the 
water we swim in” (“Unexplained Illness” n.p.).  
 In the analysis that follows, I demonstrate that in addition to generating an 
alternative framework for diagnoses, the ANT assembly frame better describes what is already 
happening. I hope that such a view might offer physicians and patients a more livable 
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framework for inhabiting diagnoses—for understanding the uncertainty that haunts them, 
the randomness with which some diagnoses occur, and the networked actants that make both 
illness and diagnosis possible. Thus, in what follows, I briefly describe the “Diagnosis” 
column by Sanders, and I then shift to an analysis of 75 diagnosis narratives to more fully 
develop my claim that Latour’s practice of assembly serves as a productive framework for 
understanding rhetoric’s function within diagnostic scenarios.  
Sanders’ “Diagnosis” Column 
 Sanders created the New York Times “Diagnosis” column back in 2002, and her 
column’s focus on mysterious illnesses and elusive diagnoses inspired the popular television 
show House several years later. Each column generally begins with a patient being brought to 
the hospital or suffering from a medical emergency, getting evaluated by a physician, and, 
eventually, getting treated for his or her illness. Strikingly, the diagnostic revelation generally 
comes at the end of the column rather than the beginning—this is not the story of recovery 
but the story of discovering what’s the matter with a patient. Most narratives, of which there 
are 75 total, have three sections—Symptoms, Investigation, and Resolution—with the 
diagnosis generally occurring within the Resolution section. When the column’s 47th post 
was published in 2011, readers were suddenly invited to respond to the mysterious story (and 
each subsequent one) and post their diagnostic hypothesis. Later, Sanders would update the 
post, highlight the range of answers submitted by readers, and congratulate the readers who 
guessed correctly (the first person to guess the correct diagnosis also wins a signed copy of her 
book, as of 2009). The invitation for readers to participate in diagnosis creates what Sanders 
calls a kind of “crowd sourced medical conversation” amongst healthcare providers, medical 
students, and laypersons (“The Girl with Unexplained Hair Loss”). Her overall goal in telling 
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these mysterious diagnostic stories, she explains, is to “put you, the reader, in the front line, 
in the shoes of the doctor at the bedside—to know that feeling of uncertainty and intrigue 
when confronted with a patient who has a problem that just might kill him” (Every Patient 
Tells a Story xxv). The payoff is not just for doctors, who need to be better informed about 
strange diagnoses so they can catch them in their own patients, but for patients themselves, 
who might better grasp their agency in diagnostic situations once they’ve studied her column. 
Sanders notes, “As physicians become more open about what we do, we make it easier for 
patients to understand what they can do to more fully participate in their own care” (xxvi). 
Thus, Sanders turns diagnosis into a kind of networked game wherein everyone can 
participate—albeit with varying levels of expertise and different roles. 
 To analyze the 75 narratives, I created a list of common ways in which the diagnosis 
occurred based on the primary actant responsible for the diagnosis—the doctor, another 
healthcare provider, the patient/others, and chance. Within these four major categories, I 
created a list of subcategories based on the more specific way in which the diagnosis occurred 
and calculated how many narratives fit each subcategory. For the first category, Doctor 
Solved the Case, I created the following subcategories: doctor’s observation of an episode (3), 
doctor just figures it out (4), doctor runs through a list of possibilities (1), reading the 
patient’s past history reveals the problem (2), linking symptoms rather than viewing them 
separately (4), doctor remembers something / notices a new factor (4), problem diagnosed 
during a physical exam (5), test reveals the problem (14), and creating a hierarchy of 
problems / isolating one factor (2). For the second category, Another Healthcare Provider 
Solves the Case, the subcategories were as follows: a medical blog provided the answer (1), 
Google provided the answer (2), the doctor missed the diagnosis (4), another doctor solves 
the case (9), and a resident or medical student solves the case (3). For the third category, the 
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Patient/Others Solved the Case, the subcategories were as follows: the patient solves her own 
case (5), a family member solves the case (4), a non-expert solves the case (1), and the 
patient’s story provides the answer (3). Finally, for the Chance category, wherein the 
diagnosis was discovered through a random series of events, the subcategories were as follows: 
chance (3), disease had to progress (3), the problem was discovered during an operation (2), 
an object in the patient’s room revealed the problem (2), and an effective treatment 
demonstrated the problem (1). In a few cases, because the diagnosis involved two actants 
working together, I allowed for the diagnosis to fit within two subcategories, and I also 
excluded two columns from my analysis because they dealt with diagnosing fictional 
characters. 
 In what follows, I will analyze key narratives using my major categories to explore 
what rhetorical interaction entails in diagnostic encounters. While these 73 narratives are by 
no means comprehensive, they nonetheless highlight key tensions and connections between 
rhetoric and medicine. The narratives also highlight tensions within assemblages between 
doctors, patients, their families, and random occurrences / nonhuman actants, and they 
emphasize the shared agency these actants demonstrate as they initiate and support 
diagnostic deliberation. The three sections that follow are based on three key actants (doctors, 
patients/others, and nonhumans/chance), but as my analysis will prove, such actants are 
often dispersed and complexly interwoven rather than solitary and stable during diagnostic 
encounters.  
Doctoring the Network 
 The narratives in Sanders’ “Diagnosis” column commonly emphasize that doctors fail 
to diagnose patients on their own; in general, they rely on a network of other physicians, 
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friends, and web resources to help them come to an accurate diagnosis. In part, this might be 
attributed to the fact that no doctor can remember all diagnoses, so a network of fellow 
doctors is needed to expand their collective bank of possible illnesses. Furthermore, as the 
forthcoming narratives highlight, doctors often rely on others to pick up on the clue that 
hides in plain sight. Just as a person solving a puzzle might be stumped by a missing piece 
only to have a friend come by and immediately find it, doctors often need other doctors to 
help them see the problem from a new angle, thus revealing the problem (in many cases). 
 Such a networked approach to diagnostic decision-making is emphasized in a post 
called “A Red Scare,” where a patient is mistakenly diagnosed with poison oak, even though 
she disagrees with this diagnosis. Although the patient insists that her rash doesn’t itch, as it 
generally does when a person has been exposed to poison oak, her admission that she’s 
“visited a friend’s farm and picked Swiss chard” recently “cinch[es]” the diagnosis for the 
doctor (n.p.). When she returns with darkening welts on her skin, the doctor admits that it is 
“time to call in reinforcements,” in this case two younger colleagues who are invited into the 
patient’s room to see her rash. “After a long moment,” Sanders writes, “one of the partners, 
Dr. Michael Adler, broke the silence. He asked the patient whether she had eaten any shiitake 
mushrooms recently. The question surprised her. ‘How did you know?’ she asked” (n.p.). The 
younger partner immediately identifies the rash as a response to consuming undercooked or 
raw shitake mushrooms, which the patient revealed she had done recently when offered a 
sample at a local grocery store. When asked how he was able to diagnose the patient so 
quickly when two visits to the primary doctor had failed to yield the diagnosis, he attributed 
it to luck: “He had read a case report of a patient who developed this crazy-looking rash after 
eating shiitakes. The picture in the journal was so striking that as soon as he saw the patient, 
it all came back in a flash” (n.p.). This example illustrates the importance of having a range of 
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physicians involved in solving each diagnostic case, as each collects informational fragments 
and memories of diseases such as this that will aid them in identifying rare illnesses or 
unusual presentations of common illnesses. “That’s what is so great about working in a 
group,” the younger partner explained, “When you get stumped, you just call for help, and 
chances are, one of these guys will know the answer. It’s like doing the crossword puzzle with 
a friend. With any luck, the other guy fills in your gaps in knowledge. This time I got to be 
that guy” (n.p.). The younger partner reiterates the collaborative nature of diagnosis and the 
need for doctors to share the responsibility of solving challenging cases in order to most 
effectively treat patients, thus undermining conceptions of doctors working in isolation to 
immediately diagnose patients with no outside help. The younger partner’s successful 
diagnosis also highlights the larger context within which both illnesses and diagnoses arise; 
the network involved in the patient’s sudden rash included mushrooms, a truck that carried 
the mushrooms to a grocery store, the store, an employee who improperly prepared the 
mushrooms, and the pans and ingredients she used. The network involved in her diagnosis is 
just as complex, since it involves a string of doctors with various forms of expertise, journal 
subscriptions, past memories, and educational experiences. In this case, the woman’s case was 
solved because the diagnostic network was able to trace her illness network in a way that 
highlighted the connections between actants. 
 Such collaborative diagnostic decision-making seems especially important in urgent 
cases where patients may not have time to wait for a doctor to sort through all possible causes 
of illness. In “Losing Consciousness,” for example, a woman presents to the hospital after two 
episodes of passing out in public with excessive rectal bleeding, which is caused by her 
blood’s inability to clot. Because the patient is in danger of bleeding to death, her doctor, 
gastroenterologist Dr. Susanne Lagarde, immediately recognizes that “this patient needed a 
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diagnosis before whatever it was that already happened twice happened again” (n.p.). Lagarde 
is stumped by the tests she’s conducted, so she thinks of a respected colleague who might be 
able to shed some light on the case—and using a different medical specialty. Sanders writes, 
“Lagarde immediately thought of Dr. Thomas Duffy. Duffy was one of the smartest doctors 
she knew, and he was a hematologist. When Lagarde reached him, she quickly outlined the 
case: a middle-aged woman with two episodes of low blood pressure and a temporary loss of 
the ability to form blood clots. Did that bring anything to mind?” (n.p.). Duffy explores 
several options before concluding that the patient has systemic mastocytosis, a rare disease 
stimulated by certain drugs where huge amounts of histamine are dumped into the blood, 
which results in the failure of blood to clot. When the patient confirms that she had started a 
new antidepressant prior to her episodes, a chemical combination that likely led to the excess 
histamine, the diagnosis is accepted. Despite years of formal training and access to specialized 
resources, Sanders concludes by noting: “For doctors, perhaps the most powerful diagnostic 
tools available are a phone and a friend” (n.p.). In this case, too, it’s important to note the 
significance of doctors with different areas of expertise working together—a 
gastroenterologist may see some of the problem through her lens, but a hematologist may see 
other important information through his. Additionally, this case unexpectedly involves the 
pharmaceutical industry in that prescribed antidepressants had potentially lethal effects on 
the patient, which only a collaboration between doctors could uncover. 
 In other cases, when groups of doctors are stumped by challenging cases, they might 
turn to an additional actant within their diagnostic network: a computer. In “The Heat of the 
Night,” Sanders recounts the story of a patient who awoke with strange fevers during the 
night, experienced significant weight loss, and had a mass on his liver. His doctors found no 
clear explanation for what was causing his ongoing illness, so the patient called an old college 
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friend who was now a practicing internist. Because the friend was stumped himself, he 
suggested a novel approach to his old friend: posting his friend’s case in an online forum and 
inviting physicians from around the world to participate in solving the case (a process that 
resonates, of course, with Sanders’ own project). Sanders writes, “That afternoon Schumann 
put the case on a blog . . . he was writing and contacted Kevin Pho, who has a popular 
medical blog . . . who then posted it, too. Within hours, a dozen comments were posted in 
response. Several pointed to a series of reports similar to this very case: patients with large 
hemangiomas and persistent nightly fevers. In several cases, simply removing the tumor 
stopped the fevers” (n.p.). The patient’s doctor arrived at the diagnosis without seeing these 
online contributions through a “more traditional route” of asking a colleague, a 
gastroenterologist, to help. This colleague immediately recognized the problem. After the 
removal of the tumor healed the patient and stopped his strange fevers, the diagnosis was 
confirmed. Sanders concludes by noting the significance of the extended network of 
healthcare providers the Internet provides: “In medicine, doctors accept that no one knows 
everything. Our knowledge is shaped by experience, training and personal interest. We all 
reach out to our community of doctors when we are stumped. Usually it’s to our friends and 
colleagues, but the Internet offers the possibility of a broader community — a sea of 
strangers linked by our medical curiosity and by our keyboards” (n.p.). Given the importance 
of assembling diagnoses in concert with other physicians with different areas of expertise and 
unique experiences with treating and studying illnesses, the Internet represents an especially 
helpful forum for solving challenging cases with experts around the globe. Rather than 
relying on their network of immediate friends and colleagues, physicians can now open up 
their diagnostic queries to the entire medical field. 
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 When doctors do diagnose patients more independently, they often do so by linking 
symptoms together rather than viewing them in isolation—thus forming a networked 
version of illness. In some cases, doctors must be able to see how the symptoms relate to one 
another rather than simply paying attention to the most prominent or strange symptom. For 
example, in “Sleepless,” Sanders recounts the story of a patient who hadn’t gotten a decent 
night’s sleep in a decade—he was unable to sleep for more than 90 minutes at any given time 
and often fell asleep during the day. He was also being treated for sleep apnea, chronic 
allergies, high blood pressure and cholesterol, adult onset acne, poor teeth alignment, and 
weak bones. The patient visited a new specialist to see if he could find an answer where so 
many other doctors had failed, and indeed, the new specialist noticed a striking symptom: 
the patient was physically large. Sanders describes how the specialist was able to identify a 
symptom missed by all previous doctors: “As he examined the patient, Helfrich was again 
struck by how massive he seemed. Not obese but big, really big. ‘Have you always been this 
large-boned?’ he asked the patient. The patient joked that he was thinner years ago — but 
weren’t we all? Helfrich looked carefully at the man’s face. His lower jaw and chin seemed 
broad and unusually square,” (n.p.). On a hunch, the doctor ordered blood work, which 
revealed that the patient was producing excessive growth hormone—the result of a tumor in 
the pituitary gland. The doctor ordered surgery to remove the tumor, which immediately 
helped his hands, feet, and face to shrink back to their normal size.  
 But everyone was shocked when the other symptoms which he’d complained about 
were also healed—the patients allergies were never allergies but the result of swelling tissues 
in the face caused by the disease, the high blood pressure was reduced to normal given the 
lack of excess growth hormone, and the patient’s sleep apnea was cured. Sanders asks, “How 
come not one of the dozens of doctors — including an endocrinologist — that he saw over 
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the nearly 15 years of interrupted sleep and other symptoms figured out that he had 
acromegaly? Perhaps because the various symptoms of his tumor were, for the most part, 
common problems: insomnia, high blood pressure, allergies and acne. They developed 
separately, years apart, and each was addressed by a specialist. It would take an act of 
imagination to link these symptoms. The patient never made that leap, and neither did any 
of his doctors” (n.p.). The division of the illnesses’ symptoms and their separate treatment by 
various specialists resulted in an inability to see the overarching cause of illness—and all of its 
attendant symptoms. In this story, the process by which doctors determine what they do and 
do not see as significant in diagnostic cases becomes an actant, as a string of seemingly minor 
complaints actually comprise the network of a major medical event. The rhetorical work of 
diagnosis, then, involves being able to see the way various problems relate to each other—to 
unite a group of symptoms and puzzle over what could cause all of them to occur. Sanders 
adds that such an ability to “[cast] a wide net to see the whole picture” is especially important 
when “the complaint that brings the patient to medical attention is commonplace, like 
insomnia” (n.p.). In such cases, the patient may suffer when his symptoms are considered as 
individual problems to be treated by specialists who don’t communicate with each other 
about their patient’s health. 
 A similar case is explored in “Perplexing Pain,” where a patient opens the narrative by 
telling her new doctor, “They took out my ovaries” (n.p.). After revealing that she has had 
thirteen exploratory surgeries to help doctors determine the cause of her chronic abdominal 
pain and fever, she tells her doctor that she has been living a “nightmare” (n.p.). The woman 
is referred to Dr. Chelimsky, a neurologist, when she begins to lose feeling in her hands and 
feet, and she explains that her ever-shifting symptoms felt like “the arcade game her children 
played, whack-a-mole — you get rid of one problem, but then it would pop back up, along 
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with another and another” (n.p.). Dr. Chelimsky began to focus on the patient’s nervous 
system, and he finally hypothesized that “Many of her other symptoms — the rapid heart 
rate, being unable to urinate, abdominal pain with no visible cause, even her constipation, 
which had been so severe that six months before much of her colon was removed — could be 
caused by damage to the autonomic nervous system” (n.p.). Dr. Chelimsky suggests to the 
patient that she might have porphyria, and recommends that she consult with her regular 
doctors about this possible diagnosis. Desperate for answers, the patient and her husband (a 
pediatrician) immediately take to his medical library to read up on the illness, and the 
Sanders reveals, “[I]t was as if she were reading her own medical history: her entire life 
seemed to be there on the page of these old medical textbooks. All the strange and terrible 
symptoms she suffered through, had surgery for, been considered crazy for, were there on the 
pages she read. Tears flowed down her face. Her husband cried, too. They had, she felt 
certain, finally found the answer” (n.p.). Although it takes the patient three weeks to get 
confirmation of the diagnosis, Sanders puzzles over what enabled Dr. Chelimsky to figure out 
in a short time what so many doctors had not despite multiple invasive surgeries and years of 
familiarity with the patient. She rationalizes, “Porphyria is a disease of the nervous system. 
Thus, everything in the body is affected. The patient’s hardworking doctors had been 
chopping down the trees one by one, treating each ailment in isolation. Dr. Chelimsky, a 
neurologist, was finally able to step back and see the entire forest” (n.p.). Because the illness 
affected the entire body, it was difficult for the patient’s doctors to notice that each symptom 
was linked to one key problem with her nervous system. Thus, rhetoric can function within 
such situations to form a conglomerate of symptoms that doctors can trace to see how they 
fit together—and what common thread or problem glues them together. 
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  Such a rhetorical goal of uniting symptoms rather than isolating one factor or 
another is also at play in “Abdominal Attacks,” the first ever post in the “Diagnosis” column. 
In the narrative, a patient presents with unbearable abdominal pain that recurs and then 
recedes after a few days. He tells his gastroenterologist, Dr. Sachdev, “I can’t go on this 
way” (n.p.). After a few tests come back normal, the doctor decides that this won’t be an easy 
case and that it will require her to take an alternative approach. Sanders clarifies that there are 
two distinct processes for diagnosis—one involves “pattern identification — you see a 
patient, recognize the signs and symptoms of some known disease and make your 
diagnosis” (n.p.). But for other patients, she explains, “the ones with symptoms that don't 
match any of the patterns you know” doctors develop their “own hierarchy of possible 
diagnoses based on what they consider the patient's most prominent symptom. It's a 
personal hierarchy developed through individual experience, the experiences of their teachers 
and what they have read” (n.p.). In this case, though, the doctor finds the answer to the 
patient’s problem not by isolating one prominent symptom (the patient’s extreme abdominal 
pain) but in asking herself how it relates to the patient’s other symptoms. The doctor notes 
that “Whatever [the patient] had, it was going to be unusual. She thought about his strange 
allergies, the swelling of the hands and feet, which she had previously assumed were 
unrelated to his stomach problems. Could they be linked? Were all these symptoms caused 
by hereditary angioedema, a rare genetic disease that can cause allergylike swelling? The 
swelling is usually found in the hands or feet but can also occur in the GI tract, which results 
in abdominal pain” (n.p.). Testing confirms that the patient did in fact have this rare disease, 
which the doctor only identified because she was able to link the symptoms rather than 
separate them. The doctor was ultimately able to cure the patient by asking what each of his 
symptoms had in common rather than focusing on one vague symptom.  
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 Perhaps the best illustration of a doctor’s need for a network of other actants to 
support her diagnostic process is the fact, as represented in the “Diagnosis” column cases, 
that doctors often miss diagnoses. Sanders admits, in “Missed Signals,” that her failure to 
notice a patient’s illness almost led to his death. She recalls that she had been treating him for 
about a year and “He was doing well, so I was shocked when I got word from the E.R. that 
my patient was dying. And the doctors there weren’t sure why” (n.p.). The patient’s heart was 
beating very slowly, and the doctor on call in the E.R. suddenly realized why—his kidneys 
weren’t functioning, and his potassium was dangerously high. When the doctor attempted to 
test the patient’s urine, he realized that the patient couldn’t urinate, so he instructed a nurse 
to insert a catheter into the patient’s bladder. When the nurse was unable to do so, it became 
even more obvious why the patient was so ill—he had an enlarged prostate gland that was 
blocking his bladder and shutting down the kidneys. Sanders chastises herself for failing to 
have the patient undergo a yearly rectal exam, which is a process that would have enabled her 
to prevent the patient from all of these complications: “When I heard that the prostate was 
the cause of the life-threatening bradycardia, I felt as if I had been punched in the chest. This 
was something I should have caught and didn’t. An internist’s job is to diagnose and treat 
acute illness and screen for and prevent additional disease. I joke with the residents I teach 
that it is our responsibility to keep our patients healthy and out of the hospital. If so, I had 
failed” (n.p.). Sanders attributes her failure to an inability to balance the patient’s acute needs 
with his long-term healthcare goals. While she had been treating and responding to his 
immediate complaints, she hadn’t probed him for information about additional concerns 
(such as his trouble urinating) and she hadn’t insisted on routine preventative exams. 
“Practicing medicine is a balancing act,” she writes, “weighing immediate and long-term 
good. His case was a vivid reminder of what can happen when that balance is lost” (n.p.). 
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Although Sanders sought forgiveness from her patient, and received it, her tale cautions us to 
grasp the importance of continually seeking what has been left out and excluded from a 
diagnostic assemblage. If the diagnostician must constantly attune herself to what is 
happening, she must also be able to ask herself what else?  
 Doctors can also fail to accurately diagnose patients when the need to solve a 
challenging case leads them to prematurely decide on a likely cause of the patient’s problems. 
In “An Elusive Agony,” Sanders tells the story of a 9-year-old girl experiencing attacks of 
excruciating stomach pain. When a series of tests ruled out the most likely culprits, the girl’s 
doctor referred to her as “his little mystery and continued to search for the answer” (n.p.). 
Unsatisfied with the doctor’s inefficacy, and determined to help her child, the mother began 
to research possible causes of illness herself; she “trolled the Internet and described her 
daughter’s symptoms to every doctor she knew” (n.p.). Ultimately, when “she outlined the 
symptoms to her own internist . . . he said right away, ‘Sounds like familial Mediterranean 
fever’” (n.p.). When she returned to her daughter’s doctor to ask if this might be the answer 
they’d been searching for, he quickly dismissed the idea, and noted that based on his 
experience training in Israel and his familiarity with the disease, it was unlikely that her 
daughter had it. When the doctor referred the child to yet another doctor, the mother again 
raised the possibility that her daughter was suffering from familial Mediterranean fever. This 
time, the doctor took the possibility seriously and a blood test revealed that the mother was 
right. Sanders writes, “I asked Levy [the child’s original doctor] why he had been so certain 
that the child didn’t have F.M.F. Until recently, he explained, F.M.F. had been a clinical 
diagnosis — one made based on the patient’s symptoms and the physical exam. The 
identification of the gene and the subsequent development of the test — which had only just 
become available at the time of this patient’s diagnosis — changed doctors’ understanding of 
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the disease” (n.p.). He added, “‘What we learned from the test was that there was a whole 
spectrum of disease . . . Before, we were only able to pick up what we now know were the 
most extreme forms of the disease — the tip of the iceberg. Now we can find all the 
rest” (n.p.). Thus, for Levy, his training to only identify the expected presentations of a 
disease led him to disregard unusual presentations, such as that of the little girl. He failed to 
see that the little girl’s symptoms also fit for the disease because they didn’t match the usual 
criteria and severity of symptoms for FMF. Again, this situation speaks to the importance of 
constantly shifting paradigms within medicine and asking what other actants within an 
assemblage might be contributing to a problem.  
 As these cases highlight, doctors must constantly solve diagnostic problems within 
networks of other actants, collaboratively share their areas of expertise to pinpoint the 
problem, view illnesses as complex assemblages rather than isolated illnesses, and link 
symptoms rather than isolating the most prominent one. To return to the view of diagnosis 
as assembling, we can see that such a process always hinges on tracing connections between 
multiple actants—or, as Rivers put it—using rhetorical tools to find the glue that holds an 
illness together. Such a framework contrasts with the view of a doctor as an isolated actant 
pinpointing a single factor that reveals the illness. As these cases emphasize, doctors’ work is 
messy and chaotic, and they must often follow multiple possibilities before they arrive at the 
right answer. The rhetorical work that doctors engage in as they locate a diagnosis is not 
simply persuasion, interpretation, or identification, but a work of assembling a diagnostic 
network and tracing the network of illness to account for the problem. 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Self-Diagnosis and Patient Advocacy 
 While the analysis of “Diagnosis” cases has thus far highlighted the doctor’s 
networked rhetorical work within diagnostic situations, much remains to be said about the 
role that patients play. Far from being passive texts inscribed with meaning to be interpreted 
by doctors, or arhetorical beings called into existence only through the doctor’s authority, the 
“Diagnosis” narratives reveal an alternative type of patient: one who is engaged, active, and 
responsible for her own health. In many of the cases, in fact, the patient actually solves her 
own case. In “Flower Power,” for instance, a patient (who is also a doctor) experiences high 
blood pressure and acute psychosis. Her physician, a colleague, is horrified when she begins 
to speak and the words are meaningless. The doctor tests his friend for abnormal thyroid 
hormones, abnormal blood chemistry or an infection, and illicit drug use. But when all of 
the tests come back normal, “After four days, the patient recovered, and she was discharged, 
her diagnosis still unknown” (n.p.). The patient, once home, resumes her normal gardening 
routine, and is surprised to find a strange but beautiful flower growing in her garden. She 
wonders, “Before it had flowered, could this plant have been mistaken for lettuce and ended 
up in her salad? She pulled the plants up by their roots, put them in a baggie and drove to a 
nearby nursery. As she pulled the plants from the bag to show the owner, the woman 
exclaimed: ‘Don’t touch those! They’re highly toxic. That’s jimson weed’” (n.p.). The patient 
learns that the root has long been associated with temporary female madness, and she had 
likely accidentally consumed some before she became sick. The patient’s perceptiveness—and 
her ability to consider unusual factors—ultimately led her to solve her own case, a move that 
echoes the rhetorical assemblage that doctors engage in themselves. Her refusal to be satisfied 
with no diagnosis, and her ability to enlist new actants into her network (such as the nursery 
owner), also serve as a reminder that it can be challenging to accurately diagnose a patient 
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when their symptoms resolve on their own or come and go. In such cases, patients may have 
to rely on their own investigations to determine what has caused their episodes. 
   Other cases present examples of physicians suddenly becoming patients and 
diagnosing themselves collaboratively with their doctor. In “Patient is a Virtue,” an 81-year-
old man (also a physician) suddenly loses feeling in his right leg. When he’s rushed to the 
E.R., he immediately begins to ask the doctor if he might be having a stroke. The doctor 
insists that they must be sure what’s going on before they treat him, but all of the tests are 
unrevealing in terms of the nature of the man’s problem. When a surgeon explains his 
confusion to the patient, he’s struck suddenly with another idea. Sanders writes, “As he [the 
surgeon] moved toward the door, the doctor-patient couldn’t resist adding one more 
possibility to the list: ‘Could I have dissected my aorta?’ he asked” (n.p.). The resident argues 
that it’s unlikely given that most of the patients he’s seen with a dissected aorta are younger 
and writing in pain. However, while it “was unlikely given the patient’s age and the absence 
of chest pain” the resident finally decides that “if he had torn his aorta, anticoagulation could 
cause the patient to bleed to death. She sent the patient back to get a CT scan of his chest 
and abdomen” (n.p.). The CT scan reveals that the patient has a huge dissection in his aorta 
and that he needs immediate surgery. Sanders concludes by mentioning that the dissected 
aorta is one of the most difficult diagnoses in medicine and that it’s often not even 
considered as a possibility. “In the case of this elderly patient,” she muses, “it was the very 
hardest kind of diagnosis — an unusual presentation of an unusual disease . . . In spite of 
that, two physicians reached this diagnosis coming at it from two different perspectives — 
that of an E.R. doctor who conscientiously made sure that she first did no harm and that of a 
patient who couldn’t stop himself from thinking like a doctor” (n.p.). Here, Sanders makes 
an interesting point when she reminds us that not only are patients apart of a network, but 
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patients themselves are networks—imbued with their own areas of expertise, their own ideas, 
and their own insight into their health. In this case, the patient’s network enabled him to 
come to the correct diagnosis more quickly than the doctor’s, which speaks to the need to 
take seriously the rhetorical agency of patients. Even in cases where a patient lacks the 
medical knowledge necessary to diagnose himself, more can be gained by invoking the 
patient’s networked knowledge into diagnostic deliberation than excluding them. 
 An example of a series of doctors failing to pay heed to their patient’s perspective can 
be found in “The Doctor Go Round,” where the case begins with a doctor accusing his 
patient of not following his instructions prior to getting a medical test. He told her that the 
results were crazy. She’d pulled a muscle months before, and had gone to her primary care 
doctor with a swollen ankle/foot and painful muscle strain. In the ensuing weeks, she was 
tested for high blood pressure, a blood clot, obstructed blood flow, stomach abnormalities, 
leukemia, and a range of other diseases by multiple specialists: her internist, an 
endocrinologist, a gastroenterologist, and a hematologist. Finally, the patient begins to read a 
recent set of test results when she notices that she has an abnormal amount of cortisol. She 
quickly calls her doctor and tells him she thinks her problems can be attributed to Cushing’s 
disease. Sanders notes that, rather than the doctor having to persuade the patient of her 
correct diagnosis, “The patient laid out her argument. With Cushing’s, the body produces 
too much cortisol, one of the fight-or-flight hormones. This could explain her high blood 
pressure. She had other symptoms of Cushing’s too” (n.p.). Still, the doctor remains 
unconvinced that the patient has successfully diagnosed herself simply by doing some 
research on her elevated cortisol levels and what it might mean. As a patient with no medical 
background, she has little credibility with her doctor as a contributor to the diagnostic 
process. The doctor decides to test her for Cushing’s anyway, due to a lack of other ideas, and 
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when the test results are strange, he accuses of her of not properly following his instructions. 
When she insists that she has, he suggests another test. The results are conclusive: “She was 
right, the doctor conceded; she really did have Cushing’s. She didn’t have the classic features, 
perhaps because she hadn’t had the disease long enough for the rest of the symptoms to 
manifest themselves” (n.p.). In this case, the patient’s diagnosis is delayed because the doctor 
fails to trust his patient’s analysis and consider her guess as to what’s wrong. Instead, he works 
against the patient, in an almost adversarial way, to determine the cause of her illness.  
 While patient-networks can play an integral role in their own diagnostic processes, 
when they’re unable to participate due to their failing health, their family members can step 
in and take their place, and they must therefore be added to our growing assemblage of 
actants involved in diagnostic rhetorical encounters. In “A Heart Loses Its Way,” a 59-year-
old woman who had a heart attack a month before is rushed to the hospital because of high 
blood pressure. Her legs are like Jell-O when she tries to stand, so her husband and several 
nurses must wheel her into the hospital. The patient’s husband, alarmed by his wife’s recent 
and sudden decline in health “felt overwhelmed and angered by his inability to help his wife 
of 36 years” (n.p.). He suddenly decided that he could help by going to his wife’s doctor’s 
appointment that afternoon, since his wife felt too ill to go. As he reviews recent events with 
his wife’s internist, he advocates for something to be done and tells her, “We can’t go on this 
way” (n.p.). The patient’s husband and his adamancy inspire the internist to revisit the 
patient’s chart as she listens to his reminders that none of her recent blood pressure readings 
have been in the normal range. She begins to rethink her approach:  
“I think maybe we are focusing on the wrong thing,” Mayer said, 
pronouncing each word slowly and carefully as she thought through the 
problem. At each visit the patient had an abnormal blood pressure — usually 
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too high, but not always. And at each visit Mayer had adjusted the 
medications. She hadn’t really stepped back to look at the big picture. Until 
now. It was clear that this wasn’t a case of blood pressure that wasn’t being 
controlled; it was a case of blood pressure that couldn’t be controlled, and 
that was a very different kind of problem. (n.p.)  
Mayer, the patient’s doctor, shifts her thinking and wonders if the patient has a tumor 
secreting high levels of adrenaline, and after a test reveals that this is the case, the tumor is 
removed. The patient automatically experiences amelioration of all of her symptoms, much 
to her husband’s relief. Sanders resolves the story, writing, “In medical school, I was often 
told that if you listen, the patient will tell you what she has. It turns out that sometimes the 
patient’s husband will, too” (n.p.). Although the patient has no medical expertise, his 
expertise about his wife’s failing health and insight into her condition leads him to 
successfully advocate for the doctor to revisit her case. His reminder to the doctor of her 
wildly varying blood pressure readings ultimately leads the doctor to the culprit. Thus, family 
members play a significant role within the diagnostic network because they advocate for a 
revisiting of the illness-assemblage, always pushing for doctors to look again and this time 
find the answer that will heal their loved one. 
 Perhaps the most striking example of a patient’s family member intervening in the 
diagnostic network can be found in “What Caused this 15-Year-Old’s Debilitating 
Headaches?” In this case, a boy suddenly develops a horrible headache that leads him to stay 
in his bed for days on end—not even getting up to eat dinner. After multiple visits to his 
internist and other doctors, the patient’s mother gets tired of being told that he simply has 
migraines. When the symptoms fail to improve after multiple visits, the mother becomes 
increasingly scared because her previously healthy and active son will no longer even eat. 
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Frustrated by the repeated inattention to her son’s rapidly declining health, she decides to lie 
to the doctors in order to convince them to take his condition seriously—and order a CT 
scan. Sanders explains, “In the E.R., the doctors asked the same questions: Any fever? Any 
nausea or vomiting? [In the past, she had honestly answered, ‘No.’] But this time she had 
different answers . . . It didn’t feel right lying to the doctors, but the mother thought that 
symptoms that fit their expectations would get action faster than her own motherly 
observations” (n.p.). Once the doctors finally order a CT scan, the problem is revealed: the 
boy has a disease that causes connections between arteries and veins to be disrupted, resulting 
in infection. In this case, the patient’s mother had to lie to the doctors, and tell them an 
expected narrative, to convince them to perform a scan and find out what was wrong with 
her son. “Perhaps,” Sanders notes, “her son would have gotten a CT scan without her 
‘fabrication’ (as she calls it), but she didn’t want to take that chance” (n.p.). This speaks to the 
rhetorical interactions that can occur when doctors fail to take actants within their network 
seriously. By refusing to listen to the patient’s mother, the child’s doctors failed to fully assess 
the range of possibilities for what was causing his illness. Fortunately, the mother was able to 
modify her rhetorical behaviors in order to save her son’s life. 
 As these examples illustrate, patients and their families serve an important function 
within the diagnostic network. When doctors feel that they’ve done enough, patients and 
their families can remind them when they haven’t. When doctors are satisfied with no 
answers, the patient and their families will provoke them to keep searching. When doctors 
are stumped as to the proper diagnosis, the patient/their families can make suggestions, even 
locating the accurate diagnosis in some cases. More importantly, though, these cases 
demonstrate the fact that patients are not isolated actants within diagnostic situations any 
more than doctors are, as they bring their own expertise and collectives with them. Doctors 
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must be constantly aware of the value their patients and their families bring to bear on their 
diagnostic assemblage, and they must treat patients/their families as capable rhetors who 
might collaborate in solving the case. Just as Latour assigns scientists and moralists different 
roles within the collective, as they work to solve the same problems using their different 
skills, doctors and patients might work together to reassemble illness assemblages by 
combining their own expertise. 
  
Nonhumans and the Role of Chance 
 While doctors and patients are commonly included in literature about medical 
rhetorics and rhetorical diagnoses, the theorists previously mentioned fail to assign a role to 
nonhumans and chance. Although Gawande and Sanders insist that uncertainty haunts all 
medical interactions—from surgery, to diagnosis, to performing an autopsy—no theorists 
have discussed the integral role that unexpected and nonhuman actants play in diagnostic 
assemblages. However, as these surprising actants intervene in many of the “Diagnosis” cases 
to help doctors and patients determine what’s wrong, they warrant analysis as to their unique 
rhetorical contributions to the collective. 
 In “Unresponsive,” for instance, a patient is brought to the hospital in a coma after a 
night of partying. Because the man who brought her to the hospital refuses to tell doctors the 
full story, since he fears being prosecuted, the doctors have an especially hard time piecing 
together the cause of her sudden illness. They run a series of tests, looking for proof of a drug 
overdose, but the tests reveal that she has not had alcohol, marijuana, or amphetamines. The 
only clue doctors find is her low sodium. Desperate to figure out what is wrong with his 
sister, her brother wonders: “What about her cellphone? [He] rummaged through the bag of 
his sister’s belongings and pulled out the phone. She had made a bunch of phone calls to her 
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friends — no surprises there. Then Cole started clicking through the instant messages. He 
saw several references to “Molly” — who was Molly? Google quickly provided the answer; it 
was another name for Ecstasy” (n.p.). Her brother spends the afternoon researching the link 
between ecstasy use and his sister’s condition. He ultimately finds that ecstasy can cause 
extreme hyponatremia in young women. The doctors are able to treat the patient for her low 
sodium, and she’s finally healed because her brother chose to invoke a pair of unlikely actants
—a phone and Google—into the diagnostic assemblage.  
 A similar case can be seen in “Fear of Falling,” where an elderly woman has lost use of 
her legs almost entirely. She says that she now “walks like a drunk,” falls frequently, and has 
come to require a wheelchair due to her loss of sensation in both legs. The doctor tests her for 
cancer, a spinal cord injury, a tumor, and even West Nile Virus, but all of the tests reveal that 
she has none of these problems. A blood test reveals that she has too much Zinc and too little 
copper in her system, and the doctor begins to seek out the cause of this dangerous 
imbalance. As the doctor examines the patient and asks her about her Zinc exposure: “On 
the bedside table, Ahmed noticed a half-empty tube of denture adhesive. He picked it up. 
Didn’t some of these adhesives contain zinc?” (n.p.). The doctor found that the woman was 
using five or six tubes of the adhesive a week since her dentures were ill fitting, even though 
when directions are followed, a tube should last for a month. Once the patient learned of the 
reason for her lack of mobility, she immediately switched to a less toxic denture adhesive, 
since she could not afford a better fitting pair of dentures. The observational skills of the 
doctor, in this case, enable him to find the nonhuman culprit behind the patient’s illness. Or, 
put another way, the nonhuman demands to be heard by the physician, who has the ability 
to discern the relationship between the excessive zinc, the deficient copper, and the tube of 
denture adhesive. By recognizing the role the patient’s dentures/denture adhesive is playing in 
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her illness, he’s able to effectively treat her, although he cannot reverse the nerve damage 
done to her legs. 
 In some cases, too, the doctor finds an unexpected issue while attempting to treat a 
different condition. In one case, in particular, it is not the patient’s or doctor’s ability to 
assemble the illness’ actants but the direct assertion of a nonhuman object that ultimately 
solves the case. In “The Tell-Tale Green Heart,” a surgeon notices that his patient’s heart is 
green during a routine bypass surgery. Although he’s initially unconcerned by the strange 
hue, he biopsies a piece of the heart’s tissue out of curiosity, because he’s never seen such a 
hue in his career spanning 25 years. The strange color is ultimately determined to be a form 
of amyloidosis, a disease that causes excessive protein fibers to form in areas such as the heart, 
arms, and tongue. Most interestingly, the green heart—and the chance biopsy out of 
curiosity—reveals the underlying cause of the patient’s other symptoms, such as his carpal 
tunnel (caused by protein deposits in his wrists) and his slurred speech (caused by tightly 
packed protein fibers in his tongue). Sanders writes: 
Often a patient will seek medical attention for one or more unexplained 
symptoms, and a diagnosis will be achieved when those symptoms are linked 
to a single disease. In this case, the patient and his doctors didn’t think there 
were mysterious symptoms. Almost every ailment had been explained. He 
had an infectious diarrhea; he had carpal tunnel syndrome; he had coronary 
artery disease. It was only an incidental finding during surgery that led to the 
diagnosis that explained everything. (n.p.) 
This narrative remains important because it illustrates how the interruption of a nonhuman 
actant—rather than the analysis of a doctor or patient—can ultimately reveal the diagnosis. 
Nonhumans are not merely useful when a doctor recognizes them; they can appear 
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unintentionally but forcefully at surprising moments to assert their significance and their role 
in the illness’ network. A view, then, that diagnostic networks only involve human rhetors 
does so to its own detriment, as the interruptions of nonhumans can sometimes save a 
patient’s life when listened to. 
 In some cases, the doctor and patient must extend the patient’s network to their 
environment. In “Rough Patches,” a four year old boy presents with a painful rash that looks 
“as angry-looking as a slap” on his mouth, nose, and penis. His eyes were also red, and he 
would cry through painful episodes with the rash, although they would recede after a few 
days only to return again. Two doctors who saw the patient diagnosed his rash as poison oak, 
but the boy’s mother remained unconvinced—the only plants he ever had contact with were 
in his grandmother’s garden, and she had no poison oak. Besides, the rash did not look like 
the classic blistered presentation of poison oak, and the rash was not itchy. The doctor begins 
to wonder if the boy has been exposed to a poisonous plant at his new nursery or in his 
grandmother’s garden, but he’s not sure. As he drove home later that day, Sanders describes, 
“He spotted a small gardening store he passed every day. Maybe he should get a consult, he 
thought, as he turned into the parking lot. Maybe he was missing something. In medicine, 
what you don’t know really can hurt you” (n.p.). He turned out to be right. A man working 
in the greenhouse was able to immediately diagnose the patient’s condition once the doctor 
listed off some of the vegetables growing in the boy’s grandmother’s garden. “That’s easy,” he 
tells the doctor, before explaining that “[p]umpkin vines more typically cause this kind of 
rash. It seemed as if the boy was allergic” (n.p.). Thankfully, the cure for the boy was simple: 
avoiding contact with the pumpkin vines would result in the retreat of his rash. As this 
narrative illustrates, sometimes doctors and patients aren’t the only actants poised to listen to 
the contributions of nonhumans; in some cases, laypeople or those with differing expertise 
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may be better equipped to consider the roles that unrecognized actants are playing in the 
illness’ network.  This speaks to the need to recognize not only the expertise of those directly 
involved in the illness—such as the doctor and other healthcare providers—but to consider 
the ways in which experts in other areas might be better able to listen locate the actant 
destroying the assemblage. Furthermore, as previously mentioned, this narrative emphasizes 
the importance of environment as an actant within diagnostic assemblages. The patient-
network brings to the doctor her entire history and her environmental circumstances, so she 
and her doctor must be able to consider the ways in which these factors might intersect with 
and act within the illness network.  
 Beyond the role that nonhumans play in diagnostic networks, several “Diagnosis” 
narratives highlight the role of abstract concepts like randomness and chance. For example, 
in “Full-Body Failure,” a doctor receives a last minute message on a Friday afternoon about a 
patient who is “sick as hell” and in desperate need of attention. The doctor was already late 
for his weekly racquetball game but was intrigued by “what promised to be a tough case,” so 
he decided to see the patient (n.p.). This chance decision, made arbitrarily, would ultimately 
save a young woman’s life. When the doctor went to visit the patient, she lay in her hospital 
bed with highlighter yellow skin, her abdomen distended, and her body feverish. Test results 
trickled in with almost every one revealing an abnormality—she was anemic despite 
transfusions, her blood wasn’t clotting, and her white blood cell count was high. Sanders 
explains, “These are the most difficult cases — patients who have so many things going 
wrong that it’s nearly impossible for a doctor to process them all at the same time” (n.p.). By 
the time Dr. Walerstein was invited to join the case, the patient was near death. According to 
Sanders, “Having examined the patient and her chart, Walerstein took a moment to step 
back and look for some kind of pattern buried in the chaotic assemblage of numbers and 
 82
tests. Everyone else started with the bloody diarrhea. Maybe that was the wrong way to think 
about it” (n.p.). Walerstein instead focuses on the patient’s liver failure and the destruction of 
her red blood cells. Considering these two symptoms in concert caused Walerstein to 
remember a “pearl of wisdom”—or a phrase used to memorize common symptom clusters 
for diseases. Explains Sanders, “Liver failure and this unusual kind of anemia were caused by 
an inherited condition known as Wilson’s disease” (n.p.). As a result, the patient needed a 
liver transplant immediately, and she eventually made a full recovery. Sanders concludes this 
column by reflecting on the occasionally random nature of medical events; “But what would 
have happened,” she ponders, “if Walerstein had been out of town that day or hadn’t come 
back? Would this condition have been diagnosed? Would the patient have survived? Neither 
doctors nor patients like to consider how much of medicine depends on chance” (n.p.). 
Neither, it would seem, do medical rhetorics scholars always like to consider the role that 
chance plays in diagnostic networks and rhetorical interactions surrounding illness. Chance, 
in this case, governed the doctor’s decision to take the case, his grouping of symptoms that 
hadn’t been considered together, his memory of the pearl of wisdom, the availability of tests 
to determine what was wrong, and a new liver for the patient. Thus, beyond informing an 
actant within a network, chance inundates the assemblage and those who trace its 
movements. “Contingency and coincidence,” Sanders declares, “can be as important in the 
moments between life and death as knowledge and skill. No doctor knows everything. 
Hippocrates’s well-known aphorism expresses this ancient truth: ‘. . . It is not enough for the 
physician to do what is necessary . . . the circumstances must be favorable’” (n.p.).  
 In a final case, unfortunately, chance shines less favorably on a patient and his 
deteriorating condition. In “The Strep Throat that Wasn’t,” a 17-year-old boy is admitted to 
the ICU because he’s unable to breathe despite his oxygen mask, which provides him with 
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five times more oxygen than the air we breathe. He’s also suffering from a 105 degree fever, a 
sore throat, and horrible chills. A few days earlier, according to his chart, the boy had woken 
up feeling ill. “He saw his family doctor the next day,” Sanders clarifies, “who diagnosed 
a strep throat and started the boy on a five-day course of azithromycin — 
an antibiotic widely used in part because it is convenient, needing to be taken only once each 
day. No strep test was done — probably, Garrett figured, because the diagnosis seemed 
obvious” (n.p.). Test after test yields no promising information, and a blood culture was not 
yet available. Finally, after days of fighting to simply keep the patient alive, a chance 
encounter reveals the problem. The blood culture results had finally come in, and the doctor 
noticed a resident looking at the boy’s chart. “‘What’s that?’ he recalls asking. The blood 
cultures finally grew strange bacteria, the resident responded, but it was probably just 
contaminant. What was the bacteria? Garrett persisted. Something called Fusobacterium 
necrophorum. The identification of the bacteria told Garrett all he needed to know. The boy 
had Lemierre’s disease” (n.p.). The doctor immediately changed the patient’s antibiotics, 
hoping that the proper medication could finally eradicate the patient’s illness. Unfortunately, 
the patient died three weeks later in ICU with his family at his side.  
 Of course, this narrative underscores the randomness with which rhetoric and 
medicine intersect, albeit in a much more negative light than in the previous example. 
Acknowledging chance as an actant within each diagnostic network means recognizing that 
each diagnosis, each illness, has rhetorical and other contingencies beyond our grasp. There 
can be no ultimate control of diagnostic encounters, just as no rhetorician can fully control a 
rhetorical situation, no matter how hard she may try. However, more positively, this narrative 
also stresses the importance of adjusting one’s network based on tragic assemblages and their 
dissolution. When the boy’s mother informed their primary care doctor, who had mistakenly 
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diagnosed the boy with strep without performing a test, he openly wept for his fatal error. 
But he also readjusted his diagnostic network to be more effective in the future. He told 
Sanders that he refuses to miss this diagnosis again and “[h]e has changed his practice: now 
everyone with suspected strep will have a throat culture to check for both strep and 
Lemierre’s. ‘Maybe that’s overkill, and I’ll probably end up treating too many of my patients 
with antibiotics,’ he added thoughtfully. ‘But I don’t ever want to lose a patient like this 
again’” (n.p.). As this doctor learned the hard way, while we may never be able to control our 
rhetorical or diagnostic networks, we may respond to troubled networks and intervene to 
enhance our practices, better serve the needs of others, and even save lives. 
Networked Attachments 
 In Reassembling the Social, Latour maintains, “it is possible to trace more sturdy 
relations and discover more revealing patterns by finding a way to register the links between 
unstable and shiftable frames of reference rather than by trying to keep one frame 
stable” (24). In this chapter, I have attempted to disrupt the seemingly stable frame of 
rhetorical diagnosis to see how defining it through the lens of ANT might better account for 
the uncertainty that haunts medical events and relationships. My analysis of the “Diagnosis” 
column narratives complicates notions that medical rhetorics can be equated to persuasion, 
interpretation, or identification. Such frameworks presume relatively stable actants who share 
common language or knowledge, which is far from the case in many medical contexts. 
Furthermore, such rhetorical relationships generally exclude nonhumans and chance from 
analysis because of their humanist bent. The rhetorical relationships featured in the 
“Diagnosis” columns are far from a one-to-one relationship of shared discourse; instead, they 
are dispersed and disrupted networks, messy and chaotic, and brimming with 
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miscommunications and random interruptions. Perhaps most important, though, such 
rhetorical interactions hinge on acting despite limitations, or as Gawande puts it: “we are 
expected to act with swiftness and consistency, even when the task requires marshaling 
hundreds of people—from laboratory technicians to the nurses on each change of shift to the 
engineers who keep the oxygen supply system working—for the care of a single 
person” (Better 4). As Gawande emphasizes, ethical action in medicine calls for an 
understanding of the networked attachments one must maintain to ensure a patient’s health. 
But what happens when the network breaks down, resulting in the misdiagnosis of a patient? 
I will explore this question, and the responsibilities of actants to their assemblage, more fully 




QUARANTINE AND NETWORKED MISTAKES 
As for the leper who has the infection, his clothes shall be torn, and the hair of his head shall be 
uncovered, and he shall cover his mustache and cry, 'Unclean! Unclean!' He shall remain unclean 
all the days during which he has the infection; he is unclean. He shall live alone; his dwelling shall 
be outside the camp. - Leviticus 13:46 
Simply put, germs travel. - Howard Markel 
 On October 30, 2014, something unremarkable happened. Kaci Hickox and her 
partner, Ted Wilbur, left their home in Kent, Maine for a bike ride through their favorite 
three mile trail. What was remarkable about this event was that Hickox and Wilbur were 
chased out of their home and down the trail by reporters, who followed them on foot. The 
reporters screamed questions after Hickox while police officers looked on outside of her 
home. The bike ride was broadcast by major news networks, and figures including Maine 
Governor Paul LePage and Rush Limbaugh spoke out against her actions. The Washington 
Post called her “defiant” (Berman and Dennis n.p.) and NBC News referred to her 
relationship with government officials, who opposed the bike ride, as a “standoff”(“Kaci 
Hickox, Nurse in Ebola Quarantine Standoff” n.p.).“It's a beautiful day for a bike ride,” 
Hickox said as she embarked in the midst of this scene.  
 Hickox’s unremarkable actions resulted in such an uproar because she had recently 
returned from treating Ebola patients in Sierra Leone, an area in Africa hit particularly hard 
by the epidemic. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Sierra Leone 
had 8706 cases of Ebola in 2014 with 3956 deaths, with the outbreak ending in March 2016 
(“2014 Ebola Outbreak in West Africa” n.p.). Comparatively, the CDC explains that the US 
had 4 total cases of Ebola in 2014, and one of these patients died (“Cases of Ebola 
Diagnosed in the United States” n.p.). Hickox returned to the United States on Friday, 
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October 24, landing in Newark Liberty International Airport. When a customs official 
learned that she had returned from West Africa, she was immediately subjected to seven 
hours of questioning and an unreliable forehead scanner test, which showed that she had a 
mild fever—potentially attributable to her long days of travel. According to Anemona 
Hartocollis and Emma G. Fitzsimmons, Hickox was “left alone for long stretches and given 
only a granola bar when she said she was hungry” (n.p.) Even though she tested negative for 
Ebola on Saturday, Hickox was quarantined in “[Chris] Christie’s Ebola detention center” in 
an isolated tent outside of a Newark hospital until Monday, October 27 (Jacobs, Goldstein, 
and Siemaszko n.p.). Hickox openly challenged the involuntary quarantine, which opposed 
medical advice from the CDC and scientific research about Ebola and its transmission. She 
was quarantined because of fears that she’d transmit Ebola to others even though Ebola can 
only be spread through the exchange of bodily fluids. Also, as Hickox pointed out, only 
symptomatic people have Ebola, which means her asymptomatic state made it safe for her to 
resume her normal activities. Although ultimately Christie released her on October 27th, the 
frenzied fear surrounding the potential public health threat she posed continued to haunt her 
through the bike riding incident the next week and throughout the following year, as she 
ultimately sued Christie for violating her civil rights. 
 Since the long history of quarantine shows that it has tended to scapegoat vulnerable 
individuals, particularly immigrants and poor people, Hickox’s quarantine and its subsequent 
media coverage is unique because she represents a Western, white, female, healthy face of 
Ebola. Hickox became the face of Ebola in the United States even while 28,637 cases and 
11,315 Ebola deaths occurred worldwide, the majority of which occurred in the West 
African countries of Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Liberia (“Ebola in Africa: The End of a 
Tragedy?” n.p.). So obsessive was the media coverage of Hickox that it distracted from the 
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single Ebola death that occurred on U.S. soil. Thomas Eric Duncan, a Liberian, visited the 
U.S. for the first time in late September 2014 to visit family. He took himself to the hospital 
soon after arriving in the U.S. complaining of dizziness, abdominal pain, and a high fever, 
but although he told doctors he’d recently been in West Africa, they sent him home with 
antibiotics for sinusitis. Four days later, he returned to the hospital, and this time he was 
diagnosed with Ebola. Less than two weeks later, he died in the Dallas hospital. 
 Duncan’s family later sued the hospital, Texas Presbyterian, claiming that they had 
acted negligently in caring for him — particularly because of his race. For example, a family 
friend pointed out to The Washington Post: “If you went to the hospital right now, and your 
temperature was 103 degrees, no doctor would send you home” (Justin Wm. Moyer n.p.). 
Others questioned not only the mistaken choice to not treat Duncan immediately, but the 
treatment measures employed once he was diagnosed. Thomas Geisbert, a professor of 
microbiology and immunology at the University of Texas at Galveston, said of the choice to 
use an experimental drug on Duncan, “It kind of came out of left field. I think the jury is 
still out on why this would have any activity against Ebola” (Moyer n.p.). Perhaps Moyer 
puts it best when he explains, “Unlike some other Ebola patients provided state-of-the-art 
experimental treatments and swept to advanced medical facilities like the National Institutes 
of Health (NIH), Duncan was poor. He had no insurance. And he was black” (n.p.). 
 Comparing Hickox’s and Duncan’s narratives as they were picked up by the 
mainstream media results in some suggestive parallels. Neither Hickox nor Duncan were 
believed when they made claims about their health, and in both cases they suffered as a 
result. Lawsuits were conducted on behalf of Hickox and Duncan because of civil rights 
violations. And both cases, of course, began with a misdiagnosis. Although Hickox was 
publicly misdiagnosed primarily by Christie and LePage, both of whom have no background 
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in medicine, and Duncan’s doctors missed what should have been a fairly obvious diagnosis, 
both individuals were the victims of a breakdown in their diagnostic networks.   
 Although many narratives catalog successful diagnoses—both in medical literature 
and popular shows like House, few texts consider what goes wrong when misdiagnoses 
happen. In “Diagnosis: A Biocultural Critique of Certainty,” Lennard Davis identifies three 
key obstacles to examining misdiagnoses: “the aura of faith” surrounding diagnosis, the 
erasure of an uncertain process post-diagnosis, and the conflicting goals of politics and ethics 
(82). First, Davis claims that diagnosis has been endowed with a level of religious certainty 
since at least the nineteenth century: 
Gnosis, as knowledge, implies the certainty of religious knowledge, and its 
adjective, gnostic, is opposed to the doubtful—that is to say, full of doubt—
knowledge of the agnostic. The heyday of the use of gnosis and of diagnosis 
in the English language was the second half of the nineteenth century, 
coinciding with the rise of evangelical Christianity, as well as the 
professionalization of medicine. Without making too much of this point, 
could we not see the physician as displacing the divine as the source for 
certain knowledge? Diagnosis in this scenario would be the medical 
equivalent of the theological certainty offered by a knowing—in this case a 
knowing of the body if not the soul. (85) 
Here, Davis argues that doctors, like priests, are unquestioningly endowed with the authority 
to classify humans into categories of well and sick, determine their illness, and identify the 
course of treatment. The confluence of specialized medical knowledge and seemingly 
infallible medical testing options have certainly reiterated the aura of faith that Davis 
identifies in the twenty first century. Such an aura of faith, for Davis, renders it difficult to 
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question medical authority and discuss medical  failures, since to do so is to commit an 
almost blasphemous offense. 
 Furthermore, Davis argues that the erasure of the uncertainty and mistakes that 
haunt the diagnostic process once the correct diagnosis has been determined prevents us 
from learning from medical error and acknowledging medicine’s fallibility. He explains, 
“Diagnosis is always synchronic. It always takes place in a clinical present moment of 
certainty. It has to willfully suppress the diachronicity of its own coming into being, because 
such history might reveal contingency, chance, convention, and so on” (90). Beyond the 
inability to grapple with physician imperfection, then, the aura of faith surrounding 
diagnosis results in a trained incapacity to recognize the uncertain process that leads to every 
medical breakthrough. When this process is discarded, information of immense value and 
alternative theories are lost. Medical narratives celebrate discovery, success, and correctness 
and skillfully conceal failure, past theories, and alternative ways of seeing. “Thus, the current 
diagnostic criteria are always the last step,” Davis notes, “the hopeful, utopian moment, the 
final correction of a history of error. In this sense, the diagnostic process is amnesiac and is 
constitutionally incapable of being uncertain about its certainty” (90). Davis’ conjecture 
highlights not only medicine’s unwillingness to reexamine the uncertainty that haunts the 
diagnostic process, but its inability to do so due to the way the diagnostic process is 
traditionally conceived. 
 Finally, Davis locates the source of willful diagnostic certainty in its situatedness 
between both politics and ethics. He quotes Zizek as saying, “the ethical is thus the 
(back)ground of undecidability while the political is the domain of decision(s)” (Zizek 316, 
Davis 93). Davis continues, “We can say then that diagnosis hesitates between the 
undecidability of nomos and dike, between custom and justice . . . Hospitality requires an 
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undecidability, but diagnosis in its political sense requires decision. Like all sovereign 
decisions, it requires the certainty that comes from the amnesis of past” (93). The ethical and 
political projects, as defined by Davis, are at odds because hospitality postpones decisions in 
order to remain open to newcomers while politics requires decisiveness and action, a closure. 
Thus, “Diagnosis will require a repression of that coming into being in favor of the moment 
of judgment” (91-2). For Davis, then, medicine’s relationship to both politics and ethics 
demands that physicians maintain an impossible tension between decisiveness—they must 
act quickly to save the patient and because of financial and time constraints—and ethics—
what is the best course of action for this particular patient? The need to act, then, obscures 
ethical questions about negative outcomes because the doctor must deliberate and decide in 
the moment, often without all necessary information available. 
 Although Davis remains most interested in the way this certainty affects the doctor-
patient relationship, I wonder how such an aura of certainty contributes to public 
misdiagnoses such as Hickox’s. While I explored the interpersonal dimensions of doctor and 
patient diagnostic communication in Chapter 2, I want to turn my attention here to what 
happens when networks of actants misdiagnose. How can we account for networked failure 
in relation to diagnoses, and how can network theory help us to reintegrate misdiagnoses 
into their own situational networks? Davis gives us a clue: “We might then say that 
something in the diagnostic process might in fact provide a curative modality. If that were 
the case, what would that curative modality look like? As we said, the diagnosis would have 
to be attained in a condition of mutuality, one that took into account the history of not only 
the patient and the practitioner but also the profession itself ” (94). The history of the 
profession of medicine, while vast, also offers us a clue as to the broken link in diagnostic 
networks such as Hickox’s. Davis argues that “To diagnose is to attempt to emphasize 
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difference,” and indeed the history of medicine involves categorizations based on difference: 
sick and well, different classifications of sickness, and the establishment of boundaries 
between them (88). Perhaps the tradition of quarantine serves as the best example of this 
boundary generation and maintenance as a way of separating those seen as a threat to the 
healthy citizenry. Quarantine establishes a separation because a group of people is waiting for 
a diagnosis that will send them into isolation, if they are sick, or back into their everyday 
lives, if they are well. Quarantine, then, generates tremendous fear because it generally arises 
in situations where people are fearful of contracting an infectious disease, and those in 
quarantine themselves often do not yet know whether they are sick. At the heart of Hickox’s 
struggle, in fact, is a fight against the stigmatization and separation quarantine demands. 
Thus, in what follows, I will cover a brief history of quarantine as it has functioned to 
perpetuate diagnostic difference and separation. I will then discuss the ways in which Latour’s 
Actor-Network Theory opens up an alternative way to negotiate with actants within a 
diagnostic network without excluding those deemed potentially dangerous. Finally, I will 
reread the Hickox misdiagnosis network through this framework of excluding actants and a 
Latourian concept of morality. 
A Brief History of Quarantine 
 Upon returning to the U.S. and being forced into involuntary quarantine, Hickox 
contacted a friend who worked at The Dallas Morning News. The newspaper subsequently 
covered her quarantine and even invited her to pen an account about the experience. An 
early piece by Naheed Rajwani quotes Hickox as saying, “I am scared about how health care 
workers will be treated at airports when they declare that they have been fighting Ebola in 
West Africa . . . I am scared that, like me, they will arrive and see a frenzy of disorganization, 
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fear and, most frightening, quarantine” (n.p.). Indeed, as Hickox points out, quarantine has 
been historically linked to disorganization and fear. Quarantine takes its name from the 40 
day isolation period required by fourteenth century Venetian port officials during the plague 
outbreak (Tom Koch 655). According to Eleanor Klibanoff in “Awful Moments in 
Quarantine History, “If a ship was suspected of harboring plague, it had to wait 40 days 
before any passengers or goods could come ashore. Venice built a hospital/quarantine center 
on an island off its coast, where sailors from plague-infested ships were sent either to get 
better, or, more likely, to die” (n.p.). Quarantine was heavily associated with both national 
and interpersonal barriers and was based on the belief that “plague was somehow transported 
from place to place by travelers and their goods” (Koch 655). Thus, over time, “The idea of 
quarantine expanded to include, at one scale, the isolation of communities within a region or 
nation and, at a still greater scale, the isolation of infected persons and their families in their 
homes or in designated sites distancing them from the general population” (Koch 655). 
Quarantine, then, involved the exclusion of Others—both at the national and interpersonal 
levels. 
 Donna Barbisch, Kristi L. Koenig, and Fuh-Yuan Shih are careful to distinguish 
quarantine’s unique meaning from that of isolation or internment. They explain, “‘Isolation’ 
is for patients who are ill. Quarantine refers to the ‘separation of symptomatic infected 
individuals from those who are not infected.’ Thus, quarantine is for those with no signs or 
symptoms who have possibly been exposed to a contagious disease and have the potential to 
transmit the disease to others” (547). Quarantine occupies a peculiar space, then, within public 
health deliberation because it covers potential rather than proven cases of illness. The person 
in quarantine may become sick, but she has not yet, and she thus occupies a liminal space on 
the sick-well continuum. This liminality, of course, opens up a lot of room for individual 
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interpretation and even abuse. In “Quarantine,” Kathryn Staiano-Ross argues that “[Disease] 
is always an event. It is polysemic, multilayered, historically full, and dynamic, not static. It is 
constructed over time and encumbered with interpretants according to the needs and 
preconceptions of those who argue they search only for truth” (84). Staiano-Ross finds in 
historical examples of quarantine the reinforcement of “prejudices both long standing and of 
recent origin. Disease proves useful as a justification for behaviors that might in other 
circumstances neither be legal nor appropriate” (84). The lack of regulation for quarantine 
procedures, and the uncertainty haunting those quarantined individuals who may or may not 
be infected, can therefore serve as a justification for racially and ethnically motivated 
exclusions and violence. 
 Quarantine’s historical links to racism and scapegoating has been well documented, 
but a few suggestive examples may help to elucidate quarantine’s link to separation and 
exclusion. In When Germs Travel, Howard Markel describes one such example:  
On December 12, 1899, health officials in Honolulu announced that a 
twenty-two year old bookkeeper named You Chong had died of bubonic 
plague. Within hours after the discovery of his death, U.S. military police 
cordoned off the fourteen-square-block area where more than 10,000 
Chinese and Japanese immigrants lived. A few weeks later, on January 20, 
1900, Henry Cooper, the president of the Honolulu Board of Health, 
ordered a controlled burning of some of the buildings in this district to rid it 
of plague. As bad luck had it, a gust of wind quickly changed the fire’s status 
to ‘uncontrolled,’ and the blaze spread throughout Honolulu’s Chinatown, 
lasting a full seventeen days, laying ruin to over 4,000 homes across some 38 
acres, and leaving 4,500 people homeless. Nevertheless, bubonic plague 
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continued to appear episodically in Honolulu through early March 1900. 
(57-8) 
This example highlights the particular insecurities of turn-of-the-century Honolulu (and San 
Fransisco, for that matter) that Chinese and Japanese immigrants were carrying diseases into 
the United States. As cities expanded and disease spread, poor public health was blamed on 
immigrants rather than their deplorable living conditions and ineffective waste management, 
particularly in densely populated cities. Thus, immigrants were cordoned off from the rest of 
the population in order to supposedly protect the rest of the city, although the immigrants 
were often merely victims of disease due to their close proximity to other actants: rats, other 
vermin, and their poverty, which excluded them from access to doctors. 
 Quarantine procedures resulted in more than cordoning off immigrant 
neighborhoods—it also resulted in physical violence and loss of financial opportunity. In a 
similar suspected bubonic plague outbreak in San Francisco in February and March 1900, 
“Personal property [of Chinatown’s residents] was confiscated and burned, Chinese-owned 
businesses were closed without sufficient explanation, and people were thrown out of their 
homes so that tenements could be disinfected. Those Chinese residents whom policemen 
deemed uncooperative were beaten on their heads and bodies with billy clubs” (66). Some 
were prevented from going to work while many were told that their businesses had to be shut 
down; Chinatown stores owned by white people remained open, however, resulting in a 
quarantine barrier that zig-zagged through the town. Of course, such a method highlights the 
lack of understanding for how disease was actually spread—it was suspected that white 
Americans could not carry disease even if they lived in the same quarters as the immigrants 
suspected to be contagious. 
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 Furthermore, such discriminatory quarantine procedures also surfaced in early 
twentieth century treatment of tuberculosis. For example, based on stereotypes that poor 
people posed the greatest public health threat, “privately practicing physicians who treated 
the well-to-do were generally not required to report their tuberculosis patients to the public 
authorities while doctors working at free clinics, dispensaries, and other institutions that 
catered to the poor were” (Markel 34). This meant that “Many poor or immigrant patients 
either avoided the doctor altogether or sought out quacks who at least promised 
confidentiality” (34). Markel notes that despite findings that native-born Americans were 
more likely to have tuberculosis than immigrants, assumptions that vulnerable populations 
were to blame for tuberculosis inspired attempts to ban particular immigrant populations 
from entering the U.S. (35). Immigration restrictionists argued that “Diseased 
newcomers . . . not only threatened the public health in the present because of their 
propensity toward acute illness and poverty; they also threatened the future of American 
society as they passed on their defective genes in multiplicity” (36). As Ladelle McWhorter 
might remind us, this is yet another instance of “scientific racism” in U.S. history, wherein 
minorities, the poor, and other “degenerates” were thought to “pos[e] a serious threat to the 
continued purity of highly evolved Nordic germ plasm” (140). Although the restrictionists 
were never successful in banning supposedly diseased immigrants, their rhetoric clearly 
intersects with the eugenics movement and structural racism that continues to haunt U.S. 
immigrants even now.   
 A final example speaks to the sexist history of quarantine procedures: that of the 
venereal disease outbreak in the U.S. in 1917. According to Klibanoff, concerns circulated at 
the time about “the number of young men ineligible for the draft because of sexually 
transmitted diseases like syphilis and gonorrhea” (n.p.). When officials also noticed “an 
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uptick in ‘camp girls,’ prostitutes and other women hanging around U.S. training grounds 
and military recruitment centers,” they decided to quarantine women who might potentially 
have STDs to prevent them from infecting men in the military (n.p.). Klibanoff elaborates:  
A federal order allowed for the incarceration of prostitutes and camp girls 
until they were deemed STD-free via mandatory testing. Harvard University 
medical historian Allan Brandt estimates at least 30,000 women were picked 
up in the raids. ‘There’s no evidence that this impacted the rates of 
transmission,’ he says. ‘But there was this notion that these women 
constituted a serious threat to our success in the war.’ He notes that while the 
women were being rounded up and held in prison, often long after they’d 
tested negative, the Army was issuing condoms to soldiers shipping off to 
France. (n.p.) 
Quarantine in this case performs not only an exclusionary function—as prostitutes are 
separated from society in the name of the public good—but a punitive one, as well. The 
prostitutes were held responsible for not only the infection of men eligible for the draft but 
potentially for undermining war efforts. Of course, the double standard found in the 
military’s message that the prostitutes were unpatriotic and dangerous while the men were 
mere victims of their siren calls can be seen in the simultaneous encouragement for the 
soldiers to take condoms with them to France. The men were granted treatment and access to 
prevention methods while the women were held in prison. 
 Overall, as this brief sketch of several suggestive historic examples highlights, 
quarantine serves to exclude those who might be diagnosed from those who are presumed 
healthy. The uncertainty of potential diagnosis provokes such fear that those most vulnerable 
are often disproportionately affected, most often the working class, minorities, immigrants, 
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and women. Quarantine draws lines between those who may become ill and those who are 
temporarily healthy, but it also draws lines between citizen and foreigner, wealthy and poor, 
male and female, and white and non-white. Thus, Staiano-Ross has gone so far as to claim, 
“Who is to be isolated from the balance of society, for what period of time, and under what 
conditions, may depend more on the individual’s social, economic, and political status and 
categorization as ‘other’ than upon his/her actual threat to the public’s health” (83). If, to 
return to Davis’ conjecture, there might be something with curative potential within 
diagnosis, perhaps we might locate it by considering how exclusions, enacted in the name of 
the public good, function within quarantine networks. Rather than isolated situations, these 
quarantines are complex events unfolding through a multiplicity of actants, both human and 
nonhuman.  
Quarantine and Networks 
 Latour’s concept of morality in many ways echoes Davis’s concept of ethics, as 
contrasted with politics. Latour redefines morality as “uncertainty about the proper relations 
between means and ends”—that is, refusing to treat any entity “whale, river, climate, 
earthworm, tree, calf, cow, pig, brood” as “‘simply a means’ but…‘always also an 
end’” (Politics of Nature 156; emphasis original). This revision of morality emerges from 
Latour’s thesis that each actant is a vital contributor to the Earth’s network, and asserting 
with certainty that any actant is simply a means to an end will have negative consequences 
upon the whole network. Latour suggestively notes that we must extend Kant’s declaration 
that we should no longer treat human beings as means to ends to nonhumans as well (155). 
For Latour, each actant is both a means and an end; for example, a tree contributes to the 
network of which it is apart by supplying oxygen and other resources, but it is also an end in 
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itself, as a fully grown tree has realized its evolutionary goal of development. This new 
conception of morality is situated within Latour’s revision of the collective into four major 
professions: scientists, politicians, economists, and moralists, that will share the common goal 
of “decidi[ing] about the common world in which they live” (130). Latour tasks the scientists 
with detecting new phenomena for the collective, the politicians with the generation of 
“voices that stammer, that protest, that express opinions,” and the economists with “giv[ing] 
a common language to the heterogeneous set of entities” within the network (145, 51). 
Rather than a morality that holds unswervingly to a few key foundational values, refusing to 
accept the closure that politics demands, Latour’s morality interacts with the other 
professions in a more constructive way. Latour explains:  
Scientists, politicians, and economists, equally obsessed, though for different 
reasons, by the closing of the collective, are thus always in error in the eyes of 
the moralists who are going to equip the entities that have been set aside with 
the right to appeal that they can use when, in order to fulfill the requirement 
of closure, they are driven out of the collective in the name of their 
(provisional) insignificance. (156) 
Whereas Latour acknowledges that closure is necessary for collective action, his concept of 
closure is much less fatal than is Davis’—the closure is tenuous, subject to change, and open 
to reintegrating excluded actants. The moralists, then, are those who must constantly ask 
who has been excluded and who must be “reintegrated, at some later point, in the form of 
friends, included parties, and potential allies” (157). Rather than a passive acceptance of new 
actants, they must actively seek them out and facilitate their incorporation. 
 Moralists are furthermore tasked with the responsibility to prevent a network from 
becoming too insulated from external networks. Moralists, Latour writes, “add to the 
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collective continual access to its own exterior by obliging the others to recognize that the 
collective is always a dangerous artifice” (157). Lest those within the network come to take its 
construction as natural or inevitable, the moralists will be there to remind them of its 
constructed and revisionist design. In addition to preventing complacency on the part of the 
network, moralists must also actively pursue new attachments and encourage them to 
approach the network. Moralists “go looking for [those who have been excluded] outside the 
collective, in order to facilitate their reentry and accelerate their insertion” (157). In this way, 
moralists serve almost as intermediaries that connect new actants to the network and bring 
them into the collective project of creating a common world.  
 In contrast to the relative decisiveness which scientists, politicians, and economists 
must employ, Latour further tasks the moralists with imbuing the network with a sense of 
constant anxiety. The moralists view the closure of the collective as impossible (their motto is 
“we can never call it quits”), but Latour again sees this clash with the other professions as 
generative rather than contradictory (158). “Far from opposing the politicians, as the old 
distribution of roles would have it, the moralist’s requirement of starting over again is going 
to enter, on the contrary, into consonance with the work of the politicians, to keep on 
mending the fragile envelope that allows them to say ‘us’ without being unfaithful to their 
constituents. To every ‘we want’ or politics, the moralist will ad, ‘Yes, but what do they 
want?’” (158). Furthermore, the moralist will “add . . . a constant anxiety over the rejected 
facts, the eliminated hypotheses, the neglected research projects—in short, everything that 
might make it possible to seize the opportunity to bring new entities into the 
collective” (158). The moralists therefore function as a kind of revolving door within the 
collective; while they do not completely prevent closure, they constantly renegotiate it by 
swinging the door back open and bringing in an excluded party when needed. Thus, 
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moralists are tasked with the vital work of renegotiating the constituents of collectives, 
reforming networks, and incorporating new actants into the network’s larger shared project.  
 Perhaps Latour best sums up the way the moralists contribute to the collective when 
he writes, “With them, the collective is always trembling because it has left outside all that it 
needed to take into account to define itself as a common world” (158). To return to the 
quarantine process, perhaps it is the exclusion of moralist actants within diagnostic collectives 
that results in the exclusion of important, structural actants from consideration in public 
health scenarios. For example, in the bubonic plague outbreak situations described 
previously, poor living conditions in immigrant neighborhoods were excluded from the 
network and therefore from consideration. Thus, rather than addressing the problem of 
living conditions as it intersected with disease, the network chose to violate the rights of 
Chinese and Japanese immigrants by excluding them—literally and metaphorically. Public 
health concerns cannot be addressed adequately by exclusion, however, particularly now 
when air travel connects people with differing health care systems from around the world and 
public transportation brings people of all walks of life into close contact on a daily basis. The 
spread of Ebola and the frenzied quarantine of aid workers, in particular, highlights an 
anxiety on the part of Western countries that they can no longer remain blissfully ignorant of 
healthcare systems in underdeveloped countries, as lack of access to adequate care in Africa 
can result in an epidemic in New York City in less than 24 hours. The exclusionary move of 
quarantining actants rather than working alongside them to compose a healthier world, while 
commonly practiced throughout history, ultimately makes it more difficult to promote 
health and prevent the spread of disease.  
 In what follows, I will offer a rereading of Hickox’s network that explores the ways in 
which networked exclusions occurred. I will argue that by excluding Hickox from the public 
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health network through quarantine, Christie and LePage sought to shore up a Western 
healthcare network that was self-sustaining and protected from outside influence. Beyond 
identifying how Hickox’s Ebola quarantine represents the most recent attempt to exclude 
non-Western perspectives and bodies and nonhuman actants from Western networks, I will 
serve as a moralist in Latour’s sense by arguing that we must reincorporate several actants 
back into the collective if we are to confront future Ebola outbreaks more effectively. In 
particular, I will consider the exclusion of nonhumans (particularly deforestation and 
destroyed habitats in Africa), African perspectives about and experiences of Ebola, and 
conservative political projects as they contributed to Hickox’s quarantine and the breakdown 
of the network. I will finally describe the ways in which a moralist project, as proposed by 
Latour, might ameliorate future public health scares and offer us more effective ways to 
combat pandemics than quarantine. 
Deforestation and Animal Habitats: The Silent Actants 
  Studies of Ebola’s origins in humans almost always begin in West Africa, particularly 
in Guinea. Whereas the area was once covered in biodiverse, rich forests, meaning that 
natural boundaries were maintained between wild animals and humans, civil war in Western 
Africa between rebel groups in Liberia and Sierra Leone led refugees to flee to these forests 
and build settlements. Sonia Shah, author of Pandemic, explains of the deforestation: “The 
refugees cut down trees to plant crops, build huts, and turn into charcoal [ibid]. Rebel 
groups started logging the forest, too, selling timber to finance their battles. By the end of 
1990s, the transformation of the forest could be seen from space . . . Of the region’s original 
forests, only fifteen percent remained” (24-5). This mass deforestation, particularly given the 
relatively short period of time within which it occurred, naturally led to adverse effects on the 
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environment and wildlife. The tenuous borders between human and animal suddenly became 
much more permeable. While Shah mentions that many animals likely disappeared as a 
result of the deforestation, many remained, but now in much closer proximity to humans.  
 The story might have ended here, with war and deforestation converging to create a 
dire situation for people in affected areas. However, this already fraught network was soon 
met with another actant that transformed a humanitarian crisis network into a network of 
disease. This actant was an animal uniquely capable of carrying and transmitting disease to 
humans: bats. Bats survived the deforestation, and because they fly and have hollow bones 
(which means they “don’t produce immune cells in their bone marrow like the rest of us 
mammals do”) they were primed to spread the microbes that flourish within their bodies 
(25). Shah describes the new relationships between bat and animals, writing, “As the 
Guinean forest was chopped down, new kinds of collisions between bats and people likely 
occurred. Bats were hunted for meat, exposing hunters to microbe-laden bat tissue when the 
animals were slaughtered. Bats fed on fruit trees near human settlements, exposing local 
people to their saliva and excreta” (25). Thus, the deforestation which led bats and humans 
into closer contact put humans at a greater risk for contacting an infectious diseases carried 
by the bats. As Shah ultimately reveals, “At some point—nobody knows just when—a 
microbe of bats, the filovirus Ebola, started to spill over and infect people. In humans, Ebola 
causes hemorrhagic fever and can kill 90 percent of those it infects” (25). The disease began 
to further spread when the civil war ended in 2003 and refugees who had been living in 
isolated quarters rejoined communities where the disease was more challenging to contain. 
Just as the combined actants of civil war, people fleeing to the forests for safety, and 
deforestation had contributed to cross-species contamination with Ebola, it now enabled the 
virus to spread like wildfire through denser populations. Whereas the remoteness of locations 
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where Ebola occurred had previously prevented the disease from reaching epidemic 
proportions, its spread to larger villages and cities meant that it would now travel more 
rapidly and infect more people. Furthermore, as David Quammen points out in Ebola: The 
Natural and Human History of a Deadly Virus, “chimps and gorillas, like humans, are highly 
susceptible to Ebola” (8). This meant that those who managed to avoid contact with bats 
were nonetheless striken with Ebola if they consumed contaminated chimp or gorilla meat; 
this very method of transmission led to an outbreak in the Gabon village Mayibout 2 in 
1996, killing over thirty people (Quammen 11-12). These nonhumans—destroyed habitats 
along with bats and gorillas—helped incite the epidemic that has now resurfaced twenty-six 
times in Africa alone (“Outbreaks Chronology: Ebola Virus Disease” n.p.). 
 With the conditions being ripe for the spread of an extremely deadly disease, why 
was mainstream media coverage so scarce, at first? According to Shah, the very conditions 
that led to the deforestation prevented others from intervening or learning about the 
budding epidemic until it was too late. She explains, “[N]obody noticed. The ongoing 
conflict had severed supply routes and communication networks, leaving the refugees hiding 
in the jungle bereft of outside help. Even the most stalwart aid organizations such as 
Médecins Sans Frontières had been forced to withdraw. The isolation coupled with the 
violence compelled the United Nations to call the West African refugees’ plight ‘the worst 
humanitarian crisis in the world’” (Shah 26). Beyond the human death toll of the disease 
(more than ten thousand died by 2015), the epidemic killed one-third of the world’s gorilla 
population, and the “thousands of people infected with Ebola quickly overwhelmed the 
fragile economies and health-care infrastructures of the three most affected countries” (Shah 
27). However, little of this was discussed in the mainstream media, which instead only 
gained interest in Ebola and its many adverse effects once it threatened to spread to the U.S. 
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In fact, a Google search reveals that the earliest available reports in the Western media about 
deforestation in Africa and its relationship to Ebola began to surface in 2014—at the same 
time that Hickox and others were returning to the U.S. after caring for West African 
patients.  
 I want to suggest that the nonhuman actants demand to be heard in the story of the 
Ebola pandemic, and that they must be reincorporated into the network if we are to combat 
Ebola outbreaks in the future. While of course the human cost of Ebola is an important 
focus for prevention efforts, these efforts will ultimately fail if work is not also done to 
address deforestation and its effects. The belief that we could exclude animals and forests 
from our human networks and maintain a healthy world have been proven false already by 
climate change research, but further research must be done to uncover the ways in which this 
exclusion leads to spillover (the technical term for when diseases in animals spread to 
humans). After all, Ebola is only one of many diseases caused by spillover; others include (to 
name just a few): rabies, West Nile Virus, bird flu, smallpox, and SARS.   
 While of course Ebola is a current and prominent example of a disease network that 
requires the inclusion of nonhuman actants, discoveries about the ways in which 
deforestation contributes to pandemics may have a larger effect on public health, more 
generally. In a 2009 report, “The Spread of New Diseases: The Climate Connection,” Shah 
argues that we must not only identify the connections between non-humans, the 
environment, and medicine, but we must foster interdisciplinary collaboration to confront 
the effects of their intermingling. She writes, “These developments [in understanding climate 
change and its effects on disease] have given rise to a growing consensus among many wildlife 
biologists and public health experts who advocate a new approach to conservation and public 
health called ‘conservation medicine,’ which promotes interdisciplinary collaborations to 
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expose the links between ecosystems, the health of wildlife, and humans that lead to the 
emergence of new pathogens” (n.p.). Furthermore, as JA Ginsburg puts it succinctly in her 
article for The Guardian, “The bottom line is that there is no public health without 
environmental health” (n.p.). While developed nations must be more willing to admit 
underdeveloped nations into their healthcare networks, just as pressingly, medical networks 
must acknowledge the extent to which environmental actants play a role in shaping their 
projects.  
 Ginsburg also cautions against viewing environmental factors as solely to blame for 
recent outbreaks of pandemics such as Ebola and SARS. She writes, “Deforestation didn’t 
cause this Ebola epidemic, but did make it much more likely. The region’s legacy of war and 
poverty, its beleaguered health care systems, and a series of bureaucratic fumbles fanned a 
small and isolated outbreak into a full-blown epidemic fire, which has already killed more 
people than all previous 25 known Ebola outbreaks put together” (n.p.). Ginsburg’s reminder 
to consider deforestation as a key actant—not the sole actant—within Ebola’s network warns 
of the dangers of considering deforestation outside of the economic, medical, and political 
conditions that permitted its dire consequences.  
 In Chapter 2, Sanders’ “Diagnosis” column narratives highlighted the need for a 
more dynamic, networked approach to diagnosis. Rather than isolating a single actant as 
wholly responsible for the network’s success, the view of an interwoven string of actants 
working together and drawing on their own forms of expertise offers a more realistic picture 
of how diagnosis actually happens. As this example illustrates, such an approach also provides 
a helpful framework for thinking about misdiagnoses. Just as a single actant cannot be given 
full credit for a successful diagnosis, no single actant can ever be wholly to blame for a 
network’s failure. Ebola’s development in humans and transformation into an epidemic can 
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be attributed to a convergence of factors—among them deforestation, civil war, and 
increased contact between bats, gorillas, and humans. However, by excluding these 
nonhuman actants from the public’s view by overly emphasizing Hickox’s quarantine, the 
history of Ebola’s development—and the problems that intersect with its spread—were also 
erased from public view. Networked problems demand networked responses on the part of 
those who would intervene, and failing to acknowledge these excluded actants makes it more 
difficult to address the questions they raise within the Ebola assemblage.  
African Aid Workers: The Abandoned Actants 
 Beyond the nonhuman actants that must be reincorporated into public health 
networks if they are to more effectively prevent Ebola outbreaks in the future, the 
perspectives of Africans effected by Ebola must be heard and added to the networks. 
Beginning with the Ebola outbreak of 2014, The Guardian created a column on their website 
called “Ebola: Life on the Frontline.” The summative statement for the series reads: “People 
living in countries affected by the Ebola outbreak share their experiences” (n.p.). Meant to 
combat the relative dearth of Ebola news written by those actually living in Ebola-striken 
Western Africa, the columns present the lived reality of African healthcare workers and 
journalists who were experiencing death, sickness, fear of contracting the disease, and 
economic hardship on a daily basis. In particular, a columnist named Isaac Bayoh 
contributed a series of updates on the state of affairs in Sierra Leone and West Africa. As a 
description of his role in fighting the Ebola outbreak, The Guardian explains, “Bayoh 
volunteers as an Ebola quarantine and awareness worker. He is part of a team that isolates the 
houses of those who have the disease, educates the family and neighbours, and monitors the 
patient’s progress. Here, in his own words sent via WhatsApp, he shares his experiences about 
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how people and communities are affected” (“Life on the Ebola Frontline” n.p.). Bayoh’s 
direct contact with the disease and its victims left him in an ideal position to describe the 
way Africans were responding to the Ebola epidemic to the best of their ability.  
 A prominent theme in his narratives are the lack of resources with which to combat 
the Ebola outbreak in Africa. In the first post in his series, he highlights the disconnect 
between awareness of the disease and the ability to effectively fight it. He writes, “‘The Ebola 
virus is real, the Ebola virus kills, the Ebola virus is contagious.’ These words are being said 
everywhere, on the radio, on the internet, even little children know the dangers of the virus, 
yet people are dying everyday, people are being infected everyday . . . Many who have 
contracted the virus and died, it is not because they didn’t report it earlier or run away but 
because they lacked the intensive care they needed” (“Life on the Ebola Frontline: ‘Survivors 
are Left Alone’” n.p.). In addition to the lack of access to care, Bayoh stresses that vital 
resources such as ambulances to carry the infected to a hospital are scarce. He recalls:  
A 16-year-old girl, Adama, died of Ebola symptoms at her home at the 
weekend, two weeks after the death of both of her parents. An ambulance was 
called multiple times through the helpline 117 and it took days before they 
finally arrived. There are so many people waiting for an ambulance, the fight 
against Ebola is going from bad to worse. The burial team is said to be 
overwhelmed and overworked. Dead bodies [have] been left on the street by 
relatives in fear of being identified as the victim’s relatives. (“Life on the Ebola 
Frontline: ‘Fear is Overpowering’” n.p.) 
Without access to basic emergency medical care, the fear in West Africa remains palpable, 
according to Bayoh, who acknowledges that changes are being made and the government is 
now collecting dead bodies “24 hours upon call” (n.p.). In a later column, towards the end of 
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the outbreak, Bayoh considers that Ebola has revealed the problems with Africa’s health care 
systems, and that such problems must still be addressed if Africa is to more successfully 
prevent or handle future outbreaks. He argues: 
Ebola exposed our health systems for what they are. It showed the trust that 
was lacking between people and services, it showed how our health facilities 
were often merely buildings rather than places providing care. It showed 
broken relationships. During the Ebola outbreak, many of these centres were 
closed, leaving people without medical help. Most of them are now operating 
again, although many still lack proper equipment or improved resources, and 
the absence of trust persists. Those with options prefer private hospitals. 
There have been some changes and improvements after Ebola, but the 
question will always remain: how ready is our health care system to fight 
another outbreak like this? Many things that need to be done are yet to be 
implemented. (“Ebola in Sierra Leone” n.p.) 
Bayoh insists here that measures must be taken to develop facilities and resources in Western 
Africa that can serve as preventive measures for local epidemics—such work is just as 
important as supporting emergency response efforts. Rather than ignoring West African 
health systems when Western health is no longer at risk, we might work together to equip at-
risk countries to more effectively prevent and combat such outbreaks in the future. 
 Beyond the healthcare system flaws that the Ebola outbreak brought to the surface, 
Bayoh stresses the economic and financial hardships that continue to haunt West Africa. For 
survivors of the disease, overcoming Ebola is only the first step towards regaining their lives
—they must also confront the possibility that they will not be able to return to work because 
of the disease’s stigma. In an interview with an ambulance driver named Momodu, who 
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contracted Ebola while transporting patients to the hospital, Bayoh explains, “Momodu is 
lucky to have got his job back after he fully recovered, but many have been stigmatized and 
left unemployed” (“Life on the Ebola Frontline: ‘I Thought of Nothing Else but My Own 
Death’” n.p.). Even for those who manage to avoid contracting the disease, Bayoh explains 
that “many jobs have shut down [and] prices of food commodities have doubled three times” 
(n.p.). In a particularly poignant column, Bayoh reflects on the community’s sadness about 
not being able to participate in regular Easter traditions of going to the beach and giving 
presents to his children. Although he tells his children to be happy even though “I couldn’t 
buy many things as I did last time,” he feels sorrow that Easter has been ruined for the 
community’s children (“The Ebola Virus Took a Knife to Our Easter Celebrations” n.p.). 
During the time that should be celebratory, he reflects on the economic turmoil still facing 
West African communities. He writes, “Our lives are on hold and our livelihoods destroyed. 
Jobs remain difficult to find, as most organisations are still closed and we’ve had to adjust to 
the available work being related to Ebola” (n.p.). As an example of the career changes many 
have had to make to make ends meet, he reveals that “When Ebola came, Mr Kamara had to 
switch profession from teacher to grave digger” (n.p.). Just as Bayoh emphasizes the ongoing 
need to build better health care infrastructure in Africa, he also insists that economic 
hardship in Africa is not going away even if the epidemic has died down. He explains, “Yet 
our economy has gone from bad to worse. People say this because Ebola put our nation on 
hold. Even with all the money we received from donors it seems the poor are getting poorer 
and the rich, richer. Life was hard before Ebola and is still so after it” (n.p.).  
 Among the lingering effects of the Ebola outbreak is the stigmatization that 
continues to haunt survivors. In another column for The Guardian’s “Ebola: Life on the 
Frontline” series, Huw Poraj-Wilczynski speaks to a nurse, Fatmata Sesay, who was among 
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the first responders to the Ebola crisis. She contracted the disease when a colleague whom she 
was caring for vomited on her shoulder; she subsequently infected her daughter, Tata, 
although both mother and daughter survived. Poraj-Wilczynski explains of Sesay’s experience, 
“[T]he problems of the Ebola outbreak are not limited to the virus itself. Working in the 
Ebola treatment centre, even before she caught the disease, was a lonely experience…People 
stopped coming round to see her” (“Ebola in Sierra Leone: ‘Remind People not to Forget’” 
n.p.). Because of the lack of understanding about Ebola in Western Africa, Ebola health care 
providers faced particular stigmatization. Sesay remembers: “It was very difficult for us nurses 
at the time…People in Kenema said we nurses were the ones who were killing the patients. 
They thought the president had given us money to reduce the population. They said Ebola 
was not real” (n.p.). Sesay and other nurses were met with suspicion despite the fact that they 
were fighting a disease they did not understand with inadequate resources for doing so; she 
mentions in particular that the protective garments they wore were thin and allowed liquids 
to seep through (n.p.). Stigmatization continues to haunt Ebola survivors as well. In Bayoh’s 
account of Momodu, the ambulance driver who contracted Ebola, he describes the 
challenges of reintegrating into his community after he was pronounced Ebola-free. He 
explains, “My integration back into the community was a very difficult one. People were 
asked not to sit by me, others refused to come close. My money was rejected in the market. 
My neighbors were afraid of me, they said I still had the virus and until three months [had 
passed] no one should come close…After about two months, my community finally 
embraces me. But it was a terrible experience” (“Life on the Ebola Frontline: ‘I Thought of 
Nothing Else but My Own Death’” n.p.). For survivors who have witnessed comrades dying 
beside them on a daily basis while in treatment centers for Ebola, such continued 
stigmatization perpetuates psychological trauma that will take a lifetime to recover from.  
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 A final theme of “Life on the Ebola Frontline: ‘I Thought of Nothing Else but My 
Own Death’” speaks to the continued work that must be done to foster more trust between 
Western aid workers and African community members. In a column entitled “Ebola Shuts 
Schools in Sierra Leone but Teachers Use Skills to Stop Disease,” social worker John 
Momodu Kargo reports on the ways in which teachers repurposed themselves into public 
health educators after schools were shut down during the outbreak. He recalls the plan for 
teachers to educate their communities: “After the schools closed, the teachers we had trained 
were calling out to be put to work in preventing the spread of the virus. I soon realized that 
these teachers could be very useful in helping their communities by educating their own 
people in the attitudes and behaviour they needed to adopt to remain safe from 
infection” (n.p.). 145 teachers were ultimately trained to take Ebola prevention messages 
(most simply put: “Don’t touch the sick. Don’t touch the dead. Wash your hands with soap 
frequently”) to 200 people per teacher and track Ebola outbreaks within their communities 
(n.p.). Such messages are vital in communities where Ebola is believed to be unreal, “a tool 
for the government to gain influence,” or associated with “devils or evil spirits” rather than “a 
disease like malaria” (n.p.). Rather than sending Western healthcare workers to educate 
already suspicious and vulnerable communities, Kargo’s method involved educating West 
Africans who might have more influence over their communities. He rationalizes:  
As they are highly respected and influential in their communities, teachers are 
ideally placed to change people’s mindsets about Ebola. When they work 
among their own people, our teachers are seen as ‘children of the village’ so 
the community will trust them. Rural villages can be suspicious of people 
coming to talk to them. Their own son or daughter finds it easier to carry the 
messages that we need to disseminate. (n.p.) 
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Future efforts to educate rural communities about Ebola prevention measures might make 
use of this mix of Western and local to better serve communities and more effectively 
convince them to avoid Ebola infection. 
 Overall, this collection of narratives reveals many ways in which we must continue to 
reincorporate African perspectives into our Ebola network. In particular, we must collaborate 
with African governments and community leaders to address healthcare system needs, 
economic and financial needs, psychological trauma for survivors, and education efforts. The 
narratives also demand that Westerners acknowledge the extent to which Ebola still effects 
West Africans, even if we have the privilege and distance with which to move on. While 
Western aid workers can go home after an outbreak of disease, West Africans are left behind 
to pick up the pieces. Ebola cannot only be a network we address in times of emergency; it 
must be an ongoing fight, and our commitment to those affected must last longer than a few 
months. In addition to our ethical obligation to care for those in other parts of the world, the 
Ebola outbreak reveals the extent to which all healthcare system nodes are intricately 
connected. Ongoing disturbance in Western African nodes can have dire consequences on 
the rest of the network if another outbreak occurs. 
 The perspectives of African aid workers provide another important lesson for those 
who wish to intervene in public health crises: diagnostic networks cannot simply abandon 
their efforts when one set of actants (the Western, white ones) are no longer affected. As these 
narratives demonstrate, stigmatization against those affected by Ebola in Africa remains 
fierce, the economy is still broken, and picking up the pieces is a daily challenge. We need a 
long view of diagnosis that never feels complacent in its approach to disease; as the Ebola 
epidemic reminds us, we are all intricately interconnected through travel, and we are 
therefore always at risk for developing a disease. Furthermore, just as deforestation allowed 
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for increased human and animal contact, and therefore spillover, the ongoing destruction of 
habitats around the world might lead to increased risk for contracting new diseases. 
Diagnostic networks must do more than simply label a disease once it has surfaced. They can 
do perhaps more good by learning from past outbreaks, rebuilding communities where 
diseases have had especially devastating effects, and working with local leaders to institute 
preventive measures and training procedures. Hopefully such international systems can 
prevent epidemics from occurring or at least keep them from spiraling out of control in the 
future. 
Conservative Politicians: The Isolationist Actants 
 The final actants that must be reincorporated into the network has never actually 
been excluded per se—only quietly overlooked. While the Ebola crisis raged on in Africa and 
fears circulated in the U.S. and other Western countries, one group benefitted from the 
paranoia and their time in the limelight: politicians. In a sarcastic editorial for The Huffington 
Post, editor Brian Rooney claims, “The Ebola virus is the best thing to happen to American 
politicians in years. Ebola has done what neither war, climate change, nor economic 
meltdown have accomplished. It has united our politicians in action because Ebola is 
bad” (“Ebola is Good” n.p.). Rooney offers a scathing critique of politicians who use the 
Ebola crisis to fear monger and take a heavy-handed approach—seemingly to demonstrate 
their effective leadership abilities. Rooney quips, “Alarm is good. Voters unite around 
politicians who tell you to be alarmed” (n.p.). While they perpetuated paranoia about 
contracting Ebola and fought media wars with Hickox and other Ebola nurses returning 
from Africa, they were also simultaneously engaging in actions that actually prevented the 
resolution of the Ebola crisis. In what follows, I explore several key ways in which politicians, 
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particularly conservative politicians, used Ebola to further their own political agendas in ways 
that were counterproductive. 
 First, Bobby Jindal, the Republican Governor of Louisiana, was publicly criticized 
when he banned medical workers who had returned from countries affected by Ebola from 
attending a medical conference meant to generate response strategies. According to Jess 
Bidgood and Kate Zernike, he “issued a stern warning . . . to medical experts coming to an 
international conference on tropical diseases that they should stay away if they had been in 
Ebola-affected countries in the past 21 days, and that those who defied would be confined to 
their hotel rooms” (n.p.). Rather than encouraging the collaboration of experts with the most 
knowledge of Ebola’s treatment and prevention, Jindal instead prevented the very efforts that 
might have led to a faster resolution of the epidemic. According to Rooney, who again takes a 
more humorous approach, “Jindal, who likes to think of himself as having presidential 
mettle, is so tough on Ebola, he’ll quarantine even the scientists thinking about Ebola. That’s 
the kind of action we’ve come to expect from our politicians” (n.p.). Jindal’s efforts effectively 
prevented networked problem solving among experts; which, according Dr. Alan J. Magill, 
the president of the American Society of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene, “harm[ed] crucial 
sessions where scientists, doctors and administrators who had been in the region were going 
to teach others” (Bidgood and Zernike n.p.). Such efforts, unfortunately, are also in keeping 
with conservative skepticism about the expertise of scientists, medical professionals, and 
others who advocate for the health and wellbeing of vulnerable populations. 
 Others were critical of the ways in which both liberal and conservative governors 
enforced harsh quarantine procedures in order to secure a solid foundation for future 
political maneuvering. Bidgood and Zernike point out that these procedures “went beyond 
what the federal Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and many medical experts have 
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said are necessary to prevent the spread of the disease” and that, conveniently, “Some of the 
toughest policies have been imposed by governors in tight races—such as Connecticut, where 
a Democratic incumbent was fighting a tough challenge, and Georgia and Florida, where 
Republicans were” (n.p.). Amongst governors and state politicians, fears circulated about the 
potential backlash that a local Ebola outbreak could foster. In Hickox’s public statement 
against Christie, who detained her even though she never had Ebola or its symptoms, she 
directly identifies his particular motivation for quarantining her in an unheated outdoor tent 
with no access to a shower. She writes, “My liberty, my interests and consequently my civil 
rights were ignored because some ambitious governors saw an opportunity to use an age-old 
political tactic: fear” (Laura Wagner n.p.). Christie, who conveniently quarantined Hickox 
near midterm elections and later ran for president in 2016, responded to reports of the 
lawsuit by saying, “I’ve been sued lots of times before. Get in line” (n.p.). Hickox went 
beyond the lawsuit, though, penning an op-ed for The Guardian called “Stop Calling Me the 
Ebola Nurse.” In it, Hickox reiterates to readers that she has never had Ebola and demands, 
“I never had Ebola, so please stop calling me ‘the Ebola Nurse’—now!” (n.p.). She again 
highlights the ways in which she was quarantined because Christie and LePage (the governor 
of Maine, where Hickox lives), hoped to advance their careers by disregarding science and 
medicine and violating her civil rights. She writes:  
They bet that, by multiplying the existing fear and misinformation about 
Ebola—a disease most Americans know little about—they could ultimately 
manipulate everyone and proclaim themselves the protectors of the people by 
‘protecting’ the public from a disease that hasn’t killed a single American. 
Politicians who tell lies such as ‘she is obviously ill’ [Christie’s comment about 
Hickox when it was proven that she did not have Ebola] and mistreat citizens 
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by telling them to ‘sit down and shut up’ [Christie’s comment to an angry 
attendee at a Hurricane Sandy meeting] will hopefully never make it to the 
White House. (n.p.) 
While Christie’s White House bid was ultimately unsuccessful, Hickox correctly predicts 
Christie’s motives for publicly lying about her health (he falsely claimed she had a fever and 
that she was ill even after she’d been pronounced healthy) and keeping her quarantined 
against her will. 
 Perhaps more painful for Hickox were the personal debates about her humanitarian 
intentions, which were launched against her when she defied quarantine orders. 
Unintentionally, Hickox became the center of a partisan tug-of-war over the way public 
health crises should be handled and the intersections of public health and individual rights. 
Hickox was particularly attacked by conservative politicians, or “loathed” by them, as a 
headline from the Washington Post put it. Rush Limbaugh suggested that her problem with 
the quarantine was not its lack of scientific basis, but rather the lack of attention she received 
while in quarantine, hidden away from the public eye. Of course, one wonders how he 
Limbaugh can see her isolation—and the subsequent media frenzy—as detracting attention. 
Still, he asks: “Is this not a little bit sanctimonious? I mean, here you volunteer and you let 
everybody know, by the way … ‘I am a good person. I have volunteered to go to Africa, and 
I am helping Ebola patients. Look at me. See me? I am a good person.’ You come back, ‘I 
have just returned from Africa helping Ebola patients, and you are not going to quarantine 
me so that I can’t be noticed’” (“Kaci Hickox, Rebel Ebola Nurse” n.p.). On the other hand, 
in another Washington Post piece, “Ebola Nurse Kaci Hickox: ‘Flaming’ Liberals Love Her. 
‘Bully’ Conservatives Hate Her,” Justin Wm. Moyer explains that although “Kaci Hickox 
may not have intended to become the center of a political debate . . . she is one now” (n.p.). 
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Hickox, who became “a stand-in for the entire labor movement” for standing up to “bully 
governors,” was particularly beloved by liberals for standing up to Christie. Writes Moyer, 
“She . . . struck a blow for all the teachers, nurses, public employees, minimum-wagers and 
workers of all kinds that Christie has bullied, belittled and silenced over the years” (n.p.). 
Although Christie did not personally attack Hickox, he used her to “[take] up an unusual 
rallying cry for a member of the party of Reagan: the need for big government to contain a 
crisis” (n.p.). Thus, rather than drawing on Hickox’s knowledge and firsthand experience 
with Ebola, political figures either turned her into the liberal advocate she never asked to be 
or demonized her efforts to stand up for health care workers who might be discouraged by 
the new quarantine policies and to fight a deadly disease in a country without proper 
resources by calling her petulant and self-serving.  
 The actions of Jindal and Christie, among others, had more extensive consequences 
than the violation of Hickox’s civil and personal rights—they also prevented aid workers 
from volunteering to serve African communities at the heart of the outbreak. In “Ebola and 
Quarantine,” Drazen et. al. argue that involuntary 21-day quarantine for Ebola aid workers 
returning from African countries is not scientifically based and is akin to “driving a carpet 
tack with a sledgehammer: it gets the job done but overall is more destructive than 
beneficial” (2029). While they understand the goal of protecting the public’s health from an 
oftentimes deadly disease, they point out the contradiction of quarantining healthy Western 
aid workers while failing to stop the epidemic at its source by encouraging aid workers to 
volunteer in affected areas and honoring them when they return. They explain: 
Hundreds of years of experience show that to stop an epidemic of this type 
requires controlling it at its source. Médecins Sans Frontières, the World 
Health Organization, the U.S. Agency for International Development 
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(USAID), and many other organizations say we need tens of thousands of 
additional volunteers to control the epidemic. These responsible, skilled 
health care workers who are risking their lives to help others are also helping 
by stemming the epidemic at its source. If we add barriers making it harder 
for volunteers to return to their communities, we are hurting ourselves. 
(2029)  
In particular, aid workers returning from Ebola-striken areas could fear that in addition to 
their own potential quarantines, their family members and friends could be quarantined if 
they chose to see them. Doctors Without Borders was especially vocal in challenging the 
policies of governors who reacted with panic rather than reasoned and scientifically-based 
policies. In a press release on the Doctors Without Borders website, Sophie Delaunay, 
executive director of Médecins Sans Frontières in the United States explains, “There are other 
ways to adequately address both public anxiety and health imperatives, and the response to 
Ebola must not be guided primarily by panic in countries not overly affected by the 
epidemic. Any regulation not based on scientific medical grounds, which would isolate 
healthy aid workers, will very likely serve as a disincentive to others to combat the epidemic 
at its source, in West Africa” (“Ebola: Quarantine Can Undermine Efforts” n.p.). For aid 
workers already anxious about the risks to their physical and psychological health of serving 
in countries where they will have to watch children and adults alike die everyday from the 
disease, the further risk of quarantine might be too much to bear. The press release explains, 
“International MSF staff members commit to burdensome four-to-six week assignments in 
the Ebola-affected countries. The risk of being quarantined for 21 days upon completion of 
their work has already prompted some people to reduce their length of time in the field. 
Others will be less inclined to volunteer in the first place” (n.p.). Thus, the politician’s strict 
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quarantine enforcement did more than prevent conversations about prevention measures, 
serve their own political agendas, and violate Hickox’s rights (among many others). It also 
prevented aid workers from volunteering to educate and treat patients in Africa or to reduce 
the amount of time they spent there serving affected communities. 
 The Ebola outbreak and the enforcement of heavy-handed quarantine procedures by 
U.S. governors should foster a critique of the ways in which politicians use public health 
scares to serve their own interests. Responses to epidemics cannot be determined by 
politicians who are more concerned with their favorability ratings than with scientific 
principles governing disease transmission and containment. Furthermore, politicians not 
only took control of the Ebola network in the U.S. in totalitarian ways, they attempted to 
exclude scientific and medical actants who countered their actions. For the ostensible cause 
of defending their constituents from possible illness, they failed to heed the advice of medical 
experts who deemed their quarantine procedures both unnecessary and dangerous. Gregg 
Gonsalves and Peter Staley sum up the disconnect between scientific arguments against 
quarantine and political action:  
The argument against these [quarantine] policies is based on the lack of 
scientific grounds for the quarantine criteria, the likelihood that unnecessary 
restrictions on those returning from the region will dissuade health care 
workers from volunteering to help fight the epidemic, the illicit and 
erroneous public health message sent by these quarantines that asymptomatic 
persons are a danger to their communities, and the inconsistency in applying 
the policies to health care workers who’ve had contact with Ebola in Africa 
but not those who’ve seen patients in U.S. facilities. (“Panic, Paranoia, and 
Public Health” 2348) 
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The involvement of politicians as actants within public health and diagnostic networks raises 
another important question: if we must, as I’ve argued, harness the energy of diagnostic 
networks to do more than address immediate threats, what role should politicians play in 
legislating disease? Here, Latour might remind us of the importance of never turning a 
network into a hierarchy; politicians must act while acknowledging the limitations of their 
knowledge and power and defer to other expert actants, such as scientists, aid workers, and 
even the patients themselves. By failing to defer to the expertise of scientists and physicians, 
politicians such as Christie and LePage risked stigmatizing Ebola to the point that aid 
workers would avoid volunteering to help stop the epidemic. Their actions could have also 
resulted in people hiding Ebola symptoms to avoid the media spectacle. Advocating for the 
common good cannot be a business of isolated decision making but rather networked and 
pooled expertise, a project I’ll address more fully in Chapter 5.  
Perhaps most frustrating of all is a point that Gonsalves and Staley miss but Shah 
picks up—the entire pandemic could have been prevented by more effective international 
cooperation amongst politicians and health care systems. Writes Shah: 
The Ebola virus broke out in a remote forest village in Guinea in early 2014. 
It would have been easy to contain using only the simplest, cheapest measures 
had it been squelched early on at its source. Instead the virus, which had 
previously infected no more than a few hundred people at a time, in a single 
year spread into five neighboring countries, infected more than twenty-six 
thousand people, and would cost billions to contain. Well-understood 
diseases that can be easily contained with drugs and vaccines escaped control 
even in the wealthy countries best situated to stanch them. (8-9) 
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As this example (and countless others, according to Shah), illustrate, a networked view of 
disease and diagnosis must be mobilized to stress international collaboration, the enrollment 
of nonhuman factors, and “reaching across the aisle” between different political parties and 
specialist and non-specialist audiences. 
“Ebola is Good” 
 While “Ebola is Good” was obviously a sarcastic commentary on the ways in which 
politicians (ab)use epidemics and public health crises for their own gain, epidemics like Ebola 
offer us important opportunities to recalibrate public health networks. In particular, due to 
developments in air travel and human population concentrations in cities, bodies of U.S. 
citizens are more interconnected than ever with the rest of the world. This increased exposure 
to others must be reflected in our networked relationships; rather than excluding actants who 
we fear will contaminate us, we must find ways to work with such actants to promote global 
infectious disease prevention, research, and education. Rather than responding with fear 
mongering, we must respond with initiatives that are both scientifically-based and beneficial 
for all of the network’s actants. As Jane Bennett argues in “Thing-Power,” networked 
relationships change our ethical obligations, as we can no longer care only for the humans 
that we perceive as immediately affecting us. Recognizing that healthcare systems are 
comprised of global network of actants demands that we maintain responsibility for actants 
across the globe and expand our sense of whose health matters. She writes:  
The ethical aim becomes to distribute value more generously, to bodies as 
such. Such a newfound attentiveness to matter and its powers will not solve 
the problem of human exploitation and oppression, but it can inspire a 
greater sense of the extent to which all bodies are kin in the sense of being 
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inextricably enmeshed in a dense network of relations. And in a knotted 
world of vibrant matter, to harm one section of the web may very well be to 
harm oneself…A vital materialism does not reject self-interest as a motivation 
for ethical behavior, though it does seek to cultivate a broader definition of 
self and of interest. (48) 
For Bennett, then, the so-called Ebola nurse quarantine illustrates the need for a greater sense 
of responsibility, or, as Latour might claim, we need more moralists to seek out and enlist 
actants into our public health networks.  
  Furthermore, we also cannot allow politicians to create their own networks to the 
exclusion of public health specialists and experts. At the heart of the Ebola quarantine 
struggle, wherein Kaci Hickox was only the first of several nurses to be quarantined after 
returning from treating patients in West Africa, is a problem of expertise. While Latour 
encourages us to always extend the number of actants who can participate in our networks 
and to continually ask who has been prematurely excluded, the question remains of how we 
might determine expertise in a network of flattened ontologies. For example, during an Ebola 
outbreak that encompasses many actants—from nonhumans, to African Ebola patients, to 
international aid workers, to scientists and medical experts, to politicians—how do we find 
ways for expertise to be collaboratively shared rather than contested? If we cannot respond to 
the demands of each actant all at once, how will we decide who to listen and respond to first? 
This issue is of particular importance during an era when president-elect Donald Trump and 
his administration express open disdain for academic and scientific expertise. For example, 
Trump recently appointed former Texas Governor Rick Perry as the Secretary of Energy, a 
post previously held by a nuclear physicist. He has also appointed a vocal climate change 
denier, Myron Ebell, to lead the Environmental Protection Agency transition. Future 
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collaborations within diagnostic networks will demand shared work between politicians and 
expert healthcare and science specialists, and given Trump’s recent nods to non-specialist and 
anti-science leaders, the future looks grim for medical and scientific research. Just as Christie 
and others chose to disregard the expertise of scientists and healthcare providers, future 
politicians might similarly let partisan interests cloud their judgement as they face future 
health crises. Global trends that show that pandemic outbreaks have historically occurred 
once every fifty years, and according to Sonia Shah, “90 percent of epidemiologists said that a 
pandemic that will sicken 1 billion, kill up to 165 million, and trigger a global recession that 
could cost up to $3 trillion would occur sometime in the next two generations” (Shah 8, 
Brilliant n.p.). And, she argues, the cause of the next pandemic may be the very 
disorganization and lack of networked care that the Ebola quarantine situation illustrates. 
She writes, “Partly, this sense of an impending pandemic derives from the increasing number 
of candidate pathogens with the biological capacity to cause one. But it’s also a reflection of 
the shortcomings in our public-health infrastructure, modes of international cooperation, 
and ability to maintain social cohesion in the face of contagion. The way modern societies 
have handled outbreaks of new issues so far does not bode well” (8). Thus, the ANT frame 
might reach beyond the interpersonal dimension of diagnostic networks as they function in a 
hospital room and into the messy international arena of epidemic identification, treatment, 
and prevention. 
 Although Kaci Hickox has largely resumed her normal life after relocating to Oregon, 
she continues to pursue a lawsuit against Christie. Hickox, who is represented by the 
American Civil Liberties Union, was told last fall that while “Christie and state health 
officials are immune from federal civil rights charges,” she can “proceed with parts of her 
lawsuit alleging false imprisonment and invasion of privacy” (“Judge Tosses Civil Rights 
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Claims” n.p.). Despite the ongoing legal battles, Hickox’s public misdiagnosis has given her a 
platform for holding other actants accountable, and she serves as an excellent example of 
intervening within a network that simultaneously undermines public health policy, science, 
and civil liberties. And, perhaps most impressively, her experiences of being isolated as an 
actant within a complex and multi-faceted network has enabled her to generate a new 
network: one that might confront partisan approaches to public health policy and lead to the 
revision of the U.S. Ebola network. 
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CHAPTER 4: 
DIAGNOSTIC (UN)CERTAINTY AND DELIBERATIVE RHETORICS 
Doctors are men who prescribe medicines of which they know little, to cure diseases of which they 
know less, in human beings of whom they know nothing. - Voltaire 
I carry tattooed upon my heart a list of names of women who did not survive, and there is always 
a space left for one more, my own. - Audre Lorde 
 On August 1, 2009, artist Megan Hildebrandt discovered a lump on her throat. It 
throbbed with pain when she drank beer. And it wouldn’t go away. Hildebrandt, an MFA 
student attending the University of South Florida at the time, didn’t have health insurance, 
which made it difficult to get in to see a doctor. She explains, “Finally, by the end of August
—I could no longer ignore it. I went in to the University ER . . . There I was given a CT 
scan and told I was too young to have cancer, and that I was more likely to be HIV positive. 
(wtf ) I was given 7 days of antibiotics and told to get tested for HIV” (Hildebrandt). 
Hildebrandt waited two weeks, giving the antibiotic time to work and the lump to go away. 
But when it got worse instead, she decided to get checked again, this time pursuing a 
diagnosis at the student health center at USF. She recalls that “the lump was huge by this 
point—the antibiotics had not worked on CANCER” (Hildebrandt). Still perplexed, the 
student health center referred Hildebrandt to Moffitt Cancer Center, “where I was quickly 
given blood tests, another CT scan, and finally, biopsy surgery. It was late September by the 
time I was actually diagnosed with Hodgkin's Lymphoma, Stage 2A” (Hildebrandt). 
Hildebrandt, who had been made to wait two months for a diagnosis, “began chemo 
immediately [with] ABVD infusions every two weeks until the beginning of April. Then I 
was declared cancer-free” (Hildebrandt). However, her doctor advised that she should get 
regular CT scans in order to ensure that the cancer hadn’t returned. Hildebrandt was worried 
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about the levels of radiation she was being exposed to during her regular CT scans, but she 
trusted her doctors. 
 Approximately two years after beginning treatment, Hildebrandt’s doctor told her, “I 
think we should stop giving you so many CT scans” (“Culture Vultures”). He admitted that 
her continued exposure to radiation, via the CT scans, put her at an elevated risk for cancer 
recurrence. New research had revealed the link between radiation exposure and cancer, which 
had resulted in stricter guidelines regarding how many CT scans patients should receive. 
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Figure 4.1. Megan Hildebrandt. Counting Radiation I, ink on 
paper, 96 x 54 in, 2012. Courtesy of the artist.
When she asked how much radiation she’d been exposed to for each CT scan, he told her, 
“For each CT scan of your head and neck we’ve given you, you’ve been exposed to one 
lifetime of radiation” (“Culture Vultures”). He then asked her, “How many have we given 
you?” She replied, “You’re my doctor, don’t you know?” She finally told him she had had 
sixteen CT scans over two years. He said, “Okay, that means you’re about thirteen hundred 
years old in radiation years” — a 
revelation that was particularly hard for 
her to process, she notes, as she was still a 
young college student at the time 
(“Culture Vultures”). Upon returning to 
her studio, Hildebrandt began to 
wonder, “How am I going to deal with 
this number? It’s huge” (“Culture 
Vultures”). She started to break 1300 
down into months, weeks, minutes, and 
seconds worth of exposure in an attempt 
to process the quantity of radiation she 
had endured.  
 Overwhelmed by the giant number, 
she began to represent it visually through 
a landscape drawing of crosshatches, 
broken down in increments of five sets of 
tally marks. The pieces in Hildebrandt’s 
Counting Radiation series, which are about eight feet tall, loom over viewers, viscerally 
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Figure 4.2. Megan Hildebrandt. Counting Radiation II, 
ink on paper, 96 x 54 in, 2012. Courtesy of the artist.
communicating the intensity and weight of the number 1300. “The bigness and scale was so 
important,” Hildebrandt reflects, “[It was important] that it was bigger than my 
body” (Hildebrandt). The repetitive marks became a source of comfort for Hildebrandt, who 
says she achieved a state of flow while creating the pieces because she didn’t have to think 
about anything but moving her body while she tallied.  
 Now, almost 8 years after her diagnosis, Hildebrandt feels perhaps more anxiety 
about her risk for disease than she did while she was going through treatment. “The liminal 
space post-treatment is harder,” she muses, adding that going through treatment allowed her 
to focus her energies on getting better 
rather than dwelling with daily 
uncertainty. “Cancer is chronic,” she 
tells me, “I think of it as ‘carrying the 
diagnosis’ with me [because it’s always 
with you, even when they tell you 
you’re a survivor]” (Hildebrandt). 
Given her 50 percent chance of cancer 
recurrence, and coupled with the extra 
radiation exposure she endured to 
monitor her cancer treatment’s efficacy, 
she feels the heaviness of the tally marks 
perhaps more now than she did when 
she created the pieces.  
 Hildebrandt’s emphasis on the 
challenge of living with uncertainty 
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Figure 4.3. Megan Hildebrandt. Counting Radiation III, 
ink and graphite on paper, 96 x 54 in, 2012. Courtesy of 
the artist.
post-diagnosis, and the dread that accompanies risk for or recurrence of disease, offers an 
important addition to the way the illness narrative genre, broadly speaking, conceives of 
diagnosis. While the diversity of the illness narrative genre renders any description of 
“norms” challenging, a common approach to diagnosis in much of the illness narrative 
literature involves a shocking reveal—one that the person has never known she should fear. 
For example, in Marisa Acocella Marchetto's Cancer Vixen, she depicts Cancer as a villain 
with skeletal hands and a Grim Reaper costume knocking on her door on a random May 
day. She reveals the diagnosis via a knock knock joke, picturing herself peering through the 
peep hole to meet her new guest: “Who’s there?” she asks. Cancer responds, “Cancer.” She 
responds, “Cancer Who?” And Cancer tells her, “Cancer your wedding! Cancer your career! 
Cancer your life!” (64). This sudden interruption presents diagnosis as an unexpected shock
—not a new chapter in an ongoing saga of disease and anxiety or a confirmation of her worst 
fears. Prior to her diagnosis, we do not see Marchetto staying up all night, worrying about 
cancer, pacing waiting room hallways, and furiously googling symptoms. Instead, she meets 
the love of her life and gets engaged, which postures cancer as an unwelcome intrusion 
within an otherwise pleasant narrative. For Marchetto, these uncertain experiences come 
later, once Cancer has knocked on her door.  
 Marchetto’s narrative, while striking in its playful irreverence, is not unique in its 
shocking reveal of a diagnosis. Other contemporary examples include Breaking Bad lead 
character Walter White’s sudden lung cancer diagnosis in the pilot episode, award-winning 
film Still Alice’s Alice Howland’s sudden diagnosis of familial Alzheimer’s disease, and the The 
Diving Bell and the Butterfly’s author Jean-Dominique Bauby, who communicated the text of 
the book by blinking after a sudden and massive stroke rendered him paralyzed save for his 
left eye. However, the narrative convention of sudden diagnosis fails to account for other 
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relationships to disease: What about those at risk for disease who are fearful before they ever 
exhibit symptoms? What about those who are not surprised to see Cancer (or another villain) 
lurking towards their door but are rather relieved that it has finally arrived? The surprise 
diagnosis convention can emphasize the shock of discovery to the point of masking the 
experiences of those for whom diagnosis is not a surprise. 
 Two shifts within medicine have generated a space for the kind of living-with-risk 
narrative shared by Hildebrandt. First, enhanced treatment and vaccination for diseases like 
cancer mean that more people are surviving initial bouts with disease, which means that 
more people are also at risk for recurrence. This is particularly true for cancer, as treatment 
and predictive testing have become more effective in recent years. According to their “Annual 
Report to the Nation on the Status of Cancer, 1975-2012,” A. Blythe Ryerson et. al show 
that cancer death rates have decreased “by 1.5% per year from 2003 to 2012” for both sexes 
and all types of cancer (1312). They also found that “Overall, cancer incidence and mortality 
declined among men; and, although cancer incidence was stable among women, mortality 
declined” (1312). Thus, more and more people are living with the daily uncertainty that 
Hildebrandt describes and anticipating future diagnoses. Furthermore, medicine’s ability to 
detect genetic mutations through predictive or presymptomatic testing has generated a 
population of people who can know in advance whether they will develop a genetic disease. 
In May 2013, Angelina Jolie raised awareness about precisely this issue when she published 
an op-ed entitled “My Medical Choice” in The New York Times. In the piece, Jolie wrote, 
“[T]he truth is I carry a ‘faulty’ gene, BRCA1, which sharply increases my risk of developing 
breast cancer and ovarian cancer” (n.p.). According to Jolie, “My doctors estimated that I had 
an 87 percent risk of breast cancer and a 50 percent risk of ovarian cancer, although the risk 
is different in the case of each woman” (n.p.). In response to this news, Jolie opted for 
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preventive surgery: “Once I knew that this was my reality, I decided to be proactive and to 
minimize the risk as much I could. I made a decision to have a preventive double 
mastectomy” (n.p.). Although she admits that genetic testing for the BRCA1 and BRCA2 
genes are financially challenging for most—the cost is “more than $3,000 in the United 
States”—she insists that “It has got to be a priority to ensure that more women can access 
gene testing and lifesaving preventive treatment, whatever their means and background, 
wherever they live” (n.p.). She ends with an exhortation for women to undergo testing so 
they can know whether they are at risk for disease:  
I choose not to keep my story private because there are many women who do 
not know that they might be living under the shadow of cancer. It is my hope 
that they, too, will be able to get gene tested, and that if they have a high risk 
they, too, will know that they have strong options. Life comes with many 
challenges. The ones that should not scare us are the ones we can take on and 
take control of. (n.p.). 
For Jolie, interestingly, being informed and having options are linked to taking control of 
genetic risk —as if testing itself can release a person from the anxiety potential disease brings. 
Her exhortation was nonetheless effective, as a study by Sunita Desai and Anupam B. Jena 
found that “Daily BRCA test rates increased immediately and sharply after publication of the 
editorial” (“Do Celebrity Endorsements Matter?” 2). They identify a change in “BRCA 
testing rates of 52%,” although they also note that Jolie’s editorial was less effective at 
reaching the subgroups most at risk for the BRCA gene (3). Overall, though, Jolie helped to 
popularize a relatively unknown diagnostic phenomenon, and her endorsement of it 
encouraged others to explore their options and risk.  
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 Despite these shifts towards diagnostic risks pertaining to recurrence and genetics, 
the illness narrative genre has been slow to generate alternative approaches to diagnosis. 
While my goal is not to criticize the way writers choose to present their experiences of illness, 
I am struck by the relative dearth of narratives that focus on someone who is at risk for a 
disease and must learn to dwell with her uncertainty. Such experiences are perhaps more 
challenging to represent as they are anticipatory of a potential, future diagnosis—they are 
more abstract, for example, than the experience of Marchetto being visited by an unwelcome 
house guest or the shock of seeing Jolie’s column in the New York Times. This is not to say 
that illness narratives do not involve uncertainty—uncertainty abounds regarding such 
important questions as: How will I pay for treatment? Will my friends and family continue 
to support and love me? How will I change as a result of my changed body / abilities? What 
kinds of treatment will I undergo? Will I live? But sustained uncertainty about whether one 
will become sick and when is relatively rare in illness narratives, where the very title of the 
genre tends to give away the plot to some extent. In narrative terms, we might say that such 
questions anticipate a future narrative event that may never come.    
 Despite their relative rarity, when such narratives do exist they tend to take one of 
two forms: (1) a person is at risk for a disease due to genetic factors, as in the case of Jolie, or 
(2) a person is at risk for a recurrence of their disease, as in Hildebrandt’s case. For patients 
who fear recurrence, the diagnosis is just a node on a network of illness that may also include 
the experience of a migraine triggering fears that cancer has returned and the terror of 
returning for a yearly check-up. And for those at risk for a genetic disease, the story involves 
fearful symptom checking and anxiety that an ordinary experience—such as tripping while 
walking down the street—signals the development of a looming inherited disease. Susan 
Sontag’s immortal words, with which she opens Illness as Metaphor and AIDS and Its 
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Metaphors, perhaps come closest to presenting the uncertainty of fluctuating within the 
liminal space between health and illness:   
Illness is the night side of life, a more onerous citizenship. Everyone who is 
born holds dual citizenship, in the kingdom of the well and in the kingdom 
of the sick. Although we all prefer to use the good passport, sooner or later 
each of us is obliged, at least for a spell, to identify ourselves as citizens of that 
other place. (3) 
Sontag, herself as breast cancer survivor by the time she wrote her most famous text, 
highlights the oscillation that illness engenders, and the constant fear of shifting (back) into 
the “night side of life.” She views such a shift as inevitable, a part of life, although tellingly 
she also allows for a shift back into the kingdom of the well. Although this opening to her 
text is a bit tongue-in-cheek, as it masterfully captures the very metaphorical treatment of 
illness that she finds so unethical, Sontag was primed to narrativize such an experience, as she 
had lived through three decades of uncertainty about cancer recurrence. According to Abigail 
Zuger, she first survived her “breast cancer metastatic to the lymph nodes,” in 1975, which 
she considered unlikely (“A Fight For Life” n.p.). Still, Zuger explains: 
She survived the draconian treatment and the years spent expecting her 
unlikely remission to end, only to develop unrelated uterine cancer in the late 
1990s. Again she survived, and again she developed a new cancer: this time 
myelodysplastic syndrome, a virtually untreatable variant of leukemia, 
probably related to the treatment for the first two. She died in 2004. (n.p.) 
But rather than describe “what it is really like to emigrate to the kingdom of the ill and live 
there” in Illness as Metaphor and AIDS and Its Metaphors, Sontag chooses instead to challenge 
“the punitive or sentimental fantasies concocted about that situation” (4). Rather than 
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discussing her own experiences with dual citizenship and anxiety about sudden deportation 
to the other place, she focuses on the metaphors used to describe illness, emphasizing the way 
such metaphors have disempowered or unfairly heroized patients over time. Thus, Sontag’s 
classic treatise—while brilliant—perpetuates the silence about diagnostic dread and 
uncertainty that haunts the illness narrative genre. 
 Perhaps one reason for the lack of narratives about potential, future diagnoses and 
bodies at risk can be attributed to Western medicine’s concern with—some might say 
obsession with—certainty. For example, shows like House generate faith that no matter how 
challenging a case, doctors will eventually figure out the problem and be able to treat it. Such 
expectations have led to a new genre of memoirs by physicians and residents-in-training who 
refute such god-like portraits of clinicians and present instead the challenging, uncertain 
circumstances they face while on the job. Chapter 2 disputed the idea that medicine is an 
exact science, and physicians such as surgeon Atul Gawande and internist Lisa Sanders are 
quick to point out the extent to which healthcare professionals are often making informed 
guesses in high pressure situations—hardly the portrait of medical perfection and certainty 
that dominates in Western culture. Siddhartha Mukherjee, a physician famous for his books 
The Emperor of All Maladies (2010) and more recently The Gene: An Intimate History (2016), 
agrees with Gawande’s and Sanders’ assessments, writing of his time in residency:  
I had never expected medicine to be such a lawless, uncertain world. I 
wondered if the compulsive naming of parts, diseases, and chemical reactions
—frenulum, otitis, glycolysis—was a mechanism invented by doctors to 
defend themselves against a largely unknowable sphere of knowledge. The 
profusion of facts obscured a deeper and more significant problem: the 
reconciliation between knowledge (certain, fixed, perfect, concrete) and 
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clinical wisdom (uncertain, fluid, imperfect, abstract). (The Laws of Medicine: 
Field Notes from an Uncertain Science 6) 
Despite Western perceptions of medicine as a perfect science, and efforts by physicians to 
make their work seem more exact (through classification methods, for example, as Mukherjee 
suggests), the daily reality of practicing medicine offers an alternative, messier picture. 
Mukherjee furthermore claims that, far from being a medical anomaly, uncertainty is at the 
heart of what physicians do every day—in fact, he bookends his TedTalk (later printed as a 
book) with reminders of medicine’s fallibility. In the introductory section, he quotes a 
surgeon he observed during his residency who left him with important advice for his medical 
career: “It’s easy to make perfect decisions with perfect information. Medicine asks you to 
make perfect decisions with imperfect information” (4). In the conclusion, Mukherjee 
affirms his former mentor’s words, now speaking from his prestigious position as a renowned 
physician and writer:  
The discipline of medicine concerns the manipulation of knowledge under 
uncertainty. Abstract away the smell of rubbing alcohol and bleach; forget the 
adjustable beds and ward signs and the gleaming granite of hospital lobbies; 
erase, for a moment, the many corporeal indignities of a man in a blue cotton 
gown in a room or the doctor trying to heal him—and you have a discipline 
that is still trying to reconcile pure knowledge with real knowledge. The 
‘youngest science’ is also the most human science. (70) 
Mukherjee adds his voice, then, to the chorus of physicians stressing that what they do is not 
an exact science and calling for recognition of the limitations of physician ability and 
knowledge, despite their years of schooling and experience. As Mukherjee reiterates, doctors 
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are constantly negotiating the pure knowledge they’ve gained in school with the real 
knowledge of treating real human bodies.  
 Lennard J. Davis also reminds us that perhaps nowhere is this fixation on certainty 
more prevalent than in diagnostic encounters. As described in Chapter 2, the very definition 
of the word “dia-gnosis”—to know with certainty—highlights the discomfiting parallels 
between medicine and religion; we expect doctors to be able to at least identify what is wrong 
with us even if they cannot cure us, just as we might expect a priest to be able to identify our 
sin and (we hope) pardon it. The word also refers to a process of distinguishing a disease from 
a list of other possibilities and arriving at a conclusion based on evaluation. Such terminology 
itself points to a scientific orientation for diagnosis, perhaps to again reify medical authority 
and make the practice of medicine seem less tied to chance, randomness, or guessing. 
However, such expectations for diagnosticians to always know “what’s wrong” condition us 
to have perhaps unrealistic expectations for what doctors can reasonably do. Furthermore, 
such expectations can lead to further frustration for individuals facing questions diagnosis 
cannot answer: Will I live a long life? Will I develop cancer? MS? Will I develop a genetic 
disease? What lifestyle factors put me at risk for contracting a disease in the future? Finally, 
and perhaps most importantly, such assumptions about the invincibility of doctors’ 
diagnostic knowledge and abilities presume that knowing one’s diagnosis is always a good in 
itself. The anxiety we feel before Dr. House solves the case (generally in the last five minutes 
of the show) indicates an unwillingness to live without a diagnosis—a discomfort with 
uncertainty that potentially has more to do with a desire to know than a desire to be 
diagnosed. 
 Furthermore, I want to highlight an aspect of diagnosis that Davis leaves out of his 
study: the extent to which diagnosis invokes a decision or judgement on the part of a doctor. 
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For example, the Cambridge Dictionary defines diagnosis as “the making of a judgment about 
the exact character of a disease or other problem” and Merriam-Webster defines it as “the 
decision reached by diagnosis” (“Definition of ‘Diagnosis’ in the Cambridge English 
Dictionary”; “Diagnosis”). These definitions suggest that diagnosis hinges on the doctor’s 
decision, an idea I called into question in Chapter 2. However, they also reveal that diagnoses 
rely not only on relations between networked actants but on their generation of deliberative 
contexts. In Chapter 2, I argued that diagnoses are rhetorical assemblages, and I suggested 
that the assemblages’ aim was to answer questions of conjecture, definition, and quality (or, 
the first three levels of stasis). In this chapter, I shift my analysis to consider how diagnostic 
assemblages relate to the fourth level of stasis, policy. Once an illness has been defined, or if it 
cannot be defined, questions remain regarding how to proceed and which course of action to 
decide upon. While previous chapters have explored the makeup of diagnostic networks, I 
want to now turn our attention to how a decision is made based on their coming together. 
And whereas previous chapter have emphasized more “traditional” cases where patients 
experience surprise diagnoses, I want to shift my focus towards the way decision-making 
happens for patients at risk for diseases. How might they engage in decision-making 
processes with their healthcare providers in order to ensure their continued (physical, 
emotional) health? And how might doctors shift their decision-making processes to best 
account for these rapidly expanding populations? 
 In what follows, I will suggest an alternative approach to diagnoses in potentia that 
better accounts for the reality of uncertainty not just in practice for doctors, such as 
Mukherjee, Davis, and others, but in patients’ lives. First, I will draw on two key examples to 
further explore the focus on certainty in Western presentations of diagnosis. My analysis will 
focus on two enigmatic communities who have much to teach us about the drive to 
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certainty: bug-chasers, a subgroup of gay men who pursue HIV positive partners, and those 
at risk for genetic disease who choose not to be tested. In considering the way both groups 
confront uncertainty and risk, I will seek to first consider the way (un)certainty influences 
the decisions that both subgroups make regarding their health. I will then argue that we need 
an approach to deliberative rhetorics within medical contexts that is as complex as the 
patients doctors treat. I locate such an approach in Arabella Lyon’s feminist and non-Western 
framework for deliberation in Deliberative Acts: Democracy, Rhetoric, and Rights. Although 
Lyon cultivated her framework specifically for human rights deliberations, I will address the 
benefits of applying such a model to medical and diagnostic contexts. 
  
Bug Chasing and the Desire for Certainty 
   In “The Existence of a Bug Chasing Subculture,” David A. Moskowitz and Michael 
E. Roloff define bug chasers as “physiologically healthy, HIV-negative gay men [who] . . . 
actively see[k] seroconversion by engaging in unprotected sex with HIV-positive 
partners” (347).  The phenomena was not well-known by the mainstream media until a 2002 3
article in Rolling Stone, “Bug Chasers: The Men Who Long to be HIV+,” shocked readers by 
providing insight into the bug chasing subculture. Gregory A. Freeman estimated, at the 
time, that about 25 percent of HIV+ of newly infected gay men “[fell] into” the bug chasing 
category (about 10,000 men per year) (n.p.). He furthermore explains that the internet has 
helped foster a community bent on contracting the disease, since most bug chasers turn to 
anonymous communities to share their deadly interests and find potential partners (n.p.). In 
an interview with a bug chaser named Carlos, Freeman learns that HIV is now viewed by 
 Thanks to Tamika Carey for bringing this phenomena to my attention as it relates to my 3
project.
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some bug chasers as a “minor annoyance” rather than a devastating death sentence — “It's 
like living with diabetes. You take a few pills and get on with your life” (n.p.). However, 
Carlos also acknowledges that “I know what the risks are, and I know that putting myself in 
this situation is like putting a gun to my head” (n.p.). Nonetheless, for Carlos, contracting 
HIV is a kind of dream because it constitutes the most subversive and radical thing he can do 
as a gay man (one, it’s worth noting, who volunteers at a crisis center for gay men and 
educates others about safe sex). Freeman offers a contrasting account from a man named 
Doug Hitzel, a former bug chaser who “successfully” contracted HIV. Hitzel regrets his 
decision to contract HIV and becomes angry when he hears people irreverently discussing 
“bug chasing” now that he has to live with the daily reality of the disease. “Whenever I have 
to deal with things like medication, days when I'm really down,” he tells Freeman, “I have to 
look myself in the mirror and say, ‘You did this. Are you happy now?’ That’s the one line that 
goes through my head: 'Are you happy now?’” He says it with a snarl, full of anger” (n.p.). In 
contrast to Carlos, who brags about his uncertain HIV status and the number of positive 
partners he has each week, Hitzel takes a more reflective approach. According to Freeman, 
“Looking back on it, Hitzel says he was committing suicide by chasing HIV, killing himself 
slowly because he didn't have the nerve to do it quickly. Hitzel is ashamed and embarrassed 
that he actually sought HIV, but he's willing to tell his story because he hopes to dissuade 
others who are on the same path” (n.p.). Thus, Freeman’s account exposes two approaches to 
understanding bug chasing—one informed by an infatuation with gaining entrance into a 
community through subversive sexual acts and the other a form of slow suicide due to the 
end of a relationship. 
 So unsettling was this story for readers that articles quickly proliferated attempting to 
prove whether bug chasing was a real subculture or a mere “urban legend or an inductive 
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fallacy” (Moskowitz and Roloff 355; Grov and Parsons 493). Moskowitz and Roloff proved 
the existence of this subculture and distinguished it from the barebacking subculture 
(specifically as it applies to gay men who practice unsafe sex), noting that while bug chasers 
actively pursue serodiscordant partners or indicate ambivalence regarding the partner’s status, 
none of the barebackers in their study sought a serodiscordant partner (352). They did 
indicate, however, that while discourse surrounding bug chasing holds that “Bug chasers are 
purportedly in search of ‘the bug,’” “only 8.7% reported a preference for a certifiably positive 
partner and the majority (60.6%) of bug chasers reported the HIV status ‘doesn’t 
matter’” (352). Thus, for more than half of the people Moskowitz and Roloff studied, bug 
chasing seemed to be less about active pursuit of HIV and more about the excitement of 
risking infection and/or a resignation to the likelihood of being infected resulting in 
indifference. 
 Because of the counterintuitive premise of bug chasing—why would someone want 
to contract HIV on purpose?—many writers have attempted to explain the practice. Deann 
K. Gauthier and Craig J. Forsyth suggest four major explanations for bug chasing, based on 
their analysis of bug chasing literature and internet resources: “fear and relief,” “risk taking as 
eroticism,” “loneliness and group solidarity,” and political actions” (93-5). Each of these 
explanations is highly suggestive, particularly the idea that a gay man who has been routinely 
stigmatized might chase the bug because he desperately wants to find acceptance and 
compassion. The question of how Western culture treats gay men with HIV in comparison to 
how we treat healthy gay men warrants much more analysis than this current research can 
pursue. However, I want to focus particularly on a motivation that correlates with a drive to 
diagnostic certainty: the desire to contract HIV in order to know one’s status definitively. 
Freeman explains, “For some, the chase is a pragmatic move. They see HIV infection as 
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inevitable because of their unsafe sex or needle sharing, so they decide to take control of the 
situation and infect themselves. It's empowering. They're no longer victims waiting to be 
infected; rather they are in charge of their own fates” (n.p.). Freeman highlights the 
significance for a gay man, who may know or sense that he has a high probability of 
contracting HIV, choosing to be in control of his fate by choosing when—and by whom—he 
will be infected. Indeed, some bug chasers even speak about contracting the bug in language 
that mirrors pregnancy, although being “impregnated” with HIV fosters death rather than a 
new life. Furthermore, to return to Gauthier’s and Forsyth’s four explanations for bug 
chasing, those who pursue HIV out of “fear and relief ” typically feel that “fear of infection 
inhibited their behavior in the past to such an extent that their perceived quality of life had 
diminished to unacceptably low levels” (93). In response, “These individuals wish for the 
‘relief ’ of knowing that they are infected. For them, infection is often viewed as ‘the great 
inevitable,’ and thus they wish to merely quicken the inevitable so that they can get on with 
the business of living out their lives in a more uninhibited fashion, however short that life 
may be” (93). Again, given the new sense among some gay men that HIV is a “manageable 
infection,” contracting HIV may seem necessary in order to achieve “increased quality of life” 
(93). For example, in a 1999 article in POZ by Michael Scarce, a 33-year-old gay man 
named Pete said, “I was so afraid of becoming positive for such a long time, and once it 
happened, I felt relief ” (“A Ride on the Wild Side” n.p.). Rather than feeling that HIV has 
ended their life, bug chasers may instead experience a feeling of invincibility: what more can 
happen to them once they have contracted HIV? What will they have to fear after infection? 
While of course there are many more things to fear—including side effects from treatment, 
the development of AIDS, and contraction of illnesses that will further compromise the 
immune system—for some, contracting HIV can offer respite from the endless questions and 
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“what ifs” of practicing unsafe sex. Thus, in contrast to public health efforts to encourage safe 
sex and diminish the spread of HIV, the bug chasing subculture seeks relief from their 
uncertainty by pursuing the virus. 
 Bug chasing highlights two key needs on the part of chasers—first, a desperate need 
for certainty in the face of risk and disease and second, a sense of agency in an otherwise 
chaotic and dangerous practice. Bug chasers in the aforementioned texts almost unanimously 
express a desire to catch HIV so they will no longer have to live with the terror and anxiety of 
not knowing if—or more likely when—they will contract it. Instead of waiting for the virus 
to strike when they least expect it, bug chasers pursue it so they will no longer be held back 
by fear. As Carlos puts it to Freeman: “It’s about freedom . . . What else can happen to us 
after this? You can [do whatever you want as much as you want], and nothing worse can 
happen to you. Nothing bad can happen after you get HIV” (n.p.). Although Hitzel would 
disagree, pointing out that several days on the HIV medication that makes him constantly 
vomit would make most realize how devastating the lived reality of HIV is, Carlos highlights 
the extent to which bug chasers see themselves as untouchable post-infection. In narrative 
terms, bug chasers see an HIV diagnosis as an inevitable future event in their lives and 
organize their actions around (and in fact cause) the ending they forsee. Once they have 
achieved the life event they planned for, they feel a greater sense of narrative freedom because 
they can now pursue other narratives not bound up in illness. Hitzel, it’s important to note, 
labels this a false hope. 
 Furthermore, others posit that bug chasing gives them a sense of agency in what 
would otherwise be a highly uncertain process of risking HIV infection. Even the verb 
“chase” suggests an approach to disease that can be controlled rather than passively feared. To 
again cast the impulse in narrative terms, for gay men who feel as if they cannot control the 
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inevitable conclusion of their story, bug chasing can be a tragic assertion of agency. If they 
contract HIV because of unsafe sex practices as a gay man, they might be seen as another 
victim of the disease in a community already ravaged by it. They may fear that their identity 
will be subsumed in their illness, and their individuality will get erased in a sea of statistics. If 
they transgress against the traditional narrative of HIV positive gay men by intentionally 
contracting it, then they will (potentially) be seen as martyrs rather than victims of a disease. 
They will also assert their individuality (bug chasing appears to be a relatively rare 
occurrence) and uniqueness. While they ultimately comply with a seemingly inevitable (to 
them) conclusion of their narrative—developing HIV and then AIDS—they recast their role 
within the story as an active tragic hero rather than a passive casualty.  4
 The bug chasing phenomenon offers a profound indictment of the way illness 
narratives treat diagnosis as an anchor. Such narratives set up an expectation that illness is 
inevitable, and the anxiety such an expectation engenders might be particularly unbearable 
for groups already especially vulnerable to contracting contagious diseases due to their 
lifestyle practices or genetic traits. The feeling that illness is inevitable but never quite realized 
might lead some to prefer contracting the disease rather than living in its constantly looming 
shadow. A narrative emphasis on the inevitability of disease can also create a dangerous 
impulse to find agency even in committing a form of suicide—signaling a feeling of 
powerlessness to control the narrative’s outcome but a measure of agency to control one’s 
response to (or acceptance of ) it. Overall, bug chasing highlights the limitations of viewing 
 It’s also worth noting that bug chasers may be complying with the demands of those who 4
would like to see LGBTQ+ individuals disappear from society. Perhaps bug chasers seek to 
identify with homophobic aggressors by contracting HIV—thereby placing themselves 
beyond the reach of their vilification. Some bug chasers may believe that contracting HIV 
will make them more sympathetic to those who would otherwise hate them, allowing them 
to elicit their pity rather than their disgust. 
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diagnosis as the only narrative option for vulnerable populations; bug chasers don’t seem to 
acknowledge other alternative futures as viable for themselves, and they therefore resign 
themselves to their ostensible fate. Additionally, bug chasers might feel that there is more 
they can do if they have been diagnosed than they can do as they wait around for a potential 
diagnosis. In a way, diagnosis empowers patients to take action, whereas waiting for a 
diagnosis leaves most frozen in uncertainty. Thus, one diagnostic problem that rhetoricians 
might be particularly well-suited to address includes collaborating with potential patients or 
those at-risk for developing diseases to forsee and plan for alternative futures that can be 
pursued with as much agency as bug chasing. Such an approach, about which more later, 
would need to both suggest an alternative to inevitable diagnosis and help potential patients 
to find ways of envisioning a future diagnosis as not necessarily destructive of their narrative. 
Genetic Testing and Choosing Not to Know 
 While some bug chasers pursue HIV positive partners in order to gain certainty 
about their health status, another community offers us an alternative portrait of the way at-
risk populations grapple with diagnostic uncertainty. In Mapping Fate: A Memoir of Family, 
Risk, and Genetic Research, Alice Wexler combines a memoir about her mother’s diagnosis 
with and death from Huntington’s disease with the story of how her father and sister, Milton 
and Nancy Wexler, successfully led efforts to identify the genetic mutation responsible for the 
disease. Huntington’s disease (HD) is an inherited disease caused by dying brain cells and 
resulting in dementia and an inability to move. A person with Huntington’s will typically 
start to exhibit symptoms in her mid to late thirties, and at first she may have trouble 
walking steadily and concentrating. She will develop, at some point, shaking and restless 
limbs that resemble Parkinson’s disease symptoms, and she will slowly lose the ability to walk, 
 146
speak, and even swallow. The disease is incurable and tragic, a disease that robs sufferers of 
both their physical and mental capacities early on in life. So cruel is the disease that, 
according to Samuel Frank in “Treatment of Huntington’s Disease,” “25% of patients 
attempt suicide, which is a cause of death in 8–9% of patients” (154). Before the detection of 
the gene that causes HD, anxiety about contracting the fatal disease was typically coupled 
with guilt when a person who had not known their risk had children who were also suddenly 
at risk. A person whose parent has HD has a fifty percent chance of inheriting the disease, a 
terrifying statistic when the child will have to watch her parent die a slow and painful death 
while wondering whether she, too, or perhaps one of her siblings, will endure a similar fate. 
Such was the case for Wexler, who watched her mother slowly lose her vibrant personality, 
her will to live (she attempted suicide several years before she died), her ability to move, her 
ability to do her favorite things (smoke and write letters), and finally her mental capacities 
that had once been so sharp. As she did so, she worried extensively that either she or her 
sister would also inherit the disease, and both sisters struggled to decide whether or not they 
should have children when they were not sure if they had inherited the HD gene. Her 
memoir, thus, differs from other illness narratives because “it is really less about an illness 
than about the possibility of illness, less about the medical dilemma of living with disease 
than about the existential dilemma of living at risk” (xxii). Thus, in contrast to Jolie’s 
assumption that women should want to know their genetic risk, Wexler presents an 
alternative picture—one that is ultimately more comfortable with uncertainty.  5
 Of course, there are important differences between bug chasing subculture and at-risk 5
populations who choose not to undergo genetic testing. Significantly, one can voluntarily 
expose oneself to HIV, whereas HD is an inherited disease for which there is no treatment or 
cure. In considering these two sets of potential patients alongside each other, I hope to 
highlight productive tensions and parallels within their experiences that might help us 
envision an alternative approach to communication in uncertain medical contexts.
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 The Wexler family’s involvement in the identification of the HD gene began in 1968 
when Milton Wexler started the Hereditary Disease Foundation (HDF), which is dedicated 
to conducting research and raising awareness for hereditary diseases, especially HD. 
According to Douglas Martin, Wexler “formed the [HDF] to gather young scientists from 
different disciplines and institutions for freewheeling talks about Huntington’s as well as to 
sponsor research” (n.p.). The creativity his foundation inspired, and Wexler’s ability to draw 
on his background in psychoanalysis, was both inspiring and controversial to the scientists he 
enlisted: “His strategy was one he developed for group therapy among creative people: no-
holds-barred discussion toward a common purpose in a nonthreatening climate” (n.p.). 
Wexler always maintained that his activism was the result of his wife’s diagnosis with HD, 
her brothers’ and fathers’ deaths from the disease, and the risk that one of his daughters 
would develop the disease. Calling his activism “terribly selfish,” he admits that he was 
“scared to death one of my daughters would get it, too” (n.p.). One of the daughters, in fact, 
developed her father’s passion for studying the disease. Although Nancy Wexler “was 
pursuing a PhD in clinical psychology at the time of her mother’s diagnosis,” according to 
Kristin Darwin, she soon shifted her focus to genetics and “devoted her life to the study of 
HD” (1). Darwin summarizes Wexler’s own contributions thusly: “In 1979, Wexler and her 
colleagues began a research project in Venezuela to search for the HD gene. They surmised 
that finding the gene was the most direct route to the development of treatments, even cures! 
They developed a pedigree of over 18,000 individuals and collected more than 4,000 blood 
samples from the largest extended family with HD ever to have been discovered. Their data 
led to the identification of the gene responsible for HD” (1). Nancy’s team published their 
findings in a paper, “A Polymorphic DNA Marker Genetically Linked to Huntington’s 
Disease,” which was published in the November 1983 issue of Nature. Subsequent news 
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coverage in The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, Time Magazine, and other major 
presses praised Nancy as a heroine, and “[e]veryone lauded the astonishingly rapid 
localization of the Huntington’s gene to the short arm of chromosome 4 as the first 
significant breakthrough in the entire history of Huntington's disease” (Wexler 219). Nancy, 
then, extended the research efforts her father had initiated and ultimately solved the HD 
mystery that had haunted their family—and thousands more— for decades. However, her 
team’s discovery, while exhilarating, instigated a painful dilemma for her family to consider. 
 The discovery of the genetic mutation responsible for HD meant that Nancy and her 
sister would now be able to receive reliable test results regarding their risk for contracting the 
disease. Although Nancy had once been thrilled at the idea of predictive testing for HD, 
particularly as it might enable would-be parents to decide whether or not to have children, 
the newfound ability to determine whether she possessed the genetic mutation responsible for 
HD gave her pause. Alice Wexler quotes “a widow and mother of several individuals who had 
died of Huntington’s” who she spoke with at the time as wondering, “Do you really want to 
know that in 10 to 15 years, you too will be stricken by the disease, or would you rather live 
in uncertainty?” (221). Such was the dilemma now facing the Wexlers, who had pioneered 
research for the predictive testing they now resisted. Milton Wexler was particularly opposed 
to his daughters undergoing the test, which led to a nasty blowup in a conversation with his 
daughters as they held a family meeting to consider whether or not to move forward with it. 
For a time, the father and daughters did not communicate as a result of their conflicting 
feelings about the test. As he explained in a 1986 interview with Diane Sawyer, which was 
later transcribed in Alice Wexler’s memoir: “What I have now is joyousness. If I knew they 
[Nancy and I] were free of the disease, I’d feel ecstasy. It’s not that great a gain. But there’s an 
immense difference between joy and discovering one of them carried the gene. It’s not worth 
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the gamble” (233). Nancy, for her part, also acknowledged her sudden shift in perspective—
from a  scientific to a more disconcerting personal uncertainty. “I’ve always believed in 
knowledge for its own sake. And it is ironic that after working for precisely that, I’m now 
finding it much more complex than I ever thought it would be” (233). Diane followed up by 
asking, “Did you think you’d take the test when the linkage was discovered?” And Nancy 
replied, “Absolutely. Yes. I never doubted it. And now I’m not sure” (234). Alice and Nancy 
finally resolved not to undergo testing, choosing instead to live with uncertainty. “The 
decision not to take the test—at least for the moment,” writes Alice, “meant learning once 
again to live at risk, with no thoughts now of a final release, no fantasies of freedom from the 
possibility of HD” (234). Thus, in exchange for an ending to their uncertain narrative of 
living at risk for HD, the Wexler sisters chose instead to live without closure. 
 The Wexler sisters were not alone in their decision. After the discovery of the HD 
gene in 1983, testing programs were opened in the U.S., Canada, England, and in other 
European countries. However, “relatively few people actually completed the test, despite the 
enthusiasm for a predictive test in the days before the marker was discovered and the 
euphoria of the discovery in 1983” (235). By 1990, only 1,400 people worldwide had been 
tested for the gene, in spite of mounting pressure from the media and medical experts, who 
advised that those at risk should get tested (235). Wexler mentions that doctors and 
counselors often “portray[ed] those who took the test as somehow stronger, braver, more 
optimistic, more ‘normal’ than those of us who chose not to know. But isn’t it also possible 
that those who opt not to know are more able to live with uncertainty and 
ambiguity?” (235). When Alice Wexler questioned those who did take the test about their 
decision, many said they needed to “escape the oppressive uncertainty” of living at risk so 
they could resume their lives—even if a positive test result indicated that their lifespan would 
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be shortened (236). As one man who chose to be tested explained to her, “You think about it 
constantly . . . I wanted to set my mind at rest one way or another” (236). Wexler sums up 
her discussions with those she interviewed: “The issue of control loomed large. Knowledge 
one way or the other appeared to give a measure of control, or at least of choice, over how 
one lived one’s life: at the very least, knowledge of one’s future in relation to Huntington’s 
seemed to increase the terrain on which one could knowledgeably make decisions” (236). 
However, many found that their uncertainty was only amplified post-testing, as they now 
lived in constant fear of the onset of symptoms or learned that they were not at risk but their 
siblings were. Acting because of their uncertainty, the Wexler sisters decided not to have 
children in order to avoid putting any future offspring at risk for HD.  
 Wexler’s 1995 “Afterword” to her memoir and scientific-historical treatise revisits the 
imperative to undergo genetic testing because of some elusive benefits dangled in front of 
potential patients by doctors or the media. “[T]he number of people actually going through 
with testing has remained relatively low,” she writes, “under 20% of adult people at risk,” 
with more women electing to undergo testing than men (268). Speaking out against the 
“potential benefits” of testing, Wexler cites research that proves that those who undergo 
testing actually have a harder time planning for the future—particularly when they have 
considerable economic constraints that diminish their ability to secure financial decisions 
(271). She furthermore highlights that “these assertions of ‘psychological benefits’ enter a 
social and political world in which pressures for presymptomatic testing are growing while 
insurance coverage shrinks” (272). Such contradictions within the research surrounding 
predictive testing and its dubious benefits seem particularly significant given reports that “as 
many as a third of all medical geneticists (who are primarily physicians) believe, in general, 
that people should be informed of their genetic status even if they do not want to 
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know” (272-3). In response to the potential for physician coercion and a lack of cure for 
HD, Wexler ends her text by calling for “new metaphors to talk about a deeply existential 
choice” (275). Choosing not to be tested must be recognized as a viable and even courageous 
act, an assertion of how one wants to live, just as choosing to know one’s genetic risk for HD 
must be understood as a complex choice that can never fully satisfy one’s desire to know.        
 Wexler’s account of the pain certainty engenders, its elusive qualities, and its 
contested benefits offers an important critique of Western medicine’s assumption that we 
should want to know what our futures hold. The Wexler sisters—and the other 80 percent of 
people who chose not to undergo testing at the time of Alice’s writing—assert the 
importance of living without a diagnosis and accepting a state of being that embraces 
uncertainty. It’s important to note that this perspective seems particularly popular in terms of 
HD because it is incurable, so predictive testing could not result in a changed outcome or 
preventive measures. Unlike the bug chasers, who choose to contract HIV to open up their 
life story’s possibilities once they have eliminated diagnostic uncertainty, people like the 
Wexlers, who choose not to know what their diagnostic futures hold, feel that their life 
stories might be more bearable if they don’t know the ending. Similarly, while bug chasers 
seek agency by intentionally contracting the disease, those who choose not to undergo 
predictive testing assert their agency by resisting a medical model of disease that values 
certainty over quality of life, knowledge over happiness. In some ways, bug chasers’ assertion 
of agency—the will to know regardless of the consequences—is more in keeping with such a 
model than the decision to not learn one’s genetic disposition for disease. However, Wexler’s 
account raises a significant question that rhetoricians are perhaps uniquely qualified to 
answer: instead of insisting that people undergo genetic testing, and vilifying those who 
choose not to, why can’t we instead generate an alternative framework for dwelling with 
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uncertainty—not until more information is discovered, but because we want to live without 
knowledge that might do more harm than good?    
An Alternative Approach to Deliberative Practice  
 In describing the importance of HD as an instigator of renewed debate surrounding 
what it means to live at risk, Wexler writes, “Huntington’s disease may serve as a space where 
many discourses collide and therefore help make visible the hidden stakes in this contest for 
human survival and identity in which all of us are at risk” (xxv). Indeed, both bug chasing 
and choosing not to undergo predictive testing remind us of some such hidden stakes: 
namely, the human costs of technological advancements that claim to offer greater insight 
into our bodies and medical futures than ever before. With the possibility of learning more 
about our risk for disease comes new questions about whether we would actually like to 
know. Furthermore, physicians’ ability to detect diseases but not necessarily cure them can 
leave many at-risk populations feeling hopeless, as they know they are at risk for diseases that 
cannot be fully managed by the doctors who diagnose them. While predictive tests and 
treatment methods are of course crucial medical developments, they cannot assuage the 
anxieties that surround the possibility of illness and a future life story tinged with pain, 
disability, or disease. Even when doctors can generally answer questions of probability and 
causation, they cannot as simply answer questions about when we will be affected or how we 
can live with the knowledge of future disease. The accounts by bug chasers and the Wexler 
family highlight the importance of alternative frameworks for engaging with patients at risk 
for diseases so that they can learn to live with uncertainty and so that uncertainty can be 
recognized as an integral part of deliberation. 
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 The purposes of my analysis thus far have been twofold: first, I want to highlight that 
diagnosis is only part of the story. While previous chapters have emphasized the diagnostic 
encounter as a networked exchange, I want to contextualize this analysis by considering how 
potential or future diagnoses get framed within narratives. Some bug chasers pursue a 
particular narrative ending—and diagnosis—because they would rather know their status 
than live with uncertainty. On the other hand, the Wexlers remind us that some would rather 
live their lives without a diagnosis—even if one is available. As these two groups challenge 
assumptions that diagnostic certainty is always a good thing and call on us to reexamine 
diagnostic practices surrounding certainty, I want to consider what rhetoric might offer to 
those who seek to better equip patients to dwell with the uncertainty that diagnosis entails. 
How might physicians work with patients to reframe living at risk in ways that both parties 
can better navigate? Additionally, how might their collaboration shift patients away from a 
view of doctors as gods and towards a model that values deliberative assemblages wherein 
doctors merely play a role and contribute one type of expertise? 
 In Deliberative Acts: Democracy, Rhetoric, and Rights, Lyon offers a framework for 
reimagining deliberative rhetorics in ways that account for difference and uncertainty. She 
begins by distinguishing her framework from the Aristotelian model of persuasion and the 
Burkean model of identification. For Lyon, there are three key problems with Aristotle’s 
persuasion-focused deliberation model, in particular. First, as she writes, “persuasion [via 
Aristotle] presumes a powerful speaker (even a demigod) and a docile audience, not a 
relationship between equal interlocutors” (33). Aristotle’s failure to account for a diverse 
public and disparate set of citizens means that they are a collective not intended to actually 
challenge or engage with a speaker’s ideas. As Lyon puts it, “Aristotle’s audience may make 
judgments, but they do not make counterarguments”—thus, their decisions are always 
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already constrained by the one in power (33). Second, Aristotle’s model of persuasion is 
“driven to hopeful, future outcomes, which may not be the true purpose of the 
persuasion” (33). Lyon conceives of Aristotle’s rhetoric as “a calculation of the means to an 
end” that has endowed us with a deliberative rhetorics tradition that “is outcome-based” 
rather than relationship and process based (36-7). Such an approach overly emphasizes the 
success or failure of the persuasive act to the neglect of other moments in the deliberative 
process. Finally, Aristotle’s deliberative rhetorics “presumes a common core of interests, 
knowledges, and spaces” (33). By failing to account for the reality of diverse perspectives, 
Aristotle again doubts that his audience will engage in challenging agonistic inquiry, a duty 
he reserves for the speaker.  
 Beyond her rejection of Aristotle’s outcome-driven model, Lyon also levies critiques 
at Burke’s identification model, which she calls a sort of “magical thinking” that emphasizes 
“my [the speaker’s] feeling about your similarity” (59). As she explains, “Our identification is 
all my pretense, cloaking co-optation and narcissism as it ignores differences” (59). One key 
issue with Burke’s model, for Lyon, is that it emphasizes the individual over the collective in 
deliberative contexts. Identification also “distorts the difficulty of difference” while it 
emphasizes the speaker’s ability to find and mobilize perceived similarities to move an 
audience towards their preferred outcome (59). While Lyon acknowledges the usefulness of 
identification in some contexts, “it is a deeply troubled term in deliberative situations” 
because “in privileging sameness and bonding, identification is imbued with power’s innate 
normativity, and too often, as a[n] abstraction, it depoliticizes the most political and 
contingent acts of deliberation—the many becoming action” (60). Although it does add an 
emphasis on human relationship to its model, by failing to adequately account for the 
challenges of deliberative engagement, identification, too, falls short of the mark. Ultimately, 
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for Lyon, both Aristotle’s and Burke’s models fail to account for deliberation across 
specialization, culture, and difference. 
 Her generation of an alternative framework for deliberative rhetorics has two key 
components: an emphasis on non-Western (and particularly Chinese) approaches to 
deliberation and an adoption of Hannah Arendt’s concept of “inter-est" as a new mobilizing 
principle. First, Lyon looks to classical Chinese deliberators and finds that they “eschew 
persuasion and argumentation as dangerous and inappropriate to human relationships” (38). 
Rather than persuasion or argumentation, classical Chinese texts reveal that remonstration is 
the preferred means of deliberating about future action. As she explains, “The communicative 
act is an opening of the undecided and uncontrolled future to consideration by interlocutors” 
rather than an act of co-optation by an agentive speaker (39). Lyon pays particular attention 
to the root meaning of persuade and remonstrate, highlighting the conceptual differences 
between the two words. In contrast to persuade, “Monstrare . . . emphasizes the act of 
showing or demonstrating,” which involves an audience who must be engaged in the 
demonstration and interpretation of such an act (39-41). Lyon’s breakdown of the differences 
between persuasion and remonstration are worth quoting at length as they distinguish a 
teleological from a relational model for deliberation:  
‘Remonstrate’ is a process verb, lacking a telos. ‘Persuade’ is a terminus verb. If 
I say, ‘I persuaded him that . . .,’ there has been an end. The act of persuasion 
rarely occurs in the present tense, as an ongoing process . . . Almost always, 
when one speaks of persuading, there has been a change in him, and the act 
of persuading is ended. In fact, if we think of this in temporal terms, the 
future and the past are the realms of persuasion: ‘I will persuade you’ or ‘I 
persuaded you.’ This is all less true of ‘remonstrate,’ which even lacks the 
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grammatical object, a person to be moved. If I say, ‘I will remonstrate 
that . . . ,’ it is less clear that there has been an end, or what would constitute 
an end, or who would judge an end. The remonstration simply stops . . . In 
remonstrating, one can run out of time, energy, or materials, but otherwise 
one can continue the performance, always in the present. In persuading, one 
has a temporal progression, a narrative from a strategic beginning to an end 
marked by a change in the audience . . . The persuader may do most of the 
action, but the end is in changing an audience. With remonstration, the 
effect is less clear and unnecessary for judging the speech act: the 
remonstrator will do all the identified action. The end is when the 
demonstration finishes, rather than when an audience changes, jointly 
decides, or enacts an event. Although an audience is implied in 
remonstration, there is no defined manipulation. The remonstrator simply 
shows something. Those who observe the performance are free to interpret it, 
heed it, repeat it, ignore it, or refute it. (40) 
Remonstration shifts us away from a Western value of action and certainty and towards a 
messier project of ongoing conversation about a particular issue. By calling on a classical 
Chinese framework, Lyon shifts deliberation away from an outcome-based process and 
towards rhetorical moves that “keep a community engaged in ongoing communication” (42). 
If Western deliberative rhetorics fears a lack of outcome, Chinese remonstration might be 
said to fear silence—an end to the perpetual conversation. In sum, Lyon writes: “In 
privileging the continuance of relationship over an outcome-based model of persuasion and 
the movement of interlocutors to consensus, a remonstrative model of deliberation considers 
the possibility of proceeding without end, proceeding to exhaustion or engagement, without 
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emphasizing the closure of a singular, future position” (43). Thus, remonstration remains 
bound in the present struggle rather than looking ahead to future decisions, and it 
emphasizes ongoing communication rather than decisive closure. 
 To supplement the concept of remonstration and build on its relational qualities, 
Lyon incorporates Arendt’s framework of inter-est. For Arendt, inter-est refers to: “the 
overlapping concerns that initiate citizens’ unique relations and separations” and the process 
of binding diverse people together within a common struggle (56). “From its start,” Lyon 
writes, “the question of inter-est considers ‘what we should do together’” (56; emphasis 
original). Rather than emphasizing an end to deliberation as the ultimate aim of discourse, 
Arendt instead focuses on the moment of recognition, the coming together of deliberators to 
work towards a common goal. Lyon reads Arendt as arguing that: 
inter-est designates the shared actions and words that make collaboration 
possible, the finding of what is common or cosmopolitan, and the matters 
that make remonstration effective or that allow deliberation to begin . . . 
inter-est arises and asks, ‘What binds you to others?’ More than something of 
interest or concern, inter-est implies the multiple ties among people which 
prompt recognition and the complex openness of shared action. (56-7) 
Arendt’s alternative rhetorical frame for deliberation acknowledges the impossibility of 
humans determining the ends of their discourse and moves deliberative rhetorics away from 
an outcome driven approach out of necessity. Lyon explains that for Arendt, “Agents cannot 
know the end of their actions, a scary predicament for human affairs . . . deliberation cannot 
be imagined in ends, for there are not ends to human acts” (58-9). What Arendt and Lyon 
are after is prior to identification or deliberation as it involves the discovery of “what binds us 
together,” since deliberation must hinge on “the significance of other people to fashioning 
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who I am and who you are: that is, who we are in apposition, for who we are in apposition 
forms what we can do together” (57). Far from success hinging on “individual views 
negotiated,” successful deliberation would be “an enactment of inter-est in an in-between, a 
shared agency arising in the present moment of engagement” (57). Thus a communal 
positioning, rather than pushing an agenda in pursuit of a future action, would govern the 
process of deliberation.  
 Taken together, remonstration and inter-est shift deliberation away from an 
individualistic, outcome-driven model of persuasion or identification and towards a 
communal, relationship-focused process of ongoing dialogue. While Lyon does not deny the 
eventual outcome of such deliberative work, the outcome is not inevitable within her model, 
as other possibilities can emerge and outcomes can shift and change over time. 
Remonstration is always subject to revision, and the decisions made through its process are 
constantly in flux. She also resists making the outcome the sole moment of importance 
within the exchange, focusing instead on the fusing of perspectives and interchange of ideas 
that makes deliberation possible at all. In what follows, I will briefly trace some ways in 
which Lyon’s model might enhance diagnostic deliberation practices for patients at risk.  
Deliberative Rhetoric and Diagnosis 
 What, one might wonder, does all of this talk of remonstration and inter-est mean 
for diagnostic deliberation practices? Lyon’s approach to deliberation fits nicely with 
problems of power and difference that haunt interactions between patients and their 
assemblages (doctors, nurses, insurance companies, family members and friends, 
medications, etc.). Approaches to diagnostic deliberation that attempt to mask issues of 
power cannot adequately account for the way doctors (to recall Chapter 2) or politicians (to 
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recall Chapter 3) might co-opt networks for their own purposes rather than negotiating with 
the rest of the network for the good of the patient. Lyon’s framework also gels nicely with 
diagnostic deliberations such as the ones described by bug chasers and the Wexlers because 
there isn’t yet a problem to respond to; therefore, the network can focus on reshaping 
relationships and building trust amongst actants in order to prepare for a potential future 
crisis. Lyon’s approach to deliberation may be less useful in climate change networks, for 
example, where perpetual action and decision-making can be enriched—but not altogether 
replaced—by the kind of ethical work she wants to encourage. However, her shifted 
emphasis to relationship building provokes some ideas for how pre-diagnostic deliberation 
might happen differently for patients at risk.  
 What bug chasers and the Wexlers are implicitly calling for is an alternative way of 
approaching uncertainty in diagnostic contexts—the same thing, in fact, that doctors are 
calling for in many cases. While previous chapters focused on ANT have stressed the 
importance of networked responses to the problems both doctors and (potential) patients 
identify, I want to make a few suggestions myself given Lyon’s alternative approach. First, 
Lyon’s model reminds us that Western medical deliberation must shift away from its 
overemphasis on outcome-based measures, which are not always the best way to respond to 
individual health crises. Particularly when the crises are hypothetical or potential, diagnostic 
actants might learn to take a step back and engage in dialogue about the patient’s risk. As 
Gawande and Sanders might remind us, while doctors are trained to act quickly and 
decisively in highly uncertain situations, they are generally less adept at listening and advising 
patients on how they might cope with their risk for disease. Such patients may not always 
require a decision as much as compassionate care or conversation about their health. For 
example, Rita Charon’s narrative therapy practice provides an important model of holistic 
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care that does not distinguish between emotional, physical, and diagnostic support. She even 
maintains that patient care is enhanced over the long term because of her ability to 
acknowledge a patient’s uncertainty and ongoing health concerns as important aspects of 
providing care (67). What Charon’s practice values is not the outcome of a particular visit, 
per se, but the ongoing wellbeing of the patient; this approach necessarily involves taking a 
long view of a person’s diachronic narrative of health. The physician, rather than intervening 
in a momentary emergency or solving an aberrant mystery, engages with the patient’s 
network on a regular basis, thereby focusing less on an immediate outcome and more on 
long-term care. 
 Lyon also shifts towards a deliberative practice that emphasizes relationship over 
expertise. Lyon’s conception of relationship differs from Burkean identification by fusing an 
acceptance of difference with an openness to change. It also, significantly, reserves the power 
to decide with the audience or listener (in contrast to Western theories of persuasion where 
the rhetor persuades others to act as she wishes). Rhetorical engagements within medicine 
hinge on expertise—while the doctor may possess specialized knowledge unavailable to the 
patient, the patient knows her body’s history. But as I have argued in previous chapters, 
pitting expertise against expertise results in adversarial relationships between stakeholders 
who should be working together and combining their areas of expertise to confront the 
problem at hand. Doctors might enhance expertise negotiations by learning when to make 
recommendations based on their expertise and when to defer to patients’ wishes. Such an 
approach seems particularly apt in cases of genetic testing, where doctors may possess 
knowledge about a patient’s risk that the patient does not want to know. If patients are aware 
of the doctor’s recommendation and choose not to learn test results that indicate their risk 
for an incurable disease, can an acceptance of the patient’s decision be considered an act of 
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care? And what of patients who know that an undesirable result would be more than they can 
reasonably handle? Relationships within diagnostic networks built on trust become crucial in 
such conversations, as patients will be more likely to take the advice of a doctor who has 
taken the time to listen to their feelings about their risk, make their emotional and 
psychological care a priority, and provide them with the answers they need. On the other 
hand, doctors who know that patients have important reasons for not taking their advice—
and that such advice has been thoughtfully considered—might be less likely to pressure them 
to pursue unwanted procedures or testing. 
 Lyon suggests, though, that relationships are not enough—we must also ask 
challenging questions about what we have in common. She shifts deliberative practice away 
from an emphasis on the outcome and towards a closer examination of pre-deliberative 
negotiation. Rather than focusing on the moment of decisive action, she postulates that a 
more important event occurs when the many calibrate their needs and perspectives, thereby 
deciding to engage in deliberation together. Such a delicate practice involves finding 
common ground, which Lyon would again be careful to distinguish from the sort of 
identification project Burke pursues. Finding common ground cannot simply be about 
encouraging another person to share our point of view; it must involves asking challenging 
questions about what we have in common that might best enable us to work together. What 
mutual needs or concerns do we share, and how might these commonalities help us to act 
together? How might our differences enrich our deliberation and sharpen our problem-
solving abilities? To apply such questions to diagnostic deliberation would necessarily involve 
dialogue between doctors and patients about their common ground: uncertainty. Both 
doctors and patients must learn to act in the face of uncertainty, and this can serve as an 
important starting point for conversations about mutual concerns and shared values. 
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Furthermore, because both doctors and patients live with the knowledge that they are 
temporarily able-bodied, vulnerability might also function as common ground where doctors 
and patients can negotiate what it means to live at risk or in diagnostic limbo. In both cases, 
rather than viewing uncertainty as a necessary evil of medicine, an embarrassment to be 
concealed through classification systems and emblems like white coats, doctors might harness 
uncertainty as a way of relating to patients for whom they do not always have answers. 
 Perhaps the most important shift that must occur if diagnostic deliberation is to 
become more encompassing of those who live at risk will be a relinquishing of the idea that 
diagnosis is medicine’s telos. While successful diagnosis is a crucial aspect of healthcare, we 
would do well to reexamine what a fixation on the identification of disease can mean to 
patients for whom diagnoses are unavailable or unbearable. When diagnosis is medicine’s 
telos, those without a diagnosis may feel hopeless and outside of medicine’s reach. The 
Wexlers and bug chasers described previously demand that we focus on other values within 
medicine that will broaden the scope of what it means to provide care. Diagnosis is a means 
to an end—providing effective and ethical care—rather than a good in itself. Rather than 
celebrating diagnosis for certainty’s sake, diagnostic stakeholders should strive to understand 
the particularities of patients who choose or are forced to live without an understanding of 
their body’s status. This will likely entail medical training that emphasizes flexibility in 
responding to potential or future diagnoses. When doctors presume that patients will want to 
know if they carry a mutated gene, for instance, they falsely assume that this situation 
requires the same response as an instance where a patient has just presented with symptoms 
for a serious disease. However, diagnosis cannot always be the rhetorical response within 
medicine, and we need new ways to articulate other aspects of care that can occur instead, 
such as counseling and instruction. Doctors must also do more than test patients for HIV 
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and other STDs; when they fail to engage at-risk gay men, for example, in conversations 
about prevention measures and alternative futures free from disease, they may unknowingly 
be reiterating expectations that living at-risk means that contracting disease is inevitable. In 
both cases, diagnoses should open up dialogue and serve as starting points in a person’s 
ongoing narrative of care rather than the penultimate moment in medicine. 
An Exemplary Lesson 
 Before I conclude this chapter, I want to briefly return to Sanders’ Diagnosis column 
to discuss a case that illustrates the dangers of viewing diagnosis as medicine’s telos. As the 
narrative demonstrates, when the identification of disease becomes medicine’s focus, rather 
than providing long-term care based on the patient’s wishes, the stakes are quite high: 
patients’ lives may even be at risk. This is certainly the case in “Why Was This 3-Year-Old So 
Irritable, and What Was Wrong With Her Eye?,” wherein a mother notices that her child has 
suddenly started to misbehave and develop red lesions around her eyes. She asks her 
husband’s sister Amber Bard, a third-year medical student who is in town to visit her niece, 
to look into the source of the problem. Her sister-in-law, though nervous due to her lack of 
experience, uses VisualDx to check the symptoms. The program is “one of a dozen or so 
programs known as decision-support software, designed to help doctors make a diagnosis,” 
and Bard chooses this particular program because of its focus on skin-related problems (n.p.). 
She sorts through several possibilities, including sties and pink eye, paying special attention 
to the images as she tries to discover her niece’s condition. Finally, though the images of 
herpes keratitis do not resemble her niece’s red lesions, the potential for the disease to result 
in blindness leads her to gently suggest to her sister-in-law that her daughter might have 
herpes (n.p.). The mother admits that she had had a cold sore weeks earlier, and that a 
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bedtime kiss near her daughter’s eye might have resulted in an infection. Bard consults with 
her colleagues at work, asking them about the potential for herpes to be transmitted during a 
kiss—they all find it highly unlikely (n.p.). Further, when her sister-in-law takes the child to 
the doctor, “[She] listened carefully as the mother described the girl’s eye and her recent 
behavior. She asked if they could be linked. Unlikely, the doctor told her. Then she examined 
the child. The eye itself looked fine, the doctor said, and her vision wasn’t affected . . . There 
was no need for any testing or treatment at this point, she said” (n.p.). This should have been 
good news: her daughter’s eye would be fine, and they wouldn’t even need to test her to see 
what was wrong. The symptoms would resolve on their own. But the mother refused to be 
reassured by the doctor’s lack of concern, reluctantly asking about the possibility of herpes. 
Sanders explains, “That also seemed unlikely, the doctor replied. The mother asked if she 
could test the girl anyway. Bard had been so insistent that the child be tested that the mother 
was determined to push for it if she had to. But the doctor readily agreed to the test and 
quickly swabbed the center of each sore to send for a culture” (n.p.). Thus, with Bard 
resisting the advice of her colleagues and the mother rejecting the doctor’s consolation, both 
women waited to hear the results of the test. 
 Despite the doctor’s reassurances, the little girl tested positive for herpes infection 
around her eye, meaning that early intervention would likely save her vision. Although future 
recurrences that would require treatment were likely, her eyes were saved because of the 
persistence of her aunt and mother. While the doctor and colleagues in the story are wrong, 
they are by no means villains, as part of doing their job effectively entails using probability to 
determine the most likely causes of diseases. They have been indoctrinated within a 
healthcare system that values finding an answer—and moving on quickly when a patient’s 
symptoms seem negligible. After all, there are always more patients in line who may be facing 
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much more life-threatening conditions. However, the narrative highlights the limitations of 
this probabilistic and outcome-based method of deliberation. In this case, as in many others, 
Bard is actually better able to anticipate an unlikely cause of her niece’s condition because of 
her lack of immersion in the deliberative process of medicine; her lack of expertise makes her 
better able to see other possibilities beyond the few diagnoses (such as sties and pink eye) that 
might be more likely. In addition to her unique perspective as someone with access to 
diagnostic aids, but without enough experience to dismiss her niece’s condition, her affection 
for her niece leads her to feel that even an unlikely disease should be treated as a serious 
threat given its potential to cause blindness. The mother’s persistence in this story, also 
motivated by her affection for the child, similarly demonstrates the significance of not only 
looking beyond the purview of traditional deliberative criteria—diagnostic stakeholders must 
also advocate for patients when the network fails to do so. Thus, in this case, non-experts 
offered vital contributions to the deliberation, and in doing so, they not only solved the case, 
they saved the patient.  
 Such an approach exemplifies Lyon’s approach to deliberation because it highlights 
the need for a process that can escape the confines of the outcome-driven, probabilistic 
approach to diagnosis. In this case, as in many others, the diagnosis is only possible when an 
outsider’s perspective identifies an unlikely, but serious, potential problem that must be 
considered. Sanders’ narratives commonly focus on the role an inexperienced healthcare 
provider, such as a medical student or intern, plays in identifying a diagnosis or crucial detail 
that a more seasoned doctor misses. They have not yet been fully trained in how to see, and 
they are therefore better able to consider uncommon diagnoses, pay attention to gut feelings, 
and notice unusual details. This offers a powerful validation of Lyon’s claim that 
identification erases the importance of conflict as a vital component of problem-solving; 
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when everyone learns to see the same things in the same way, alternative solutions and 
approaches will be overlooked. The liminal space Bard occupies as a novice medical student 
also exemplifies the importance of this difference within diagnostic contexts—rather than 
identifying with her colleagues and ignoring her own hunches to fit her perspective to theirs, 
she insists that the potential risks of an untreated herpes infection are too serious to ignore. 
As Lyon indicates, this productive tension actually enhances the network’s efficacy and 
benefits the patient. 
 One unresolved problem with the narrative involves the proper use of technology as 
an actant within diagnostic deliberation. Interestingly, even the software Bard uses seems to 
disprove her theory that herpes is to blame, as the images don’t resemble her niece’s 
condition. Her shame at even broaching the subject with her sister-in-law almost prevents 
her from bringing it up at all. On the other hand, she might never have learned about the 
potential diagnosis—and its significant risks—if not for the diagnostic program. Research 
indicates that other problems, such as an unwillingness to use such programs, have presented 
additional challenges in terms of inviting technologies and non-human actants into 
deliberative processes. An unwillingness to adopt such programs cannot be attributed to any 
inadequacy on the technology’s part: in addition to its helpfulness in this case, “a study 
published in 2011, and conducted at U.C.L.A-Harbor Medical Center and University of 
Rochester Strong Memorial Hospital, showed that physicians using VisualDx were four times 
more likely to suggest the correct diagnosis for patients admitted to the hospital for serious 
infections that those who didn’t use it. Without VisualDx, admitting physicians made 
diagnostic errors 28 percent of the time” (n.p.). According to Sanders, “Despite such 
evidence of the effectiveness of diagnostic-support software, studies show that doctors rarely 
use” (n.p.). Such data makes one wonder whether the little girl would have been properly 
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diagnosed at all if Bard had been a more seasoned physician, one who doubted the usefulness 
of such a program in comparison to her hands-on experience. In this case, an 
acknowledgment of uncertainty, and a willingness to look beyond oneself to multiple actants 
with their own forms of expertise, ultimately resulted in the best possible care for the patient. 
No actant offered the correct answer, and yet the deliberative process yielded a favorable 
result because Bard insisted that the child be tested anyway. In this case, Bard decided to test 
the technological actant’s contribution, but the situation could have easily turned out quite 
differently had she relied on her own expertise—or that of her medical network. While 
Lyon’s model offers an important alternative to outcome-based, identification models of 
diagnostic deliberation, future research should seek to articulate better methods for 
diagnostic networks to respond to technological contributions. I will further explore such a 
problem in Chapter 5, where I consider the problem of expertise in diagnostic contexts. 
On the Threshold 
 House episodes almost always end with a diagnosis. Within the last few minutes of 
each episode, Dr. House victoriously identifies the disease, and the patient goes home still 
puzzling over the strange man who cured them. But diagnosis can only be the end of the 
story for the doctor who solves the case. If the cameras continued to roll once the patient left 
Dr. House’s care, a new story would emerge, one in with the diagnosis was merely the 
beginning of a series of treatments, a life lived in illness’ shadow, a slow decline towards 
death, or of a future haunted by uncertainty. Diagnosis irrevocably alters a person’s life story, 
but it never ends there. What doctors and patients and other actants must learn to do is 
reconcile their alternative feelings about diagnosis’ role in their ongoing narratives. Doctors 
must learn to see diagnosis not just as a medical victory but as a new beginning for patients
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—and generally not a positive one. They must guide patients through the new chapter in 
their stories, connecting them with resources and support systems that can supplement their 
care. They must demonstrate an openness to hearing how the diagnosis they revealed will 
affect the patient’s life, and they must answer questions about how the patient can cope. And, 
perhaps most of all, they must empathize with the patient whose life has been changed by the 
news they delivered. 
  Furthermore, doctors must adopt strategies for advising and empathizing with 
patients who choose not to learn their risk for disease or for whom diagnoses are not 
available. Doctors must understand that diagnoses cannot be taken back once they have been 
revealed, and they must respect the wishes of people like the Wexler sisters, who make 
informed decisions not to learn their status. Such a choice represents not only a decision to 
preserve one’s emotional wellbeing, it can also encompass an insistence on protecting one’s 
narrative and regulating the way it unfolds over time. While we cannot always control what 
happens to our bodies, patients should have some say in whether they actually want to learn 
of their risk for disease in situations where the news may cause more pain than good.  Such 6
negotiations must govern conversations for those whose lifestyle choices may put them at risk 
for diseases, too. Although patients may conceal bug chasing activities from doctors, doctors 
might respond to the phenomenon by warning patients of the dangers of bug chasing, 
educating them about prevention measures (such as medications like PrEP), and monitoring 
patients who may be at risk for engaging in such intentional acts. While more research must 
be done so that healthcare providers might more successfully intervene and perhaps stop 
 I want to be careful here to distinguish my advocacy for patients to be able to choose 6
whether or not they want to learn about their genetic risk—and have their decision honored 
by healthcare providers—from advocating for doctors to withhold information from 
patients. Patients should be primed for such decisions by doctors, who can discuss risks and 
benefits with them based on their unique circumstances. 
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would-be bug chasers from pursuing a deadly disease, demystifying diagnosis and making it 
more concrete might aid prevention efforts. And finally, to more adequately care for patients 
like Hildebrandt, doctors must emphasize their ongoing relationship with patients post-
diagnosis and foster dialogue to support those in remission as they negotiate fears about 
recurrence and cope with ongoing effects of disease. This will involve an attunement to what 
matters to patients, anticipation of their needs, and an openness to extend care beyond the 
crucial diagnostic moment and into the more crucial questions regarding what to do next. 
 In the end, diagnosis looks less like the neatly packaged House endings and more like 
the popular Choose Your Own Adventure stories. While of course doctors and patients cannot 
always control what happens in their narratives (much as they’d like to), they must deliberate 
together to respond or act decisively in response to plot twists. And, in other cases, they must 
develop relationships that will prepare them to act in the face of challenging, potential future 
decisions. What this chapter has hopefully illuminated is that response need not always hinge 
on decisive action, and that deliberation is comprised not just of such moments but of 
moments of collective thought and engagement. I would like to close this chapter, then, with 
one such pensive moment. 
 Sam Taylor Johnson’s Self Portrait in a Single Breasted Suit with Hare  shows Johnson 7
soon after her recovery from cancer. Because it was her second incidence of cancer, Johnson 
decided to have a mastectomy (hence the “single breasted” word play). In the photo, Johnson 
stands before a door, indicating her position on the threshold of illness. She holds a hare in 
her hand which represents a return to lust and humor now that she is in remission. Her black 
and white suit indicates her readiness to return to her regular life, but her tennis shoes 
 I am indebted to Diane Price-Herndl for sharing this photo and her insights about it with 7
me.
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indicate her lingering sense that she will always be running from something—perhaps from 
her illness. She stands on a checkered floor that resembles a chess board, poised uncertainly 
with one foot on the ground and one hovering in the air. And yet, despite all of the liminal, 
uncertain elements in the room, Johnson’s face is determined as she presses down on the 
button that will snap the photo. She asserts her existence in the face of uncertainty about her 
illness, choosing to act anyway.  
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CHAPTER 5:  
NETWORKED ETHOI:  
DIAGNOSTIC ASSEMBLAGES AND PROBLEMS OF EXPERTISE 
Beware of diagnoses that would reduce your generative powers . . . Break out of the circles; don’t 
remain within psychoanalytic closure. Take a look around, then cut through!  - Hélène Cixous 
Trauma bleeds. Out of wounds and across boundaries. - Leslie Jamison 
 While previous chapters have argued that a networked approach to diagnosis is not 
only generative but necessary, questions of how best to respond to multiple ethoi remain 
unanswered. While I will trace a more complex definition of ethos later in the chapter, I will 
begin by focusing on traditional conceptions of ethos as an appeal to authority and/or 
expertise. In “The Presumptions of Expertise: The Role of Ethos in Risk Analysis,” Carolyn 
R. Miller argues that this approach to ethos represents “a narrowing” of its original 
(Aristotelian) meaning, which emphasizes expertise (“the first of Aristotle’s three 
constituents”), while neglecting “moral qualities (arete) and goodwill (eunoia)” (194). 
Furthermore, for Miller, such a definition actually distorts the first constituent by shifting it 
from “Aristotelian phronesis, a knowledge focused on prudent action in the social world, to 
episteme, a knowledge that is close to what we call expertise” (194). While Miller’s critiques of 
the easy conflation of ethos with expertise productively complicate contemporary definitions 
of the ancient term, I focus on this traditional definition/distortion in the first part of this 
chapter because it saturates healthcare contexts. The extent to which ethos as expertise 
dominates in medical networks can be perhaps most easily identified via the “Trust me, I’m a 
doctor” cliché. As my subsequent analysis will demonstrate, feminist ecological approaches to 
ethos reincorporate a focus on deliberation, ethics, and care, thereby recalibrating Aristotle’s 
three constituents for ethos and mobilizing them for advocacy and social justice projects.  
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Negotiations of ethos in healthcare settings remain a pressing problem both within 
my project and the broader field of medical rhetorics. Many writers—from concerned 
healthcare providers such as Lisa Sanders, to narrative medicine scholars like Rita Charon, to 
feminist therapists such as Laura S. Brown, to sociology scholars like Becky W. Thompson—
have highlighted the inequitable power dynamics that emerge between doctors and patients 
in diagnostic interactions. Within a networked framework, though, wherein patients and 
doctors are parts of complex diagnostic networks and no single actant’s ethos can be 
privileged within diagnostic interactions, a related but slightly different question arises: how 
can doctors, patients, and other actants negotiate the competing ethoi that emerge? Within 
diagnostic settings, ethoi proliferate; doctors possess specialized knowledge about 
administering and interpreting tests, nurses have specialized knowledge about patient care, 
patients have specialized knowledge about their bodies, and family members have specialized 
knowledge about the patient’s history. Even objects reveal information about the patient’s 
habits, secrets, and experiences—we might recall, for example, the cell phone from Chapter 2 
that uncovered an unconscious patient’s drug use. At the community or national level, 
politicians purportedly possess specialized knowledge about confronting crises and protecting 
citizens, while health experts and national organizations possess specialized knowledge about 
public health matters. However, as the networked approach to diagnosis in Chapter 2, public 
misdiagnosis in Chapter 3, and inadequate networked deliberation practices of Chapter 4 
indicate, more analysis regarding the management of these multiple forms of expertise is 
warranted. Thus, in what follows, I will address methods for negotiating the multiple forms 
of ethoi that networked actants generate.  
 In The Body Multiple: Ontology in Medical Practice, Annmarie Mol wonders what 
happens when a patient and doctor rely on different forms of expertise that prevent them 
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from understanding the patient’s condition. Mol’s central thesis is that if bodies are multiple, 
then so are diseases, and she argues that their enactments within different settings result in 
not various presentations of the same disease but multiple presentations of multiple diseases. 
Her study of atherosclerosis in Hospital Z leads her to consider the atheroscleroses that 
emerge in various spaces: patient rooms, surgeries, and autopsies. An emphasis on 
multiplicity, though, ultimately leads Mol to the same impasse that networked diagnosis 
reaches: if ethoi can be collaborative, then they can also be competitive. She explains: 
A week later I spend another day with the same technician. A patient, let’s 
call him Mr. Somers, lies on the examination table. Again cuffs are inflated 
and allowed to slowly deflate. Again the stethoscope is used to listen to the 
sound of turbulence in the arm arteries and the Doppler apparatus is used to 
listen to the velocity of the ankle flow. The technician writes down her 
numbers. She makes her calculations. There’s the ankle/arm index. It’s within 
the normal range. ‘I can find nothing wrong. Nothing at all,’ the technician 
says to the patient in a tone that’s meant to reassure him. But it doesn’t. 
‘That’s very strange,’ Mr. Somers replies, ‘for I feel something. It hurts a lot 
when I walk.’ The technician shrugs: ‘Well, there’s nothing wrong.’ Mr. 
Somers insists: ‘Oh, but that’s strange. Are you sure? I admit, they’re only my 
feelings, but then they are my feelings.’ His tone is one of disbelief. 
Disappointment. The technician, in what is clearly meant to be her closing 
remark, sounds impatient. ‘Well, you’d better discuss that with your doctor, 
then, what all you feel.’” (62)   
In this case, the actant Mr. Somers possesses knowledge of his embodied experience and the 
pain he’s experiencing, while the Doppler apparatus and stethoscope possess their own forms 
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of ethos—they are tools wielded to determine ankle and arm blood flow, respectively. The 
technician finds herself within the role of negotiator, as she must determine whether Mr. 
Somers’ or the Doppler/stethoscope actants are to be granted greater authority to determine 
the patient’s condition.  
 Mol responds to this problem by suggesting three possible ways in which competing 
ethoi can be made to cohere: through creating a hierarchy, “adding up,” and calibrating ethoi. 
First, perhaps most obviously, actants tend to generate hierarchies amongst disparate forms of 
expertise, labeling some more objective or credible than others. She clarifies, “In order to 
achieve . . . coherence, a hierarchy between diverting measurements may be established. This 
is often done. In cases where two facts contradict each other, one may be accorded more 
weight than the other” (63). In Mr. Somers’ case, for example, “a hierarchy with the lab on 
top” would enable the vascular surgeon to say, “No, Mr. Somers. I’m really sorry, there’s 
nothing I can do for you. I don’t doubt that you have a lot of pain, but I’m only good at 
unplugging vessels, and your vessels are in no need of unplugging” (63). Thus, by siding with 
the lab results and indicating the limits of his expertise, the doctor will shift the patient back 
to his general care practitioner (63). Without discounting the patient’s embodied ethos, the 
doctor nonetheless grants the test results greater epistemic weight. Although Mr. Somers will 
likely receive other tests to try to locate the cause of his pain, the Doppler and stethoscope 
actants are granted the ultimate authority to reject a particular diagnosis. 
 While creating a hierarchy is a common method for resolving disputes amongst 
networked actants, other scenarios might find similar sets of actants in conflict—even 
seemingly infallible lab results. How, Mol wonders, might the expertise of competing actants 
at the same level of the hierarchy be negotiated? As a second approach to the addition 
method, Mol writes, “When different tests give different outcomes, it is not obligatory to 
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abandon one. It is also possible to understand the objects of two different techniques as 
indeed being different objects” (66). Rather than discarding test results that fail to align, Mol 
suggests the addition method, which can occur when “surgeons do not ask ‘what is the 
matter?’ but rather ‘what to do?’ Because when the vascular surgeons of hospital Z try to 
decide ‘what to do,’ they are not only interested in complaints and the results of pressure 
management. They draw in a lot more elements” (69). Shifting away from a diagnostic 
question—what is wrong?—to deliberative practice—what to do?—encompasses a shift in 
thinking away from classification and towards assemblage. When responding to the patient’s 
atheroscleroses as a composite, “the patient can now be diagnosed as having two 
‘atheroscleroses,’” each requiring their own interventions (68). Rather than cancelling each 
other out, competing lab results can be added together to enable doctors to offer more 
complex and effective care based on the patient’s unique presentations of disease. When tests 
are not assumed to have a “common object,” “it takes tests as suggestions for action: one bad 
test outcome may be a reason to treat; two or three bad test outcomes give more reason to 
treat” (84). Thus, rather than discarding test results that fail to align, diagnostic networks 
may draw on the contributions of each actant and his/her/its expertise as they deliberate. 
 Finally, perhaps Mol’s most rhetorical method for resolving diagnostic ethoi disputes 
is the calibration of test outcomes. She explains, “If test outcomes were listened to as if they 
were each speaking for themselves alone, they might get confined within different paradigms. 
The question whether different tests say the same thing or rather something different would 
not be answerable—indeed it could hardly be asked” (84). Tests that measure different 
objects, then, can be calibrated to see what they mutually indicate about a patient’s health. 
For example, doctors and researchers might “tinker” with PSV ratios (which measure 
stenosis, or the narrowing of arteries) and lumen loss (which measures changes in the artery 
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width following a stent procedure) to find correlations: “It turned out that a PSV ratio of 2.5 
proved a good cutoff point for differentiating between lesions of more and less than 50 
percent lumen loss” (77). Thus,“the objects of angiography and duplex are coordinated into a 
single common one: the severity of some patients’ stenosis” (77). By translating test results 
and correlating findings to determine what they might indicate together, ethoi might be 
calibrated by finding a relationship between actant contributions. Significantly, such a 
process must involve the presentation of a third actant who can mediate between the two or 
more disputants; for Mol, these often take the form of correlation studies. She discusses the 
role correlation studies play at length, since they serve as the means for translating test results 
into common measures:  
The possibility to negotiate between clinical notes, pressure measurement 
numbers, duplex graphs, and angiographic images only arises thanks to the 
correlation studies that actively make the comparable with one another. The 
threat of incommensurability is countered in practice by establishing 
common measures. Correlation studies allow for the possibility (never 
friction free) of translations. (84-5) 
Mol’s concept of calibration nicely aligns with Latour’s ANT method of tracing actants, 
although she more fully explicates how actants within medical or diagnostic networks might 
negotiate their findings. Her emphasis on intermediaries who might correlate and translate 
test findings, seeking relationships between measures and mutual reinforcements, is 
particularly apt for an ANT approach to understanding diagnostic network negotiation. 
 Despite the usefulness of Mol’s model of adding up and calibrating varying forms of 
expertise within diagnostic contexts, S. Scott Graham levies two major critiques at Mol in his 
book, The Politics of Pain Medicine. First, Graham cites Mol’s failure to look at networked 
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interactions beyond the purview of the hospital to see how ethos gets negotiated as a major 
oversight. He writes, “Despite Mol’s compelling analysis, the practices that stage disease 
ontologies do not exist in a vacuum. They are controlled, influenced, and regulated by 
broader calibrating practices that exceed the local site of clinical doings” (110). He argues 
that by neglecting the institutional actants that shape and restrict networked negotiations, 
Mol misses several major players in her analysis—such as the insurance industry, third-party 
payers, and the DEA. After all, he reiterates,“clinical practice is accommodated to the 
economic structures of the health-insurance industry,” thus highlighting the ways in which 
such institutions plays in shaping networked interactions on the micro-level. In addition to 
his emphasis on actants Mol misses, he stresses the importance of considering context as an 
active contributor to hospital negotiations. For example, in discussing methods for treating 
patients with opioid addiction, he explains that “the climate of opiophobia is so pervasive 
that addressing the practical-translative stasis cannot happen within the clinic” (112). Thus, 
not only does Mol’s analysis offer an incomplete picture of how diagnostic negotiations 
happen surrounding ethos (as they are both verified and controlled by institutions such as the 
FDA, the pharmaceutical industry, and medical boards), but her selection of a site within a 
hospital limits the interactions and presentations of atheroscleroses networks that she can 
witness.  
 Relatedly, Graham’s second major critique of Mol is that she fails to consider the 
meta-level of networked calibration. In some ways, Mol doesn’t go far enough in considering 
how not only diagnostic practices but ontologies get calibrated:  
Here we see calibration is a sort of meta-activity. In fact, it’s so meta that in 
Mol’s study it only gets a quick mention as something that happens in 
correlation studies. The details of these studies are beyond the scope of Mol’s 
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analysis. As a rhetorician, it is precisely spaces like these studies that interest 
me. The work of calibration is predicated on the metapractical discourse of 
correlation. How do different diagnostic ontologies get calibrated? How are 
the different forms of diagnostic practice realigned, reinterpreted, 
rearticulated so that they may ‘speak’ to each other, so that translation may 
occur? (87-8) 
Graham finds, then, Mol’s theory of calibration to be crucial, although her treatment of the 
actual work of calibration is lacking. The shift, he explains, is from an emphasis on 
“Ontological calibration” or “the ‘what’” to a question of “how?” networks calibrate their 
forms of expertise (88). As he notes, rhetoricians are particularly qualified to take up such 
questions as they pertain to medical and diagnostic networks. 
 In response to Graham’s suggestions that Mol better contend with the meta-level of 
calibration, and that she attune herself to the contexts within which networked negotiation 
occur, this chapter will apply Mol’s approach to networked calibration while shifting towards 
an emphasis on context and institutional levels of analysis. While Mol does not explicitly 
refer to ethos, her analysis of the various ways in which expertise gets negotiated within 
medical networks offer some generative starting points for reframing ethos. Thus, drawing on 
Mol, this chapter will argue that a more dynamic approach to diagnosis must entail a more 
complex conception of ethos. I will first review several challenges regarding ethos within 
diagnostic networks which were raised, but not fully addressed, in previous chapters. I will 
pay particular attention to doctor, patient, and other stakeholder perspectives. In addition to 
considering how multiple ethoi might be juggled within diagnostic contexts, I want to 
highlight the ways in which actants must also navigate their own multiple ethoi within such 
interactions. Finally, in an attempt to fuse Mol’s theories of networked ethos “adding up” and 
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calibration with Graham’s cautions against dismissing global level concerns, I will suggest an 
alternative framework that ties together an ANT and feminist framework for networked 
ethoi. Drawing on feminist ecological approaches to ethoi, I will suggest that diagnostic 
networks adopt a model of ethoi that is multiple, dispersed, and fluid within diagnostic 
settings. 
Ethos Generation in Networks 
 A networked conception of diagnostic ethoi raises important questions about how to 
navigate differences of expertise and decide whom to trust in crucial moments. While Mol’s 
analysis remains clinical and detached in considering ethos negotiation, real life scenarios can 
be much more fraught. In a crisis scenario, with a patient’s life on the line and time in short 
supply, should a mother’s hunch, a doctor’s training, or a test result be heeded? In Chapter 2, 
I explored alternative frameworks for diagnostic rhetorics apart from approaches that hinge 
on persuasion, interpretation, and identification. In analyzing Dr. Sanders’ “Diagnosis” 
column, complex relationships between doctors and patients emerged that challenged 
traditional conceptions of the doctor as the ultimate authority and the patient as the passive 
text to be read. For example, in several cases, patients actually solved their own diagnostic 
mysteries or lied to the doctor in order to be taken seriously. However, other relationships 
also emerged between not only doctors and patients but family members, healthcare 
providers, technologies, tests, and other community members. Furthermore, diagnostic 
success in these narratives often resulted from collaborations between stakeholders. These 
collaborations involved, for example, a brother checking his unconscious sister’s cell phone 
for clues (“Unresponsive”). In other cases, doctors collaborated with colleagues with different 
specializations or even with residents and interns to determine the cause of the patient’s 
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condition. Thus, drawing on Latour’s theory of Actor-Network Theory, I recast diagnoses as 
assemblages of human and non-human actants that sometimes work together and, at other 
times, work at cross-purposes. While such an approach allows for more dynamic doctor-
patient relationships, it also extends the number of actants who must be considered when 
making a diagnosis. The narratives Sanders shares also highlight the need for a sufficiently 
intricate approach to diagnostic ethos. 
 Sanders’ narratives vividly demonstrate the multiple types of ethoi that emerge in 
diagnostic networks. For example, in “What Caused this 15-Year-Old’s Debilitating 
Headaches?” Sanders tells the story of a mother who advocates for her son’s treatment by 
lying to the doctors. Although they tell her repeatedly that her son simply has migraines, a 
gut feeling tells her that something more serious is to blame. When she lies to the doctors 
and tells them that her son has a fever, they immediately order the CT scan she wanted and 
find the cause of her son’s sudden illness. The mother’s experience with her son’s normal 
reactions to illness and her gut feeling enable her to push for a diagnosis that otherwise might 
have been missed. While the mother’s attachment to her son informed her tenacity and 
ingenuity within the diagnostic network, in other cases, actants do not even need to know 
the patient to effectively intervene. In “Losing Consciousness,” for instance, a 
gastroenterologist encounters a patient who cannot stop bleeding rectally. Recognizing the 
woman’s risk of bleeding to death due to her blood’s inability to clot, the doctor contacts a 
hematologist friend to ask for his input. He determines the patient’s condition immediately, 
attributing it to a reaction to combined histamine and anti-depression medications. This 
narrative stresses the significance of cross-specialty collaboration, as no doctor can possibly 
recall all diseases and pearls of wisdom for each area of medicine at all times. In fact, Sanders 
reiterates the diagnostic vitality of “a phone and a friend” throughout her “Diagnosis” 
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narratives (“Losing Consciousness”). In other cases, expertise from an entirely different 
discipline—such as botany—can prove more useful than any medical specialty. In “Rough 
Patches,” when a little boy breaks out with a mysterious rash that his doctors are unable to 
identify, a chance decision by his doctor to stop by the local greenhouse ends up revealing the 
cause of his patient’s condition. When the doctor recites some of the plants growing in the 
boy’s grandmother’s garden, a greenhouse employee is able to attribute the rash to a pumpkin 
vine allergy. As all of these examples indicate, expertise within diagnostic settings can be as 
diverse as the myriad illnesses patients experience. While doctors are primarily tasked with 
treating disease, Sanders’ narratives suggest that actual diagnoses can often be performed by 
other actants whose expertise resides in personal experience, a different medical 
specialization, or a different field of study altogether.  
 Beyond the multiple kinds of ethoi that diagnostic networks reveal, it is important to 
note that such ethoi also tend to emerge through collaboration rather than individual 
actions. In a sense, McIntyre’s thesis in Relational Agency, Networked Technology, and the Social 
Media Aftermath of the Boston Marathon Bombing that agency is relational and dispersed 
applies to the view of ethoi that Sanders’ narratives present. In particular, McIntyre’s 
argument that agency is a shared power to act co-created through networked relationships is 
suggestive for an ANT approach to diagnostic ethoi. Such a definition fits especially well for 
collaborative ethoi that emerge when doctors deliberate together on diagnostic mysteries; 
when doctors collaborate to diagnose a patient—perhaps one doctor responding to a gut 
feeling, another recalling a pearl of wisdom, and another noticing an odd test result—their 
ethoi are communally actualized. In McIntyre’s assessment, the Boston Marathon bombing 
mobilized a network of actants, including Twitter, hashtags, and Bostonians, to interact with 
the media, police, and victims, in order to help those affected by the bombing. She writes:  
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[F]ollowing the bombings, as many runners and other tourists were barred by 
law enforcement from retrieving their belongs and returning to their hotels, 
numerous Twitter users began to tweet offers for food and shelter using the 
aforementioned hashtag [#BostonHelp]. These acts of kindness are 
intentionally agentive acts enabled by a network of technologies (spaces like 
Twitter as well as the internet itself and the hardware necessary to connect), 
material goods (the food and shelter they offer), and the human kindness that 
underlies the offers. (17) 
Thus, McIntyre finds that agency is enabled by the network, and that it emerges through 
interaction rather than in isolation. Similarly, I want to suggest that ethos can be seen as 
emerging in contexts of difference, disagreement, and negotiation, since Sanders’ narratives 
highlight the inefficacy of a solitary expert solving problems in everyday diagnostic contexts.   
 For example, to return to her instructive set of narratives a final time, Sanders’ 
October entry, “Why Was this Woman Suffering from Terrible, Unrelenting Pain” illustrates 
this interactional approach to ethos generation. In this narrative, a generally healthy 43-year 
old woman suddenly begins to experience debilitating abdominal pain that makes it 
impossible for her to eat or sleep. Although she works as a lawyer, she is rendered unable to 
work due to the pain, which keeps her in bed most days. All tests for the usual suspects, such 
as Crohn’s disease or another gastrointestinal blockage, came back negative. According to 
Sanders, the one problem physicians did identify was gastroparesis, which occurs when food 
moves too slowly through the GI tract. It’s a particularly challenging condition, Sanders 
explains, because: “It’s a difficult problem to treat. Eating smaller, more frequent meals and 
taking medicine to stop the nausea caused by the backlog of undigested food can help. If it 
doesn’t, patients are put on a liquid diet or given medicine to make the stomach work faster. 
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Some patients must receive their nutrients through a tube into the small intestines” (n.p.). 
Still, “The couple resigned themselves to the situation,” apparently figuring that this 
unfortunate and painful situation would be their new normal (n.p.). Before the couple could 
fully accept their fate, however, a sudden phone call from an unexpected source brought 
some hope. Sanders recalls, “[O]ne afternoon, the patient got a call. It was Lois Abrams, a 
friend of her mother’s whom she had known since childhood. Abrams explained that she had 
a friend who had a niece who had something that sounded like what the patient was 
experiencing” (n.p.). When the patient followed up with Abrams’ friend’s niece, she 
discovered that their symptoms were identical, and that a surgery to remove the compressed 
celiac artery and associated nerves had cured her entirely. The woman consults with the 
niece’s surgeon, who proposes a simple test to see if she, too, suffers from MALS. “A specialist 
would inject a numbing medicine into her celiac ganglion,” the doctor explained, “If it 
relieved the pain for a few weeks, there was an excellent chance that surgery would solve the 
problem. After the injection, she felt no pain for six weeks and regained most of her lost 
weight” (n.p.). Surgery followed, and the woman experienced a full recovery of her pain-free 
existence, thanks to the collaborative efforts of the networked actants.  
 This example highlights the ways in which networked actants mobilize the expertise 
of other actants. For example, the niece’s personal experience with MALS led her to be a 
compelling source for the patient, who turned to an expert surgeon, who suggested a test to 
determine her condition (n.p.). Each source’s ethos was only mobilized when another actant 
called it to action. Furthermore, each actant’s ethos is actually constituted through its 
interactions with other actants, since the surgeon’s expertise is reliant on the niece’s 
recommendation, which leads the patient to seek him out. The test, too, only demonstrates 
its ethos when the doctor suggests its usage as a way to determine the patient’s condition and 
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predict the likelihood of surgical success. As this narrative indicates, it is not enough to 
simply recognize ethos as a collaborative endeavor; instead, a framework for ethos generation 
must take into account its constitution through interaction and communal decision-making. 
Ethos, then, might be more productively conceived of as hinging on relational deliberation, 
meaning that we need an alternative framework for understanding how to intervene within 
such situations to better grasp the way diagnostic ethos gets created. In some ways, this 
approach to ethos exceeds Mol’s conception of ethos by moving towards a more complex and 
meta-level approach to ethos constitution. A better approach to ethos generation, about 
which more later, will need to account for the extent to which ethos cannot always be 
isolated within a single actant but must be traced within interactions amongst actants.  
Ethos, Networks, and Negotiation  
 Beyond the relational qualities of generating networked diagnostic ethoi, I want to 
also consider how such ethoi get negotiated in healthcare settings. Chapter 2’s emphasis on 
expanding conceptions of diagnostic rhetorics beyond the doctor and patient and towards 
contributions of other stakeholders (such as family members and non-humans) culminated 
in Chapter 3’s consideration of how ANT might better explain what happens when 
networked mistakes happen. In describing the public misdiagnosis of the so-called “Ebola 
nurse,” Kaci Hickox, I drew attention to the roles played by unlikely actants whose actions 
had been masked by the public panic over Ebola. In particular, I analyzed the role played by 
deforestation in Africa, which placed animals capable of incubating and transmitting Ebola 
in closer contact with at-risk human populations. I then emphasized the contributions of 
African aid workers, who were the first responders to the crisis. Often working without the 
same precautions and resources of Western aid workers, who arrived later, this population 
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suffered both physically—many of them contracting Ebola themselves, emotionally—many 
faced stigmatization and even accusations that they were working for the government to 
infect Africans with the disease, and financially—since Ebola devastated African economies 
in a way that Western outsiders failed to grasp. Furthermore, these African aid workers often 
served as intermediaries between local populations and Western aid workers, who were 
mistrusted by such groups. Finally, I explored the contributions of conservative politicians, 
such as Governors Chris Christie and Paul LePage, who took unnecessary measures to 
quarantine Ebola aid workers against their will. In so doing, they hoped to demonstrate their 
effectiveness in responding to public health crises—although their actions defied the expert 
testimony of public health officials and healthcare providers. 
 Like Chapter 2, Chapter 3 opened up important questions about ethos, as the actants 
who ultimately misdiagnosed Hickox were politicians—not medical experts. In many ways, 
Chapter 3 tells a cautionary tale about what happens when networks ineffectively negotiate 
ethoi, discarding one form of expert testimony in favor of another rather than adding them 
up. For example, public health officials and politicians might have coordinated their efforts 
based on their differing forms of expertise, one on matters of health, and the other on 
matters of governing. They might have worked together to ensure that aid efforts were 
continually encouraged and supported while simultaneously protecting Western audiences 
from contracting the deadly disease. However, in the Trump era, part of the emerging 
conservative ethos involves a defiance of expert testimony in favor of fear mongering; this 
strategy is effective at generating citizen support, in some cases, but less effective at 
controlling contagious disease. In addition to violating Hickox’s rights, by enforcing her 
quarantine and then requiring that she remain under house arrest (she refused), the 
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networked mistake resulted in unfounded public terror about Ebola transmission in the 
United States and a reduction of aid workers willing to serve in Africa.  
 Beyond the major problems of networked ethoi within the Hickox/Ebola narratives, 
the emphasis on the relationship between African and Western aid workers reflects a 
disconnect between local and global ethoi. Local aid workers, often from the villages affected 
by Ebola, possessed an ethos amongst their people based on their understanding of the 
culture and their familiarity with local customs. Rather than dismissing beliefs that Ebola was 
a government project designed to kill African people, they persuaded local citizens that the 
Western disease management techniques were designed to protect them. They also worked 
with villagers to reform cultural traditions of washing corpses of deceased victims, 
encouraging them to stop engaging in this tradition until the outbreak ended to prevent the 
continued spread of Ebola via contaminated water sources. Such efforts were so successful 
that Western aid workers set up training workshops for African aid workers where they 
taught them how to teach their fellow villagers about Ebola prevention and treatment. While 
this negotiation of ethoi worked well, African aid workers were subsequently abandoned by 
Western aid workers when the immediate threat of Ebola dwindled. As the narratives by 
Isaac Bayoh in The Guardian’s “Ebola: Life on the Frontlines” series highlight, African aid 
workers and citizens have been left to pick up the pieces of the economic, interpersonal, and 
infrastructural devastation left in the wake of the Ebola epidemic. As he describes the post-
Ebola rebuilding process, Bayoh points to the lack of resources and healthcare infrastructure, 
wondering “how ready is our health care system to fight another outbreak like this? Many 
things that need to be done are yet to be implemented” (“Ebola in Sierra Leone” n.p.). Thus, 
while aid workers from Africa and other countries, such as the United States, were able to 
calibrate their ethoi in the moment to respond to a crisis, ongoing coordination between 
 187
their groups failed. The insights of Bayoh and other aid workers he interviews reiterate the 
need for continuing calibration amongst public health networks to contain disease outbreak 
risks, research diseases and treatment methods, and educate the public about prevention 
measures. 
 A final ethos problem invoked by Chapter 3 involved the coordination between not 
just public health officials in varying countries, but environmental and animal experts. 
Ebola’s status as a zoonotic disease (meaning it is transmitted to humans by animals) 
indicates the importance of incorporating scientific experts from a range of disciplines into 
conversations about outbreaks. Furthermore, the effects of deforestation on animal disease—
and human risk—incorporates a range of ecological activists and researchers into the growing 
network of disease. In fact, this issue is the focus of David Quammen’s New York Times 
bestseller Spillover: Animal Infections and the Next Human Pandemic. In his opening chapter, 
he argues that “The subject of animal disease and the subject of human disease are . . . strands 
of one braided cord” (13). Each chapter that follows traces these strands, in the Latourian 
sense, and he unpacks the interrelationships of nature, animals, microbes, viruses, diseases, 
and humans. In such contexts, the diagnosis of a disease involves both animal and human 
diagnoses, and such a central part of human medical encounters becomes a mere starting 
point. He writes of finally diagnosing the mysterious Hendra virus, which randomly killed 
horses and then humans that had had contact with infected horses, “Identifying the new 
virus was only one step in solving the immediate mystery of Hendra, let alone understanding 
the disease in a wider context. Step two would involve tracking that virus to its hiding place. 
Where did it exist when it wasn’t killing horses and people? Step three would entail asking a 
further cluster of questions: How did the virus emerge from its secret refuge, and why here, 
and why now?” (19). These questions—of identification, tracking, timing, and spreadability
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—encompass a range of actants who must contribute their expertise. For example, the 
Hendra case involved horses, bats, horse owners, veterinarians, botanists (who could study 
the trees where bats had gathered—and under which the first infected horse had nestled), bat 
carers, medical experts, microbiologists, journalists, and a host of other stakeholders. Each 
actant possessed his or her own expertise that had to be collaboratively considered in order to 
successfully answer any of the questions Quammen poses.  
 In many ways, the shift from Chapter 2 to Chapter 3 can be understood as a shift 
from the interpersonal to the institutional level of network tracing. While Chapter 2 
emphasized the interplay of local actants and their expertise—such as a doctor, patient, 
family members, and specialists with relationships to primary doctors—Chapter 3 takes a 
meta approach to such interactional ethoi. Rather than isolated doctor-patient networks, 
Quammen’s analysis—and Chapter 3’s—takes a different approach to understanding 
problems within diagnostic networks, focusing instead on institutions such as ecology, the 
Australian horse racing industry, veterinary precautions for treating sick animals, and the 
environmental effects of colonial efforts to introduce horses into Australian habitats in the 
late 1700s. While the meta-level networks are more complex and frightening—in the sense 
that they indicate a future pandemic that will wipe out millions of people, just as influenza 
and AIDS have done—they also offer greater possibilities for actant intervention. A key tenet 
of Quammen’s analysis, in fact, is that humans are actually bringing pandemics and 
epidemics upon themselves by destroying habitats and the environment. He writes: 
Make no mistake, they are connected, these disease outbreaks [AIDS, 
influenza, Ebola, Nipah, West Nile, Sars, avian flu, Hendra, etc.] coming one 
after another. And they are not simply happening to us; they represent the 
unintended results of things we are doing. They reflect two forms of crisis on 
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our planet. The first crisis is ecological, the second is medical. As the two 
intersect, their joint consequences appear as a pattern of weird and terrible 
new diseases, emerging from unexpected sources and raising deep concern, 
deep foreboding, among the scientists who study them. How do diseases leap 
from nonhuman animals into people, and why do they seem to be leaping 
more frequently in recent years? To put the matter in its starkest form: 
Human-caused ecological pressures and disruptions are bringing animal 
pathogens ever more into contact with human populations, while human 
technology and behavior are spreading those pathogens even more widely and 
quickly. (39-40)   
While reducing ecological destruction and the carbon footprint cannot entirely eradicate 
infectious and zoonotic diseases, Quammen provides a possibility that reforming ecological 
practices—at the individual and global level—might at least help lessen the severity of such 
diseases or enhance containment efforts. In this way, Quammen highlights the vitality of not 
only coordinating different forms of expertise but of calibrating our expertise to respond to 
the challenges that face our world. 
 This approach to ethos exceeds the boundaries Mol inadvertently imposes on ethos 
by limiting her study to ethos negotiation in hospital settings. While saving a patient’s life is 
the ultimate measure of successful network negotiation for Mol, for Quammen and Bayoh, 
successful negotiation hinges on higher stake projects: protecting entire countries from public 
health outbreaks and ensuring that steps are taken to create healthcare infrastructure that can 
adequately respond when outbreaks do occur. While saving an individual patient’s life is 
obviously an important and worthy goal, the scope of Mol’s project fails to account for larger 
scale projects that must be undertaken by more complex networks. Thus, in addition to 
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accounting for the ways in which ethos is generated via actant interaction, an alternative 
approach to networked ethos must address how expertise gets negotiated within public 
health networks. 
When Ethos Goes Unrecognized 
 Whereas Chapters 2 and 3 emphasized networked relationships, Chapter 4 focused 
on the role one often-neglected actant plays in diagnostic deliberations: uncertainty. I began 
by arguing that diagnostic deliberations tend to overly value outcome-based, probabilistic 
approaches over open-ended and ongoing ones. This habitus of Western deliberative rhetorics 
has influenced healthcare providers to stress the significance of acting quickly in response to 
imperfect or even conflicting information. However, this model’s appreciation for acting 
decisively in the moment fails to adequately serve populations of potential patients, such as 
bug chasers and those at risk for genetic disease, whose risk for disease requires a different 
rhetorical approach. Lyon’s approach to deliberative rhetorics presents an alternative picture 
of deliberation as an ongoing conversation where actants seek to understand rather than 
persuade one another. She furthermore emphasizes the moment when actants come together 
to make decisions as a situation wherein differences can be calibrated, to borrow Mol’s term, 
rather than erased. Rather than a model of persuasion or identification, Lyon’s approach to 
deliberation mobilizes Arendt’s concept of inter-est to stress the significance of locating a 
common struggle that can enable multiple actants to correlate their actions. I finally posited 
that diagnosis can no longer be medicine’s sole telos, and that diagnostic deliberation 
networks might start to locate their common ground in the uncertainty that all actants 
within diagnostic settings face. 
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 Beyond Chapter 4’s focus, though, uncertainty raises additional questions about 
negotiating ethoi in diagnostic contexts. In fact, a key challenge facing medical authority—or 
ethos—is its susceptibility to change. In Exploring Medical Anthropology, Donald Joralemon 
argues that “The social and cultural authority of a healer is supporter by anything that 
appears to his/her clients to be a cure, but when the results are ambiguous or negative, the 
healer’s authority can suffer” (70). Thus, a healer’s guesswork is not only significant for her 
patient but also for the population which she serves, which may lose faith in both her and 
the healing practice she represents if she fails. Joralemon continues, “[W]hen a new disease 
appears, for which existing therapies are ineffective, the cultural authority of healers may be 
challenged. If other healers, representing a different medical system, have greater success, 
there may also arise a contest over social authority” (70). As an example of such a contest—
and shift in healthcare paradigms—Joralemon points to the Amerindian shamans who 
attempted to protect their communities from disease from Spanish invaders in the 1500s. He 
explains, “European explorers and colonists brought with them an array of epidemic agents 
to which indigenous populations had not previously been exposed, including smallpox, 
measles, mumps, yellow fever, and bubonic plague . . . Shamans and other indigenous healers 
were impotent in the face of these devastating new diseases and they quickly lost credibility 
in their communities” (70). Far from simply eliminating community faith in the healer’s 
abilities, such a shift away from indigenous healing “represented a significant loss of social 
and cultural authority, one which undermined existing religious beliefs with a corresponding 
decay in the entire social fabric” (70). Thus, one problem with expertise is its capacity to 
evolve—one can be an expert of disease, for example, until suddenly a new disease comes 
along about which the would-be expert knows nothing. Expertise is both circumstantial and 
 192
evolving, then, as few things worthy of expert knowledge and understanding remain the 
same for long.  
 Another problem with medical expertise, and perhaps a more troubling one, involves 
uncertainty about whether an actual expert will be regarded as such by an audience due to his 
or her race, gender, ethnicity, or appearance. In Black Man in a White Coat: A Doctor’s 
Reflections on Race and Medicine, Dr. Damon Tweedy explores the ways in which his race has 
affected his medical school, training, and professional experiences. He first recalls his 
excitement as a new student at Duke University’s Medical School, although he explains that a 
professor’s confusion about why he was in the classroom—and his question about whether he 
was there to fix the lights—deflated his spirits. Later, as a medical student and then M.D., 
patients often made assumptions about his athletic abilities, assuming that he was a 
basketball player due to his race and height. “At least once a day during my rotations,” 
Tweedy clarifies, “my race would come up in an interaction with patients. The racial 
conversation was usually implied rather than explicit, as one person after another, usually 
white, took one look at me and inquired about my basketball skills” (113). While some asked 
where he played ball, others spoke of his career opportunities: “You’re wasting your time in 
school. You should be playing in the NBA” and “A tall black like you with long arms and legs 
should be on a basketball court and nowhere else” (113). Beyond making Tweedy feel 
uncomfortable, this commentary on his assumed athletic prowess caused him to wonder 
whether these assumptions actually caused patients to doubt his medical proficiency. He 
reflects, “[A]long with some people’s certainty that I could dribble and shoot came, at least to 
my thinking, an assumption that I was a dumb jock . . . Would they doubt my ability to be a 
competent doctor? If so, would that hinder my career?” (114). Tweedy not only had to 
endure racist remarks in addition to the already strenuous work of keeping his patients alive, 
 193
then, he was also made to doubt his own authority due to the assumptions underlying such 
remarks. Added to the normal anxieties about whether one can master a new and challenging 
craft, Tweedy was made to wonder whether his race would make patients doubt his ethos 
altogether. While this unsolicited commentary and subsequent self-doubt are troubling 
generally, I want to particularly focus on Tweedy’s encounters with Chester and Robert, two 
patients Tweedy worked with as a medical intern.     
 Before Tweedy even entered Chester’s room, he had made racist assumptions about 
the kind of care he could offer. Chester had asked his nurse why so many black people were 
in the hospital, and he had informed her: “I don’t want no [black] doctor” (106).  Tweedy 8
recalls that the experience was a surprise—an unexpected and unwelcome interruption into 
his daily tasks. “I was struggling with this adjustment [from medical student to first 
responder] along with the rest of my colleagues, my mind focused on the objective analysis of 
lab results, EKGs, and chest X-rays—medical tasks that had nothing to do with race. But 
Chester’s words had unceremoniously shoved me out of 2003, and back into a world that felt 
more like 1963” (106). Suddenly singled out, Tweedy is offered the opportunity to not treat 
the patient; however, he decides to do it anyway, coupling the pressure of saving the patient’s 
life with the stress of knowing that the patient will hate him because of his race. As they 
entered Chester’s room, the doctor in charge, Audrey, introduced herself, Tweedy, and 
another doctor two years out of college. Chester replied, “Where’s my real doctor?”—
evidently unsatisfied that one of his doctors was a woman and one was black (109). Tweedy 
remembers that the conversation progressed thusly: “‘We are your doctors,’ Audrey fired 
back. ‘And I’m the one in charge.’ Chester looked past her, his eyes settling on me for an 
instant, his face a nasty scowl, before they rested on Gabe. ‘I only wanna deal with 
 Chester uses a racial slur here, which I have omitted.8
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you’” (109). Gabe, though the least qualified of the three doctors, was a white male, and 
therefore infinitely more capable in Chester’s eyes. When Audrey reiterated that she was in 
charge, and he could either work with her or wait hours for a new doctor, he finally complied 
and allowed them to continue their examination. However, as Tweedy notes, it took one and 
a half weeks before Chester even acknowledged his existence enough to respond to a 
question, despite his dire physical condition (120). 
 Audrey and Tweedy also faced challenges with Chester’s family members, who were 
no less hostile to the ones responsible for their father’s care. As the two doctors met his 
daughter and grandson for the first time, the daughter was wearing a Confederate flag t-shirt 
and the son had a “shirt pocket [that] flaunted a smaller Confederate flag” (119). “With 
manners similar to her father,” Tweedy describes, “Molly derisively asked: ‘Who’s in charge 
here?’” (119). Chester’s daughter Molly challenged Audrey’s authority when she described 
what was wrong with her father, although she finally relented after Audrey confidently 
replied to every question (119). Tweedy finds himself in a challenging position where he 
must again decide whether he will continue to treat the patient (and deal with his and his 
family’s racist attitudes) or assign him to a new team of doctors. Tweedy decides to continue 
caring for Chester, but he later questions his own motives for doing so. When Chester 
ultimately dies, he is confronted by conflicted emotions about the experience and his 
response. “I was proud of the way I’d handled Chester’s case,” he writes, “but I was also left 
with a twinge of guilt. Though I was certain I had worked as hard as I could, motivated in 
part to show Chester and his family that I was a competent doctor, I knew that my clinical 
diligence had as much to do with wanting to impress Audrey and my other 
supervisors” (128). Even after Chester is dead, then, his prejudices and the hateful attitude 
 195
with which he encountered his non-white, non-male doctors leaves Tweedy unnerved and 
uncertain of his own efficacy as a doctor.  
 Beyond the challenges Tweedy faces from Chester and his family members, he recalls 
a similar experience where a patient initially refused his care—but this patient was black. As 
Tweedy entered the room, Robert demanded of him, “Does anyone in your family have 
sickle-cell?” (123). When Tweedy said no, Robert asked what he knew of the disease. With 
his expertise so brazenly challenged, Tweedy froze and was initially unable to say anything 
about the disease. “Man,” Robert responded with a sneer (123). When Tweedy asked the 
man what he meant, he replied, “C’mon man, we both know what the deal is. I’m sure you 
did good in school and everything, but they’re passin’ you off on me. And they think I won’t 
care because I’m supposed to be some dumb [black man] . Go tell your boss I don’t want no 9
black doctor” (123). Tweedy describes his painful emotional response, writing, “Dazed, I 
retreated a half-step. I felt my heart thump and blood pulse through my ears. In the clearest 
of terms, Robert was saying that black doctors were incompetent, and that I was the latest 
example” (123). This experience was more painful for Tweedy than Chester’s dismissal of his 
medical expertise, “given what it said about how we felt about ourselves as a race” (125). 
Thus, internalized racism provokes the same distrust of a black doctor’s authority—and 
disgust at being passed off on an ostensibly under-qualified doctor—causing Tweedy to 
further doubt his own expertise. 
 Tweedy ultimately gains the trust and affection of both Chester and Robert. 
Although Chester dies, and Robert lives, he teaches both men an important lesson about 
judging ethos based on physical appearance. However, the additional pressure and stress he 
faces due to the racist beliefs of both black and white patients, and the responsibility he feels 
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to prove himself as a capable medical professional in spite of his patient’s blatant racism, 
speak to a huge political problem facing medical ethos. Just because one has been deemed an 
expert by Duke University, a medical board, or a prominent hospital does not mean that a 
doctor will be granted the same authority by patients, who bring their own fears, biases, and 
prejudices to such interactions. Uncertainty about how best to respond to diagnostic 
problems—and risks for developing diseases in the future—intersects with uncertainty about 
how one’s authority will be perceived and/or challenged by others. Further, these experiences 
cause Tweedy to initially doubt himself and feel an unfair pressure to prove himself, not just 
as a doctor but as a black doctor.  
 Tweedy’s narratives speak to the importance of understanding ethoi as contextual and 
culturally generated. In particular, patients may bring prejudices that label minorities or 
women as inferior, and therefore less qualified to do their job. Even the institutions that 
verify credentials and those responsible for preparing and vetting future experts may promote 
such racist ideologies, whether intentionally or not. We may recall, for example, the professor 
who initially made Tweedy feel like an outsider, like a lesser authority or an undeserving 
member of the medical profession. As Tweedy notes, although his race may have granted him 
access to the medical field (he claims that he would not have been accepted to Duke if he 
were not black), it failed to also provide him with the attendant ethos usually reserved for 
medical experts. A final requirement for an alternative framework for ethos generation and 
negotiation, then, must account for sociocultural factors that determine who will naturally be 
treated as experts, and who will have to work doubly hard to have their ethos recognized. 
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Feminist Ecological Ethos 
 As the previous recaps and analyses have argued, ethos haunts this project in that it 
haunts medicine and diagnosis. This is particularly true of a networked approach to 
diagnosis, as enlisting more actants into consideration will bring with it attendant conflicts 
regarding whose ethos matters most and why. Although previous chapters have emphasized 
ANT via Latour, I want to shift now towards a feminist ecological approach to ANT to 
consider how their conceptions of ethos might resolve, and productively complicate, the 
problems with ethos that this project uncovers.  
 The field of rhetoric has a complex relationship with ethos that can be traced back to 
at least the writings of Homer. According to Charles Chamberlain, “In most writers of the 
fifth century B.C. and later, ēthos can usually be understood and translated as ‘character.’ In 
earlier writers however ‘character’ is often an impossible or at best a misleading translation, 
not surprisingly, since the word originally designates ‘the places where animals are usually 
found’ [or ‘animals’ haunts’]” (97). Such a definition responds to the Aristotelian tradition of 
defining ēthos as “moral character” or “the trustworthy character of a speaker as artistically 
created in a speech” (Kennedy 148). Aristotle, for his part, frames ethos as a necessary 
component of deliberation: “But since rhetoric is concerned with making a judgment . . . it 
is necessary not only to look to the argument, that it may be demonstrative and persuasive 
but also [for the speaker] to construct a view of himself as a certain kind of person and to 
prepare the judge” (112). For Aristotle, ēthos is a useful rhetorical tool that seeks to ingratiate 
the audience to the speaker in order to win their approval for a suggested course of action. 
This can be achieved by demonstrating good will or generating common ground, as Aristotle 
notes: “[I]t makes much difference in regard to persuasion . . . that the speaker seem to be a 
certain kind of person and that his hearers suppose him to be disposed toward them in a 
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certain way” (112).  Thus, Kennedy argues that although ēthos has come to mean “the 
projection of the speaker’s character,” Aristotle initially intended for the term to denote “the 
speaker’s success in conveying to the audience a perception that he or she can be trusted” (x). 
Aristotle’s approach to ēthos via generating trust and goodwill significantly places an emphasis 
on the relationship between speaker and audience, thereby setting the stage for critiques of 
the ways in which this relationship might be corrupted or exclusionary. In particular, 
Aristotle’s account of ēthos fails to account for marginalized populations whose forms of 
expertise have been dismissed and whose efforts involve seeking to change conversations 
rather than attain goodwill from audiences.   
 In contrast to the Aristotelian tradition, Chamberlain traces the ongoing 
development of ēthos’ meaning through alternative historical texts, beginning with Homer’s 
pluralistic use of ēthea (“the places where animals are found”) and location-based ētheios (“one 
who is found in a certain place”) (97). For Homer, the various forms of ēthos encompass “an 
arena or range in which the animal naturally belongs” (97). Such a belonging is innate or at 
least ingrained within the animals, since they experience distress when humans try to 
rehabituate them in a new environment. Writes Chamberlain, “the humans hope to change 
the horse’s habits by using hunger to make it regard the manger at home. But the power of 
habituation (eiōthōs) is too strong to be overcome. Homer emphasizes the horse’s joy . . . in 
order to show the power of habituation. The horse longs to be in his ēthea, feels pain at being 
locked away at the manger and joy upon breaking free” (98). This understanding of ethos 
points to a logic that defies logic, something that Chamberlain will pick back up later on in 
his piece (102). But before he does so, Chamberlain shifts to an analysis of Hesiod’s and 
Theognis’s poetry, where “ēthos is applied more widely and is used regularly in the singular,” 
attributed to humans rather than animals, and “used in a derogatory sense” (98). Ēthos 
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becomes, in their poetry, a title that indicates deceitfulness or false friendship rather than 
good character (99). Despite the suggestions that ēthos is innate or somehow deeply 
embedded in human and animal consciousness, Chamberlain credits Pindar with the 
question of whether ēthos “can be affected at all . . . Can one ‘change’ one’s ēthos?” (100). His 
tentative answer is yes, based on passages by Hesiod, Herodotus, and Sophocles, which 
suggest that women, barbarians, slaves, and children can evolve to possess more desirable (to 
Western white men) ēthea (100). He explains that their passages “suggest that the ēthos is 
susceptible to change, but only through a process of long association best done in childhood” 
(100). While Chamberlain fails to acknowledge it, the process might also be seen as a form of 
coercion, whereby those in power seek to change or “reform” the ēthea of those deemed 
inferior. 
  A final significant moment for ēthos can be located in the “political use of the word,” 
or its’ associations with “the peculiar characteristics which citizens of a polis acquire as part of 
their civic heritage” (101). Thus, ēthos can refer not only to an individual’s place of belonging 
but of a polis’. As Chamberlain explains, this collective “ēthē forms a kind of moral ambience 
which is peculiar to a certain polis and whose most important influence is upon the children 
of that place,” an idea that Aristotle in particular mobilized (102). Chamberlain finally sums 
up his review of ancient conceptions of ēthos, explaining:  
Like the pasturage which the horse calls its own, there exists a part of our 
being which is untouched by higher reasons of love or friendship or duty, and 
may come to light in a crisis . . . It is an apparently irrational or 
unaccountable entity which nevertheless follows a rational principle or 
principles of its own. To put it more suggestively, the ēthos has its own logos 
which is in a sense beyond the reach of logos. (102) 
 200
Chamberlain just stops short of identifying ēthos with phusis, thereby establishing it as a 
contradictory or contrasting concept to nomos, or the laws and customs that would try to 
habituate ēthos. 
 I begin by explaining this approach to ēthos at length because it powerfully introduces 
major themes of feminist ecological conceptions of the storied and multi-faceted term(s). In 
the “Introduction” to Rethinking Ethos: A Feminist Ecological Approach to Rhetoric, Kathleen J. 
Ryan, Nancy Meyers, and Rebecca Jones are careful to distinguish ēthos from ethos, noting 
that “The etymology of ethos, according to the Greek-English Lexicon compiled by Henry 
George Liddell and Robert Scott, is simply ‘custom’ and ‘habit,’ while the denotations of 
ēthos and its plural, ēthē, entail social, ethical, and located dimensions” (6). As such, ēthē 
becomes a compelling starting point for a feminist approach to understanding the 
development of authority or character that is social, respondent to power dynamics, and 
situated within particular contexts. In the “Preface” to the same collection, the editors 
conceive of their purpose for the book thusly: “We are compelled . . . to ask how else have, 
do, and might women compose their ethos? By focusing on ethos, we highlight a complex 
issue: the cultural, historical, and social positions that restrain and invigorate women’s 
rhetorical prospects as agentive rhetors” (vii). The writers anticipate a shift away from “male 
orators in positions of power” and toward multi-faceted, disruptive ethos generation, and 
that women offer particularly powerful examples of how best to enact these shifts due to their 
long history of marginalization (4-5). They furthermore argue that “By naming women’s 
ethos practices as feminist ecological ethoi, we shift away from an Aristotelian framework 
toward a conceptualization of women’s ethos that accounts in new ways for interrelationality, 
materiality, and agency” (viii). Feminist ecological ethoi, located “at the confluence of 
ecological thinking and feminist rhetorical thinking” seeks to challenge and “shift the 
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dominant discourse” rather than cultivate a socially acceptable ethos (2). Ryan et. al argue 
that “Common, normalizing ethoi (i.e. Mormon woman, mother, angel of the house, whore, 
bitch) ascribed to women do not lend themselves readily to public speaking. As such, new 
ethoi must be created and defined to push against these socially determined ethoi” (2). 
Indeed, feminist interventions against normalizing ethoi include work by radical feminists 
such as Andrea Dworkin, who “cultivate[s] a productive, confrontational ethos by rejecting 
social convention in her rhetoric, embodiment, and relationships” (Palmer-Mehta 66). 
Rather than seeking to appease her audience and generate feelings of good-will, she instead 
“commanded the floor with force, scarcely pausing to justify her presence. Rather than 
adapting to the audience or making conciliatory gestures, she called on them to adapt to her 
way of thinking" (66). In this way, Dworkin exemplifies the value of habit-disruption by 
“engaging in a strategic reversal . . . mov[ing] the burden of cultivating an appropriate ethos 
onto her audience,” rather than seeking to prove her own (67). Thus, feminist ecological 
ethos can be disruptive and responsive to power structures that oppress and exclude some 
from civic participation. Rather than seeking to generate goodwill between a rhetor and 
audience, ethos might be mobilized to confront an audience and productively shift the 
relationships among actants.  
 Another key tenet of a feminist ecological approach to ethos is its multiplicity, 
fluidity, and emphasis on nonlinear relations. “Feminist ecological ethoi,” Ryan et. al write, 
“open up new ways of envisioning ethos to acknowledge the multiple, nonlinear relations 
operating among rhetorics, audiences, things, and contexts (i.e. ideological, metaphorical, 
geographical). This theorizing recognizes all elements of any rhetorical situation as shifting 
and morphing in response to others, generating a variety and plurality of ethos, or ethoi” (3). 
This approach recognizes the ways in which context influences ethoi, which must shift in 
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response to new audiences and purposes for speaking. Similarly, it acknowledges the extent to 
which any individual or polis might possess multiple ethoi: as a doctor, scholar, researcher, 
and writer, and mother, for example, a woman might have a variety of ethoi that inform her 
identity and expertise. This awareness of the multiplicity of ethoi is a result of the 
marginalization of women, for Ryan et. al, who note that “marginalized rhetors have a keen 
sense of the burdens of ethos negotiation” and the tools through which they might “alter 
ecosystems” (3). As an example, we might recall Tweedy’s reflections on the way race affected 
his medical practice; as a black male doctor, he was expected to be able to seamlessly switch 
from his expertise as a doctor to expertise on sports, particularly basketball, to an 
understanding of issues affecting minorities—both social and health-related. Thus, taking a 
multiple or fluid approach to ethos should not encompass an uncritical embrace of what can 
oftentimes become a burden for marginalized populations to “prove themselves” as experts 
due to their status as non-white, non-male, non-hetero, and non-Western rhetors. 
 Finally, a major shift that Ryan et. al instigate within conceptions of ethos involves a 
move away from location and towards relationship. Crediting Craig R. Smith with the idea 
that “ethos dwells not just at specific locations but also in the speaker and audience 
relationship,” Ryan et. al are careful to note that their conception of relationships includes 
both human and nonhuman actants (7; Smith 15-6). They begin to identify the necessity of 
the “ecological” component of their definition by noting the responsibility we bear to not 
only other humans—particularly marginalized populations—but to the earth, environment, 
and nonhumans, such as animals. “Ecological thinking,” they clarify: 
is about a way of living in the world oriented toward cohabitation; it 
acknowledges the dynamic construction of relationships within and across 
location and between people as constituting knowledge and values. Ethos is 
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neither solitary nor fixed. Rather, ethos is negotiated and renegotiated, 
embodied and communal, co-constructed and thoroughly implicated in 
shifting power dynamics. (11) 
Ethos, too, is not a self-serving endeavor that seeks to cultivate one’s own authority; instead, 
in Ryan et al.’s hands, it becomes a way to “encourage the flourishing of all people” and take 
responsibility for the work we do (11). In this sense, the authors draw on Lorraine Code’s 
Ecological Thinking: The Politics of Epistemic Location, where she conceives of habitat and 
ethos within a feminist framework of responsibility. She posits that “the transformative 
potential of ecological thinking can be realized by participants engaged in producing a viable 
habit and ethos, prepared to take on the burdens and blessings of place, identity, materiality, 
and history, and to work within the locational possibilities and limitations, found and made, 
of human cognitive-corporeal lives” (5).  The responsibility, for Code, resides with any 10
rhetor who seeks to affect the ecology of which he or she is apart. “He/she,” she elaborates, 
“is self-critically cognizant of being part of and specifically located with in a social-political 
world that constrains and enables human practices, where knowing and acting always 
generate consequences” (5). Because of the “worldly implications” of ethos cultivation and 
renegotiation, then, feminist ecological ethoi emphasizes relationship to stress responsibility 
between actants who must negotiate (Ryan et al. 11).  
Feminist Ecological Ethos and Diagnostic Networks 
 In their “Introduction,” Ryan et al. stress the strength women have historically 
demonstrated their expert cultivations of ecological ethoi, but they also argue that “any 
 See also Donna Haraway’s “Situated Knowledges” for another important feminist 10
approach to responsibility and ecological thinking.
 204
marginalized rhetor can employ ecological ethoi” (4). While not all actants within the 
medical and diagnostic networks that have been covered in this chapter are marginalized, I 
want to briefly explore the value of such a model for diagnostic ethoi construction and 
negotiation before I conclude this chapter.    
 First, feminist ecological ethos offers an alternative approach to ethos generation that 
can be relational and fluid. As previously mentioned, we should be wary of efforts to embrace 
fluidity to the neglect of interrogating ways in which it can be used to disempower some who 
will be expected to exceed expectations due to their race, gender, sexuality, ability, or 
ethnicity. However, the strength of such an approach is its recognition of the constantly 
shifting parameters of expertise and the challenges of ever attaining enough authority to 
make declarations about human bodies, which are ever-changing and ultimately 
unknowable. The value of fluid ethos within diagnostic contexts might be its insistence that 
ethos must evolve just as networks do, and that actants can pool expertise to generate 
solutions, rather than relying on individual knowledge. While we might all appreciate a 
world where doctors became certified with perfect knowledge of all medical conditions, a 
more realistic approach to ethos generation would recognize the limitations of expertise and 
the vitality of relational approaches to diagnosis. 
 Furthermore, just as Mol fails to account for the meta-level of networked deliberation 
beyond hospital contexts, she also fails to suggest a method for challenging the status quo. 
Feminist ecological ethos, on the other hand, acknowledges the significance of and offers 
suggestions for generating ethoi that challenge and reshape networks. Rather than simply 
accepting the network’s project and working within its confines, actants must be capable of 
working to change the conversation altogether by cultivating ethoi that reframe relationships 
amongst actants. This approach offers possibilities for responding to diagnostic networks that 
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fail to account for the sociocultural conditions that shape them, and it also shifts creative 
power to the rhetors, who might cultivate forms of ethoi that will be most effective rather 
than limiting their ethos construction to the pursuit of goodwill. 
 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, feminist ecological ethoi challenge me to 
speak to the meta-level of my own project. While my primary focus for this project was 
broadening the scope of diagnostic networks in hospital settings, feminist ecological ethoi 
projects highlight the significance of paying attention to the broader scale problems facing 
healthcare networks now and in the future. We must learn to recognize the contributions of 
ecological and non-human actants—not only because to do so is ethical and humane, but 
because it might help us actually preserve and enhance human life. Our ethical obligation to 
protect the environment and care for animals intersects with our responsibility to create a 
world that is inhabitable for all humans—particularly those who are rendered most 
vulnerable by the effects of climate change and other global atrocities, such as deforestation 
and the over harvesting of seafood. These problems will have real effects on human lives and 
human health in the decades to come, and they require networked intervention to the same 
degree—if not more—that a patient requires a diagnosis.   
Conclusion 
 Part of the reason why I chose to focus on ethos in this, the final chapter of my 
dissertation on diagnostic networks, is because of its significance to decision making. 
Diagnosis hinges on decisions made not by medical experts alone, but by actants who are 
thrust together by chance, disease, and constraints of time, location, and finances. Since 
ethos is a mobilizing force that generates action on the part of actants, then, its alternative 
framing seems a significant way to close this project, which has attempted to shift the ways in 
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which diagnostic communication and deliberation gets framed rhetorically. More specifically, 
reconsidering ethos is an important final step towards resituating diagnosis because it deals 
with the realm of the possible, opening up pathways for intervention and responsibility. 
According to Smith, “ethos informs decision making, thus moving a people to their 
potentiality” (4). Additionally, “The teleological dimensions of ethos lead the speaker toward a 
higher potential, one capable of advancing a cause, uplifting an audience, and guiding a 
society aright, one that can improve the mutual dwelling place” (15-6). Thus, ethos 
generation and negotiation offers what perhaps few other concepts within this project can: a 
chance to make a difference. 
 Diagnostic communication is bound up in specialized language and isolated in 
settings far removed from the average American—unless, of course, they are being diagnosed 
themselves or are witnessing the diagnosis of a friend or family member. However, there are 
two major ways in which we might intervene to positively affect diagnostic networks. First, 
in “The Empathy Exams,” Leslie Jamison invites readers to enter the strange world of medical 
acting. Jamison works hourly as a pretend patient, testing medical students on their 
knowledge, diagnostic accuracy, and—most interestingly—their ability to empathize. 
Although she primarily describes her job as getting paid to “play sick,” she also highlights the 
rhetorical elements of the scripted interactions:  
You get a script and a paper gown. You get $13.50 an hour. Our scripts are 
ten to twelve pages long. They outline what’s wrong with us—not just what 
hurts but how to express it. They tell us how much to give away, and when. 
We are supposed to unfurl the answers according to specific protocol. The 
scripts dig deep into our fictive lives: the ages of our children and the diseases 
of our parents, the names of our husbands’ real estate and graphic design 
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firms, the amount of weight we’ve lost in the past year, the amount of alcohol 
we drink each week. (1) 
Jamison and her fellow actors are supposed to evaluate medical students based on their 
identification of “crucial pieces of information” within the patient’s narrative (2). For 
example, the “STD Grandma” character is supposed to “hid[e] behind her shame like a veil” 
for having “cheated on her husband of forty years [with] a case of gonorrhea to show for 
it” (3). Jamison explains wryly, “If [the student] asks the right questions, [STD Grandma 
will] have a simulated crying breakdown halfway through the encounter” (3). In less 
emotionally intense interactions, the student might get points for uncovering previous drug 
abuse, medication allergies, or past trauma—such as the death of a close friend or relative. By 
piecing together the clues and deciphering the actor’s unspoken symptoms, students are to 
determine the correct diagnosis. In this way, the first part of the exam ask students to do, in a 
contrived setting, what they will do in the future as they work with patients: collaboratively 
construct narratives about which the patient herself may not be totally conscious. 
 While the end goal of the first part of the exam is for students to correctly identify 
and diagnose the presenting problem, Jamison labels the second half of the checklist “the 
empathy exams.” Jamison reveals that “Checklist item 31 is generally acknowledged as the 
most important category: ‘Voiced empathy for my situation/problem’” (3). Some students 
fail this test by aggressively attempting to “wrestl[e] [Jamison] into eye contact” even though 
her script tells her to avoid it (4). One student fails by forgetting the pretense of the situation 
and asking in-depth follow-up questions about her fake hometown “beyond the purview of 
the script” (4). Others technically fulfill the test’s requirements by adopting a mechanical 
method for expressing empathy: “that must be really hard [to have a dying baby], that must be 
really hard [to be afraid you’ll have another seizure in the middle of the grocery store], that 
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must be really hard [to carry in your uterus the bacterial evidence of cheating on your 
husband]” (4-5). Jamison finds, through her tests, that empathy cannot be reduced to an 
item on a checklist; it involves attunement to the other person and her unique needs. But 
perhaps more importantly, empathy is interactional—“we’re holding the fiction between us 
like a jump rope,” Jamison writes—and intentional (23). Jamison explains, “Empathy isn’t 
just something that happens to us—a meteor shower of synapses firing across the brain—it’s 
also a choice we make: to pay attention, to extend ourselves” (23). Rather than viewing 
empathy as a kind of innate impulse that medical students must learn to reveal to patients, 
Jamison instead argues that empathy is a choice they must make, an intentional positioning 
of themselves as open and responsive to the patient’s needs.  
 Ultimately, Jamison argues that empathy is not only interactional; it involves, too, an 
acceptance of one’s limitations within the interaction. “[E]mpathy isn’t just measured by 
checklist item 31,” she writes: 
Empathy isn’t just remembering to say that must be really hard—it’s figuring 
out how to bring difficulty into the light so it can be seen at all. Empathy isn’t 
just listening, it’s asking the questions whose answers need to be listened to. 
Empathy requires inquiry as much as imagination. Empathy requires 
knowing you know nothing. Empathy means acknowledging a horizon of 
context that extended perpetually beyond what you can see: an old woman’s 
gonorrhea is connected to her guilt is connected to her marriage is connected 
to her children is connected to the days when she was a child. All this is 
connected to her domestically stifled mother, in turn, and to her parents’ 
unbroken marriage . . . Empathy means realizing trauma has no discrete 
edges. Trauma bleeds. Out of wounds and across boundaries. (5) 
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In some ways, Jamison’s ultimate conception of empathy transforms the two checklists into 
contradictory tests: one measuring the medical students’ expertise and the other measuring 
their willingness to be uncertain. Jamison speaks to the challenging role physicians play as 
they must not only demonstrate their competence but also their humanity through their 
willingness to accept what they do not know. Part of this process involves, as Jamison points 
out, recognizing that patients are never singular just as illness itself is never singular. 
  Jamison’s presentation of the multiple, sometimes conflicting identities doctors must 
cultivate speaks to the multiple ways in which we might intervene within networks: 
cultivating empathy for the people who require care. While this might seem like an obscure 
invitation to care for others, I want to suggest that caring for others is never a trite endeavor. 
As Jamison reminds us, it is always intentional, always slightly uncomfortable, and it 
demands of us a willingness to listen to what another person might need or want. Caring for 
others in diagnostic network contexts could involve, for example, advocating for the 
vulnerable populations who might be affected by efforts to cut access to affordable 
healthcare, such as those with preexisting conditions who might have been denied insurance 
coverage if the American Healthcare Act had passed. This might involve listening to a friend 
who has been diagnosed with a disease or who has just learned that she is at risk for a disease. 
This might mean working compassionately with students who are affected by disease, who 
live with daily uncertainty, and reforming course policies to serve such students. It might 
even mean educating oneself about how to respond empathetically when a person needs 
support due to a recent diagnosis—beyond saying “that must be really hard.” Empathy is 
hard, but it is nonetheless a responsibility that emerges through diagnostic networks; if we 
are all connected via networks of health and disease, then we all bear a responsibility to care 
for each other and participate within such networks as global citizens but also human beings.  
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 Furthermore, a second major way in which we might intervene within healthcare 
networks involves larger scale change—one that moves beyond the realm of the 
interpersonal. In order to illustrate the scope of our responsibility as global citizens, who each 
have a small but important role in shaping public health networks, I want to quote 
Quammen’s list of the ways in which humans bring pandemics upon themselves at length, as 
it speaks to both the complexity and necessity of our intervention and response. He positions 
citizens as the secondary respondents to disease crises—just after expert public health official 
and scientists—and therefore charges them with the responsibility to be informed and active. 
He elaborates: 
The experts have alerted us to these factors [that cause disease] and it’s easy 
enough to make a list. We have increased our population to the level of 7 
billion and beyond. We are well on our way toward 9 billion before our 
growth trend is likely to flatten. We live at high densities in many cities. We 
have penetrated, and we continue to penetrate, the last great forests and other 
wild ecosystems on the planet, disrupting the physical structures and the 
ecological communities of such places. We cut our way through the Congo. 
We cut our way through the Amazon. We cut our way through Borneo. We 
cut our way through Madagascar. We cut our way through New Guinea and 
northeastern Australia. We shake the trees, figuratively and literally, and 
things fall out. We kill and butcher and eat many of the wild animals found 
there. We settle in those places, creating villages, work camps, towns, 
extractive industries, new cities. We bring in our domesticated animals, 
replacing the wild herbivores with livestock. We multiply our livestock as 
we’ve multiplied ourselves, operating huge factory-scale operations involving 
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thousands of cattle, pigs, chickens, ducks, sheep, and goats, not to mention 
hundreds of bamboo rats and palm civets, all confined en masse within pens 
and corrals, under conditions that allow these domestics and semidomestics 
to acquire infectious pathogens from external sources (such as bats roosting 
over the pig pens), to share those infections with one another, and to provide 
abundant opportunities for the pathogens to evolve new forms, some of 
which are capable of infecting a human as well as a cow or a duck. We treat 
many of those stock animals with prophylactic doses of antibiotics and other 
drugs, intended not to cure them but to foster their weight gain and maintain 
their health just sufficiently for profitable sale and slaughter, and in doing 
that we encourage the evolution of resistant bacteria. We export and import 
livestock across great distances and at high speeds. We export and import 
other live animals, especially primates, for medical research. We export and 
import wild animals as exotic pets. We export and import animal skins, 
contraband bushmeat, and plants, some of which carry secret microbial 
passengers. We travel, moving between cities and continents even more 
quickly than our transported livestock. We stay in hotels where strangers 
sneeze and vomit. We eat in restaurants where the cook may have butchered a 
porcupine before working on our scallops. We visit monkey temples in Asia, 
live markets in India, picturesque villages in South America, dusty 
archeological sites in New Mexico, dairy towns in the Netherlands, bat caves 
in East Africa, racetracks in Australia—breathing the air, feeding the animals, 
touching things, shaking hands with friendly locals—and then we jump on 
our planes and fly home. We get bitten by mosquitos and ticks. We alter the 
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global climate with our carbon emissions, which may in turn alter the 
latitudinal ranges within which those mosquitos and ticks live. We provide an 
irresistible opportunity for enterprising microbes by the ubiquity and 
abundance of our human bodies. (515-6). 
As Quammen’s intersectional analysis of the problems caused by human actants within global 
health networks illustrates, suggestions for responding within such networks will require 
complex, collaborative, and multi-layered efforts. In some ways, the problems Quammen 
presents might seem insurmountable because of the sheer volume of actants involved. 
However, Quammen’s analysis also demonstrates the significance of a networked approach, 
since within both ANT and ecological models for understanding global health networks, 
relations between actants always stand open to revision and intervention. Thus, in my closing 
remarks, I want to make several suggestions for how concerned actants might begin to take 
action and reshape public health networks while we still can.  
The first steps for reshaping public health networks via public policy and 
environmental ethics entails shifting towards a networked, relational view of such practices, 
as problems facing the environment also affect animal habitats, human health, and the 
availability of crucial resources. In some ways, this first recommendation speaks to the 
limitations of ANT-based approaches to networked problems, as the larger social 
conversation about global health concerns tends to isolate each problem and cultivate 
individual responses. Future research should seek methods for mobilizing ANT for public 
audiences and facilitating collaborative problem-solving not just within higher education but 
within the public at large. Sonia Shah reiterates the importance of a global, relational view of 
health as she stresses the importance of ensuring that all countries and hotspots for disease 
are adequately prepared to monitor and respond to outbreaks. In particular, she finds the idea 
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that past prevention methods will work for future diseases dubious at best. “Fixing the 
present surveillance system is no small task,” she writes, “it will require easy and affordable 
health care for people everywhere. A network of clinics, staffed with health-care workers 
trained to recognize and report new pathogens, could do the trick” (212). Shah posits that 
disease networks are global constructions, and that we ignore this to our own detriment. 
Rather than simply concerning ourselves with affordable healthcare, treatment, and 
medication in the United States, Shah reminds us that we have to look beyond our own 
borders to foster effective healthcare and disease surveillance systems globally in order to 
prevent disease outbreaks and respond effectively to them. Howard Markel echoes Shah’s 
observations, arguing that “the human race is simply too interconnected to rely on walls or 
borders as public health safeguards” anymore (208). Diseases slip through barriers—from 
person to person, animal to person, skin to cells, and country to country. They travel 
unchecked through security checkpoints at airports all over the globe. And the diseases 
spread, sometimes invisibly and always randomly. Thus, global health infrastructure must 
reflect the complexity of these diseases, which slip into bodies and countries and leave 
devastating statistics in their wake. 
Furthermore, we must educate ourselves about the global and individual practices 
that currently threaten to perpetuate violence against the environment and thereby 
undermine the health of vulnerable populations worldwide. This aspect of intervening in 
global health networks might involve enlisting more concerned actants who are unaware of 
threats to global health or environmental destruction—thereby educating them about the 
problems that exist. However, a more important approach seems to be educating everyone 
about the ways in which they can combat such consequences within their own networks. For 
example, making the personal choice to only consume antibiotic and hormone free meat can 
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help undermine an industry that pumps medications into animals that humans consume, 
often with very little thought (if any) about the consequences of this process. While I am not 
advocating for this decision as a complete solution, I do want to commend the thought 
behind it; only by seeking to understand the local and global impact of our actions can we 
make ethical choices.  
This emphasis on educating ourselves and others about global risks for disease, and 
human causes of pandemics and disease outbreaks, means that we must continue to grapple 
with a challenge that has faced public health officials since at least 1892: we tend to forget 
about public health infrastructure so long as Western countries remain relatively untouched 
by contagious disease. Howard Markel clarifies, “[W]e continue to grapple with the essential 
paradox of public health . . . when the system is working effectively [at least for those in the 
West], it is a silent venture and there are relatively few outbreaks of disease. These very 
successes lead most of us down a complacent path of false confidence, apathy, and 
assumptions that the endless dance is over” (210). Markel insists that while “‘Public health is 
purchasable,’” in that we can fund healthcare and vaccinations for the world’s vulnerable and 
poor populations rather than paying for weapons to fight them and walls to isolate them, “it 
is an investment that works best when purchased in advance rather than paid out as each 
crisis arises” (213). Failing to adequately communicate the relational and networked nature 
of diseases can mean that we only respond—and demand response on the part of our 
government through the allocation of resources—once a crisis is already underway. Markel 
also highlights the importance of individual contributions to collective problems when he 
personalizes the response that everyday citizens might take: “Sachs and his colleagues have 
estimated that if every person living in a high-income nation today denied him-or herself the 
luxury of one movie ticket and a bag of popcorn each year, the control of infectious killers 
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such as AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis could be easily funded at the levels recommended by 
the United Nations” (213). By recasting networked relations as a series of informed choices, 
we might encourage the thoughtful consumption and allocation of resources at the local 
level, which might ultimately inspire national and global policy reform. One of the key 
arguments of this project, then, is that failing to see that disease networks always encompass 
global actants will have deadly consequences.    
Finally, we must interrogate actants within public health networks, hold them 
accountable, and protest their efforts when they fail to support vulnerable populations. We 
must advocate for the reshaping of networks when they fail to adequately meet our 
healthcare needs. In this sense, recent protests at town halls held by conservative politicians 
over the attempted Obamacare repeal highlight the power of concerned actants holding those 
in power accountable. Ultimately, the Obamacare repeal was unsuccessful at least in part due 
to fears, on the part of conservative politicians, that they would not be re-elected if they 
failed to heed the concerns of those they represent. However, the success of protestor efforts 
in relation to dangerous healthcare legislation has failed to translate into successful response 
to Trump’s proposed EPA budget cuts. In “I Ran George W. Bush’s EPA—and Trump’s Cuts 
to the Agency Would Endanger Lives,” Christine Todd Whitman claims that Trump’s 
proposed 31 percent decrease in EPA funding—it “would stand to lose approximately one-
third of its total budget”—will have serious and permanent effects on public health (n.p.). 
For example, Whitman cites Trump’s halving of the Clean Air Act’s budget as a particularly 
dangerous decision, since “A 2013 Massachusetts Institute of Technology study reported that 
roughly 19,000 more people die prematurely from automobile pollution each year than die 
in car accidents” (n.p.). The budget will also “reduce funding for the Great Lakes Restoration 
Initiative, or GLRI, by more than 90 percent” even though “The Great Lakes are the largest 
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surface freshwater source in the word . . . provid[ing] drinking water to approximately 40 
million people in the United States and Canada” (n.p.). Thus government regulations of both 
air and water pollution will be significantly diminished, likely resulting in heightened health 
complications and even death in the short term. Long term effects, of course, will include 
further depletion of the ozone layer and the contamination of precious freshwater resources. 
However, these structural risks that will affect human health (not to mention the 
environment and animals) fail to generate the same kind of outrage and responsiveness as 
proposals to nix Obamacare precautions that provide coverage for the poor and protect 
Americans at risk for disease.  
Within this landscape—of an inescapable future haunted by a pandemic that will kill 
millions of people worldwide—the good news is that public health networks are already 
mobilized. We must support and add to the ongoing efforts of such organizations at the 
national and local level. We need to contribute our own resources of time, money, and 
energy to collective efforts to ensure effective worldwide healthcare, and we need to pressure 
our elected officials to do the same. We must, ultimately, learn to do what doctors do: move 
beyond the diagnosis of a problem and towards deliberation about what to do next. 
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